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Instead of nMunich11 the wol.'•d fiYal ta" has become in 
some quarter•s the synonym for am')easemellt and :i.nternat:tonal 
sk:ulldu.ggery.l Th.ase foal:lngs ware in evidence long be.fox•e 
anything was known <:>f the basis ol' most of the pr·<Hwnt-day 
to be gene1'l>al when th£;) seo:r•et agreement of tho United States 
to Russia's ck~mo.nd fox· three votes in tb.e proposed Un:ttod 
Nations, in r>etur•n !'or t;h:PE:H} votes for the u:n:ttad fJ't;atoa 
if we so des :trod, 11 leaked out." It was wondered whoth.E:)r 
other secret agreements were ma.do also. 1.l:his was not a 
v:tolent re.act:ton; it was just thought ·that all agr•eement;s 
ought to he knovm.2 'l'he cx•:I.ticism of' th:ls was also partly 
based on the absurd:lty of' ext~a votes i'or Hussia and the 
United States. 
Af'tex• this cr:tticism resultlng frcm1 tho voting ag:eee-
mol1't1 Secrr~tary of Statf~ }'}dwal.">d R. Ste'l:;t:t.n:tus f'el·t :tt ne-
cet3Sfll"Y to swear~ in April, l94f), ppesumnbly with. Pr•esident 
Rooaeve1.1;' s knowlt~dg<1>, trw.t thex~e were no more secret 
----------------
1 Iial:la hl. Zacho.riatJ, 11 ~l'he Innide ~>tory of YaliAJ.," 
United Nations World, III (January, 1949), 12 • 
































agreE,menta mnde €it Yalta <~.z.c.ept milita!"y ones.- But in 
l',eb:r•uary, 1946, the next Sec;petal•y o1~ State 1 J ttraos F'. 
Byrnes, released wha:l.i he swore w~ul ·~alt~• s last see:;:>ot 
a long time because of' u.lloged mi11 tary eona1del"&tions, 
2 
but :l.t was Vel-vy poli·t:toal; it was the Iilar gastern agreemetlt.-
And then twelve days a.fter Byrnes gav~;; what he said was 
the last fH'3CJ:>et agr~;)ememt, the New ·york ~1 inHHl correspondent 
-~ O!f ...... .......,..a ...,.,., .. ~,~,. ..... 
at Home, Herbe:t>t L. lVIatth<ilws; wrote3 that nan unimpeaol'l...a.ble 
sourcen had seen the tex·t of a secrei.1 agreement;; by vth:i.oh 
noosevelt a:n.d ChurchlJ.l had. comudtted the United States 
tutd :&:ngland to repatria.te l>:r f'Ol"Ce a.J.l of those who cUd 
not want to return to the :b ... f.o:mnex• borne s in Soviet ter~i tory. 
Nlatthevm wrote: 
Britain. and ·t;ho Un:t1:;ed St~tes [w(:)re pledged] to cons:l.der 
as Russian cittzens all those who left the Soviet Union 
after 1929 and to send baclr: to present Hue.s:lan tcn: .. ~'i.,. 
tot .. y those elaimed aa eiti.ze:n.a by Moscow, Vatiea.n. sources 
said. 
Although tho United States and, Britain made no such pledge 
that is recorded, :J.t is significant th~1t so careful a re ... 
porter as Matt;hovn~, worklng with responsible church d1plo ... 
mats, should believe :tt. 
'11J::ds is not a.ll. I:n HHl6 a 1\use:tan Army Majo1•, 












and Brlt:lsh oottrt~.H3pondmrts wi1.y Mukden in MrinOhu.ria had been. 
str1l)IH'H;1 o:f: rrtt'l.i.~ex~ials. !le said tha:t; H.oosovel t, Chu~oh:tll, 
and .::>te.l:ln ha.d agreed to theme Hu.saif~'l.'l vEimove.ls at either 
Yalta or Berlin. Soc:r.ett'iiry of' Ste.te J3y-.Olles .said he kn.evl 
nothing of ·thi~3 (just as he lO:lt::;w noth.:lng of t;he li'ar Eastel"n 
agrso.tn@l'lta) end art~e:t"' corumltat1onrs <Mt11.ed. :tt all. Moscow 
t.hen claimed the C!iorrespottderrts made up th0 Gene:ral t s state ... 
ment. However~ a r..~o:n.d.on source close to the Vlora::tgn O:t'f:tce 
adm:ttt~H:1 a secret ol~1.u.se in. the Yalta agl .. e<:nnents tmdel"' which 
nust'iitm oiv:LJ.:tans i:n the wes·t; cou.ld 'be :r."epc~tria.ted aga.:i.nst 
the.i.r w;tll as prt:'rhend(:'H1 mombera of Soviet t-trma<..1 fox•ct:Hll .. 4 
( IJ.'here is no such &f:p:•eement mentionorl in the Yalta Pl:ootocoll: 
hut it :to ag~~.in s :i.gn:t.t' :tcan·t re(~ard1ng ·che 1~eact.fons to the 
Xa.lijfl, Con:f.'mJenoe 1;hat such. beliefs we1 .. e held .• ) Concluded 
the magaz:l.no !thm!5 in this oor.n1ectiont "E-vex>y day b:~:~cought 
a new one. An lnterru)..tional J:1Umor not a.s<Jribed tq Yalta 
was no more rQspeotnbl(1 th.un a res:tdon.t o:f Boston's Back 
Buy \Vhoee anca:wcors had not comG over on thfJ Mayflm·vex),. 11 
The:r~e vrere too ma.ny such rumors to men-tion all ot thorn. 
~'h.us, the word uY.al ta11 becamo assoc:i.ated in tho pub ... 
l:ta rni.nd w1. th secret and. rmmehow shrune.:f'ul agreements,. Soon 
after the war with J'~tpnn wns overli so,ooo men marched 
4 ~, XLVII (Mtu,.eh 1.1, 1946) t 27 • 






tl'D?ough a steady rain in Nan:t.dng, China, to protost in j~ront 
o:r th(~ Sov:tot Embassy aga:.tn;:rb th<.~ nop:tritual ntomic bomb;" 
the Yalta agreements., 6 l'Jifo t;taga.zil'le lttl:Jolod? the coni'$:!?---
enee the 11H1gh Tide of Appeo.sc.mon"!;tt of n.u.aaia b-,· tlv:. West. 
The Veter.ans of' li'o:t.r..e:tgn WarG h.ave domo..ndecl that all govax~l'l. .... 
rnent offic:tals, h.lg21 or low, :-..~c;;;pon$.:t'blr3 fo:::' th~ TJnited 
St.s:bes l1.aving been "sold out11 e;l.i Yalta ~;>e ~1 .. ren out; ot · 
ot:f!ice and pu.n:Lshe\1 to the q~te:;.1t ot ths ls.w.e H~rbert 
l!Qovor, in a speech in l95l, emphatically stated that "oe:t?;,. 
_ ta:.t.n eom1n:ttmenta were e11tarad 1~~to at 11'-:she:ran and Yalta. 
wh:J.ch sold the freed(Jm of h~lf a.. billion peoplo dowtl th.e 
r:tve:r•• u9 Guy Gabrielson, chail~.:na.n oi' the R~p"-lblioan Na ... 
tn.o.nnl Co1m11i ttoe, ca1lect i"or a c1enun.c:ts:tlon by th.:ts co1m:b:t,.y 
o.f th.e Yalta ng:rcer.:tentr; 't'Th.e:ro 1 he r'Jaid~ Ame:v!tca agreed to 
pern:d:b eolm:t'lu.n:i.stie governments :ln Yugoslav:ta and Pola:nd 
a:n.d to alJ ... ovr H'!.:t.s::tia to get Mr:t.nl'}hn:t::ts,, tb.eroby thro,tdng it 
open t;o Oh:t:nese Oom.m'~J,.n:tsts.lO 1 A-b OJ:l.e time the:t"e \Vas a reso .... 
ww-.. •. • at •· • " I'll 1li plid .. 1 .. , 
9 l.b:\5!• 1 A\tgust 31 1 lr>5l .• 
























ag:t1EH~monto shouJ.d no lr ..mgo:r be btnd:tng on the Un:t tad S·cates 
o£ Amel')ioa., ll and a olmilnl ... se:ntime:rti:> WftS volcr~~d :tn tlMl 
.. , t lO S0l'la e,.- ~ 
5 
Others) j·u.:.':l.t ao reoEmtl·~ .. , hava upheld the (}(Jtlff;renco., 
Wroto Averill He.:rr~.man~ 13 
A myth has gllown up that what Px>as:l.d¢1l'lt Hooseve:Lt and 
Px•ime M1nit:rter Ohu:r. .. chll:t did a:h Ye.;l.'tt\ h.as led ·to our 
postwar difficulties with the Boviet UnJ.on, This myth 
ia w:lthout foundo.i;ion :tn fn.ct. • • • 
Th~.? postwar p~oblema hav0 :t"Gsulted not t•:t:•om t:hr~ un-
d<fJrtrba..nding roached at Yalta 1mt from the fact that 1: 
Stalin tailed to ear:~?y OlJ.t i;hese u.:nderstand:tnga and 
fvmn a.ggt,.ossive n<~t:tox:w hy th(J Kl--e1ill:1n~~ 
Haymond .Sw1.ng lfirC.\tel4 that oomp1e·te viotox-y was won 
as $1. joint; enterpv:tse as a :ttf)sult of Yalta,. 
T!lis no <.ioubt is. ·t;hG f'l'~U.:tt b·s- v.rhioh Yal'l:;a should be 
judged first,, and },'Harhe.ps, i~:1nalJ:y. Onl:~t thona w:tl1:1ng 
·tio eapoua0 ·hhe idoe. that cotnpletie v:T.otory was a mlstake ( 
and that cc>tnpl"mn:ta~ with 11Ta~~i Germany wottlcl. htwe bean 
prof.el,.o.bl~:\\ o.va loc;5~<>o.l1y juat:t:e:tod. ln condemning the 
aoh:teVt7mcmtt~ or YaJ:ta• 
Crit;ics hf;\'ife nover shown# t/!eGeorge Eh~nd·~r l:H~ltaves, 15 
12 11Yalto. m:Htded. :Col? 8Cl%lP Hoa:p n u.s. New~> and 
.!2£.:t.2 a~o.4.~, XX.'tii (F1ebruar;r ~Jr~, 1952) I ztz-2~?-:--- -
l3 Aver•:tll i:1f. Harrima111 nOUl'~ 'Nar·t;tme Holationo with 
·the Sov:tet Un:ton and the Agx~eel:nent Heaohed at Yal tu, 11 The 
}.?JJ.?~rf!~~u .8! P.~at.e. !t?-.tl.~!.l'b XXV ( Sept~;mbex~ 3, 1951), ml. 
14 Raymond 8wi.ng, nwha.t Really Happene<'l at Yalta, n 
1fh€: New York .11:bil$S !{!ae;azine (Ptr,b:r>ua.l~"'r 20 .. ·1049), 10. 
~-~~-..-..~··"""'· ~~ ·.Y ~ 
----· .. --·. 
------~--
a por.~it:ton t;;o withhold $:1}0ept pcH~s:tbly tho 1<-ux•:lles. 11!he 
pos:ttio.n of' th.e Weste:r>r\ st&tesmon et Yalta, he bal:levet.l, 
O.:t."O viole1:1,t d:tfi'f;1:r.'cne~H!I of" l:'lp1.:n.ton :r•egnrdlng ·t.he e1uceens 
.I 
or ta:ilU1""~~ or tltO YeJ.t.!;\ C:ortf Al?el'l00 t It. 5.~1 th.€1 J!Ul":P-0 s~ oi~. 
6 
t.fh~.s atu.dy to asoa:J?t.ain t:ha role the Ynl1~£.._ &f:i;l"e~rnents pl~yed · 
:1n b·r:~lng1.n.g f1J>ou·t:; i".he. p:r•etiH3:n1:;wd.~y world eoni1lt:tons, w1 th 
p~.ll,t1~t:n.tlifl.l~ er:tplltHil.if~ be;i;n,g p:tac$d on F'rH.nklin D. 11c,osev£?~ltt a 
w~vie thr•ough the. mi:HH~ of m.a:n~r ... timE;~s pr•ej"udieed eormnen.t x~e­
gard:tng ·tho .a.gremnents tn Ol'Jclar to url->iv(S~ at an oh,iectivo 
We now kn.ow tha:b World \¥ar II did not hJ.:<~.ng the last ... 
:tng pea.o<:;) avo~Jon~) hop<~<1 ru1d ~\ssu.mad 1.t would bx-ing. 1l'h.e 
:ttseli~ in a seomi.ng l1..f'e and d~n:.t.th. struggleJ w:tth the Sovlet 
Un:ton m1d U;s Gatc:l11;cea, with both sidetJ a:f"ming i ... ox• a.:nr.>·ther 







problems for the United Sta,tes and the West in both Asia 
m d J~:t·opa.~ The Yalta Oonf'al'lenea was the culm:l.na·c:tng at1d 
most far ... l"eaching of all the confe~encaa of Roo$evelt, Stalin, 
and Olru.r•chill. At 'Ya.lta th0 ba.sie decisions we:\:'~) raade re ... 
gardi:ng wh~it th<.:HH) l.ead.e;vf-3' intended to <lo with ·the world 
that would. be :tn their hand.s as a 3.-1eault:. of thel:c• nationst 
dofeat of Get'lna.ny and ~rapan.. Thus, wllttt was decided at 
YaJ.ta :lt:J g1'~eatly oonn.aet~d with the state of the world to<:1a:y. 
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THill BACKGRotmD AND BlUGIJ)l'NING OF' r,rnn; 00Nlrl~l1ll!NC:Bl 
Yalta v.ras the -site ot' a conforenoo to discuss the 
J.ong ... de:t'ar:ved · p:r•oblemH::.l of' the postwar wox•ld.. It wa.t.~ in 
the natm ... e of a preliminary peace confer$nce and only :tn 
part conoerned. wi.th the proplems or a worlc1 or•gan:i.zation 
as discussed at J)t;un1?a:vtoxt Oalcs in the fall of 1944, r.l:1he 
a·tea.dtast pu;t. .. pq se o!' Rooaevel t had been ·bo keep a syE:rtera 
oi' inteJ~national security (the prospec·t;:lve United Nit'tiollS) 
sepa:tn'l.te .t?rom the -x)eaoe s<!)ttlementa ;tn .rgurope Md At!ia." 
He remeraberea. the u.lll'Ol"'tunate results of the Paris Peace 
Conference :tn 1~}19• where the delegntes tr:tecl to draw up f · 
a Lea.guo of No.:bions and decide ter:r:•i tor :tal and pol;t tical 
issue3 at the same tim(D. But the rapid unfolding of AlJ.:Led 
'· 
m111tf:l;cy eam,paigns right aftcn~ Dtunbar·ton Oaks made· :l.t nee ... 
essary tQ c;toal with certain tor:r."1.to1:•ial and pol:ltical prob-. 
(l,''J ...... 
lome in l~t..t.t'ope before a Un:tted Nations could be organized.,. 
wh:toh should h~w·c been submitted to a United 1Iationr1, were 













many years, wrote the following concerning the genesis of 
the Yalta Conference as far as Roosevelt was concerned. 
9 
As early as the middle of September, 1944, the 
President was contemplating a second conference witn 
Stalin and Oht1rchill. There were a. variety .of pressing 
problems which the President believed warranted such 
a ooni'erenoo and both Churchill and stalin w9re agr'ee-
able to tho conference, Churchill was, indeed, inais~ 
tent on it. The reasons were obvious. 
By this time we had agreed upon our full-out and 
final assault on the German citadel and yet there were 
no fimn agreements as to what was to be done with 
Ge1~any once she was defeated. The machinery of the 
European Advisory Oom1cil moved so slowly that it was 
quite possible to visualize the collapse of Germany 
without any plans or agreements having been made. 
Altho at Teheran Stalin had made a firm commitment 
insofar as soviet participation in tbe war ag~inst 
Japan was concerned, that needed to be clarified as 
to precise dates and the extent of Soviet participa-
tion. · 
On the political side there was no agreement as to 
reparations against Germany; the problem of dismember-
ment o:C the Reich was hanging fire; there was no agree-
ment as to zones; nothing as to whether or no~, we were 
going to encourage or discourage a central Ge;rman 
Government or, indeed, in what way the Allied ·.powers 
were going to utilize German machinery. The policy 
toward war criminals was stalemated; the earma~ks or 
trouble in Poland were already obvious--neither the 
eastern frontier nor the westGrn frontier was settled. 
Our whole policy towa:rd the F1a.r East needed a thorough-
going understanding1 particularly so far as the Soviet 
Union was concerned. We knew from Teheran that the 
Russians wanted oevtain things as a condition to their 
declaring war on Japan or, at any ra.te 1 they said '!;:hay 
wanted them and it was extremely important for the United 
States in particular, in view of our historic•relation-
ship with China; to protect China's interests, in til<We 
negotiations. Things regarding ·the Far East had to· be 
settled otherwise we migh·b find the three allies going 
their separate ways. The place of France in European 















wanted. a Zone of Occupation. She had not been given 
one. France wante~ to be on any Control Gooonission 
governing Germany. rrhe Allies had given her no asaur .. 
ances on this point. France wanted a olea.r ... out state ... 
ment regarding th$ .Allieat ambitions in the French 
Empire, particularly lndo•Ohina. France had good reason 
to believe tha.t l'resident Roosevelt was not entl:rusilastlo 
about roturning Indo ... China to the Empire, and were 
thoroUghly auspicious or the Allies on this point. 
France wanted ·to have a full part in world attairs and 
the decision on this ;point, i:f~ not made at an eax-ly 
date, would cause endless troubles. Furthermore, thex-e 
was the hs.ng-ove:r of the Du.mbarton Oaks United Nations 
Conference •.. Tho vot:t.ng prooed'tll?e had not been settled .• 
Thel'le seemed to be .no way to settle 1t except by the 
tb:t"ae heads of state getting together. ·. Indeed, all 
of the things I have ment1on$d would., in rny opinion, 
have been hopelessly delayed without a conference. 
The President • , • began to play with ideas about 
places tol' the conference 9.1'1d suggestecl a. wide variety 
of: l.ocs.tiona; none of which included Russia. I told 
the President • • • that there was l'lot a cht1noa of' 
getting Stalin out of Russia .at this t:tma in light of 
the military situation on Gertnanyt s eastern front •• • • 
And, because he felt it to his political disadvantage 
to indicate Hussia as the place of ·the l'll(7et1ng1 he 
postponed all discussion of' the place until after the 
alGation was ovox-. As soon as the el.ee.t1on had taken 
plac}o l saw Gromyko• the nuaa:tan Aml>assador1 and told 
h:tm tha.:b we wanted to al:"rttnge e. conf<Jire:n.ae,. • • • .A 
eouple of weeks later the President got e. messag$ f:t:•om 
stalin saying he undorstood the President was willing 
to go to the Or:tmeS, and augg(:))sting Yalta as a c1~sir­
able place .• • • • All of' the Prea1dent• s close advis ... 
ers were opposed to his going i;o Russia; most d.ic1 not 
like or tt'Ust the Russians anyway and could not un-. · 
dersta.nd why the President o:t'* tho United States should 
cart himself all ovex- the wol'~ld to meet Stalin. 'l'his 
argument aarx-ied no weight with rae. The all-important 
th:tng was '!;;o get the meeting. '!'here vras not a chance 
of getting that meetlng outside of the Orimea.2 









___ -- -_ -- ,_---"'-
ll 
!'l. 
He i"ol·b better lry th.o t;1.,mo he re::1.ched his destinat1.on. v 
This 1.s r.1e:nti.oned because of the following item. James 
1*'• Byrnes, an Ante:r.:lcan fldv.taer a.t Ya.l ta., ·wrote:4 u So f.tll"' 
a.a I could seet i;he P:residont had made little prapallat:J.on 
Tor the Yaltia Oonferenee.n B-yrnes W(·mt on to aay thnt the1 ... e 
was a. very oon:tplete .file of studies nnd ~eoon1manda.t:tons 
by thtill atato Dopr.1rtmen.t on. board. ship, bui.~ ·bhese wore not 
considered by Hooe.H'.Welt and his a(lvisero on ship • .;) Byrnes 
concluded:5 
I am sure tne failu1 .. a to study them. wh.:l.lo en route was 
due to the l?res5.den·b t s illness. And I um swe that 
only P~as:tdent Roosevelt;, with h.:ta intimate knowlerlge 
of the problerns. could have hal'l.dlad the tl:i:tuation so 
well with so llttle preparation. 
Mo,...eover, Harr-y Hopldns, who aooom.pa.nied Roosevelt 
to Yalta in h:ta usual capacity of adv:J.ser ~.lnd general handy 
mru1., was confined to his bed dt:tl"ing most of the conference, 
I •.' 
v1ith some meeti:n.gs by Y.l(;)CtiHHdt-y- being hold ::tn his bedvoom 
bGca.use of his ilJ.nesa, 5 
How much this laek of preparation influenced the 
4 Ibid., P• 23., 





















It 1t~ unfortunate, howe:rver1 that mox1e tho1,oue~1 p::.;•eparatiot~ 
w~u~ not mad.fJ for S\tOh an !m:po:t?tant eon:terence. 
oxl.d Bu1g£q•:te. and is ;;1:f.ne hr..t .. 'l'ldl'\ed m:tl.es south of !lioscow-. 
·k 
t::tva thm.teo.r.1.d eovon h'lm~<:;d. miJ.es ettst of Wc~ahin£rton, and· 
rsuild:tngs o!' t1llf:1 a~nc;tf.:mt Hu:sa:tan. r:~:t y1ero. l.~osor·t:; W01.?S 
e;"J?e~ttly drunager.l by ~;he Gol.?fil~lns 41 and ltussian <3oru~t#(1.ct:t.on 
mon. vt~shed in j-u:;;:t /l. £'ow weeks befo;l:~e the con.l'ox'otJ.c:-c to 
12 I 
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and most important meeting of the Big Th:t"~ee, being the first 
time they hac1 uH~t w1. th all or thc:tJ? foreign. m:tn:tstera ....... 
V, M, Molo·tov t Anthony Eden, ru.1d Eklwo..t~d H. Stett:bt:i.us of 
Rus~t:ta, Britain, and the United States :r~espaetively. This 
we.s also the f'1.rst time that the Ch~.ets of Staff of the 
Bi.g Three had exa.rn:tned thG:'I.r military positions and discus .... 
sed future military plans. It again was the first time 
that ·there weve agreera<:mts on postwar problenu~ as diatinot 
f~orn. vva~ aims and pu)?poaes. 7 
) 
'!'he oon..forenoe began o.t a t:bnilJ o:r an 1no:~.,.,eas1.ng 
numbe:v of Allied v:Leto;J;li~ls,. iJ.'he (fe:r.")man countf)r-of.fens:tve 
ht).d been s·boppea in the Ardennes Forest, and the Allies 
were p:t .. epo.r:tng the dr:tve aeroaa the Rhine. The Huaaians 
had begun the drive on the Ge;rntan eastel."n f:ro:n:tier. Wl"Ote 
Byrnes:B 
!}.be situation was t~uch tha-t;; at one time • •· • Roosevelt 
tm<l • • • Sha:U.n engaged :ln 1.$.ght ba.n:hol~ as to •,vhether 
the',Y' should wage:r that tb.e !led Al"'my wottld get to Berlin 
before th<ll American Army recaptUl'od Manila. 
At tho first oasa1on of the B:tg Tbre~, S1;.a11n [1ta.rted. 
the meet:tng by suggeating that rto(HH1'1f.elt open the conference 
and presid43 at it because:> H.('Josevelt "<'NW both Ch:i.ef' of.' State 
? EdWf.>\l"ld n. Htetttt.dU!:¥t HOC!S0V'(;.'llt aJ.'ld th!J nu.ss:te.ns 
(Garden City, New Yorlc: Double<1~y· and: "'C"or~f)iiiy7J.n~), 









and head o:r the govG:r:>n.ment wherean he and Ghu:cchill. were 
onl~· 1:wa.da of' govel.~l1lnent, and !Jl.,osident I\~llinan of .Huaaia 
ant1 King tlcorga of :llingln,nd wera not px•esent. Root1evelt 
~esponded that he was honored to open the oonf'erence.9 
'.Llhroughout th~ eon.t~arenoe the atmosphOl."6' was t·:t.lways 
eord:tal ...... full o£ oom:pliments, toa.sta1 and th.e like. F'or 
instance, at om~ dinner s·calin toasted Churchill, saying 
Churchill wae the bravest goverrunent f:Lgwe ln th<? w<n.;ld. 
14 
He said England was fighting Gexwany vthen. the :r.~est of Bul?ope 
was falling flat on its face bef'o:t'e H:ttle~, and he sa:tc1 he 
been SO impO:t."t&nt to the vwrld' f3 futu.~C;3 llistory. r£hEll'l 
Churehill toasted Stall11 as a mighty l(~ttdel, o:e a rdght·y 
oountry wh,ieh had tal~en the full shock of the Ger-man wa:r 
muohi:tl.e and h.ad ln"ok~n ·ch~ enemy's ba<.1lr- r:.md dr:l'ven 11he in,.. 
vadoros f':rtom its land. n(~ said he knew tlwt Stalin, in peace 
or :J.n Ymr, would. lead his people t3~om success ·to Sl..HHH~Stih 
No.:Jtt; Stalin too.atet.:t RootiHilVeltt ~~a:y:J .. ng that he, 8talin• 
and Ohttt'Ch:tll ht!td :t?t:J~lat:lvely simple docisions to make as 
·they had always been J~ightlng :i~ol~ the:tr vel'"Y ox:trrtence, 
"bt·t:t Hooseveli; hH.d had e. i::n:-oad<)r• concept :ton of l:ds natior1t s 
:tnterest. Even though hie countt->y was not c1:i.:~...,eotl~r lmper-
















~tcl:d.evetlO:nts. l~1ollowing th:ta,, Hoo~lEl'V'()lt said lie 'bo).:t<.1ved 
tJ::u:\t "bhs u·l:Jnmsphor•e:) lf:i:an l1.ke that-: of ll :t.,~ll~d-ly, and it was 
riot~ by say1,ne; t1'J.at he \'f(U! eonf:tdent tho proSElt1t all:hmce 
v.rould cont:tnue in peatJot:trno.l-0 
l5 
r- -










This chaptei~ w:lll be oonoe~nad with the~ agreemer.rbs 
ox.cept those :t"elo.t::ln.g to the P~al':> I!!o.st, will be handled in 
th~~ next cl:(-J.pter. The Pat• :mast agt-GH,)ments w:I.ll be di~H·mssed 
bo :tnclu.dod._ 
th0 nmrnlngn, The~J?e wa~ ·hh.em. a cornb1.ned meeting of ch:i.e:t's; 
--\ 
sr)mottrnes in{;ludilJ.g the H.tUis:l.ans. 11he :eor~;;dgn socretar:l.es 
woulc1 moot :t.n tho fm:·enoon, an.cl thcnx the B:lg ~:h:reo and their 
acltrj,sers VliOllld moot ln the af·bey•noon tabout 4~0o.l 
I. PHANOE 
l Will:ta.nt D. !ttf:HlhYi I \lift\!! 1'he~'l!e {New York: Ii!cGraw ... 
























h.t.\d. con:trH)uted 11 i;tl.e to 1:.ho wa:r:. He sa.ld t;hat Yugoslav:ta 
&.11.c1 I>oJ.a:n.d wo:t."'e ent1:1:tled to more com:ddora:b:ton thnn l?rance.2 
went home. lie fo:ti:'l that l?:r.ance ahot:tld ahr.,cr>'J t.he hu·r•den 
o.f contv.oll:tng Ge:Pnulny. {S 8ta1:i.n f.:trwJ.ly ugrocd to u F:rOileh 
zm1e of oconpat::i.on a~f.ter RoOfH:lV>Slt and Gl:.rt:trch111 ttrgod :tt, 
I 
but onl::r bccattse ·t;he l"':t .. enc'h zon.e wt-.. u:' to be taken ott.t or t'· 
the t£>Jn•:ttory mllotted to the Unlted State.:~ .m1.d. l~ngland. 4 
pB.tion r.;):n, t~he O~r:Auln Ct"lntrol Crwrmiss:tf;m wtH$ postponed until 
1 f.rl a ato:r.• dlil,te.v 
F'ran.oe being given a .~onG 1 l:mt I cannot torget that in 
this wa1.,. Franca opened, the gates to the enem:y.n7 
Churchill argued stx•ongly fo:t"' a place fo:t• Fr•~ce 
on the Commission. He sa.:td. that Jr:t•ance should. participate 
in questions concerning her zone.s 
18 
Roosevelt, ~t t'irst, agreed w5.,th Stalin in that 
ll'ro:nce should be given a ~one but sh.ould no·l.i be on the 
Cont~eol Commission. but f:tnally ~Iopk:l.ns persuaded Roos~velt 
to side with Ob.urchill, When H.oosevelt told Stalin he was 
go:l.ng ·bo support Ohu~chill, Htalin. ag:r•eod. it:umediatel:y to 
pertll~Lt r~"r'a.ti,CG to be o:n the Commission. 9 
The fi'l"'f.:mch vro:ro g:tv~m a zone in sout.hwest tle:t?marry. 
This zone was later combined w:l.th the British and Amex•:toan 
Council. ~ehus, at Yalta it was rocog.nized that lilrance was 
still an important wol"•ld };>ower and that 1.t shcruld have an 
important say :tn \"lO!>ld n.f'fu:t.rs~ 1-i'rant~e obt~J .. ilHHl as much 
as it cUd at ·b1'1.i~l confere:nct;\ lur.•gely he cause of ·cho 1~teady 
~1·;: .... ~ 
'7 !££. ,g~ tt.• 
8 J;.o..c,• ~· 





















as an n1d :tn. checking Germany. 
was Qnottgh confidence araong the Big Tlu"ee to br:tng thom 
togGther fol~ a specif~.c Cl:>ordinai.~ix:m of the utili to.ry situ-
ation .. lO They all knew that victory was wi·th:i.n their grasp, 
and they knew· :t t could <:}lu.de them onl~r through ·the:tr own 
discol,.d. All thr~{} were eager to infl:tct; blovm or1 the enemy 
a:q.d were therefore busy shelving 1asu(:).s th.H.t divided them.ll 
\ r.rhe main a:1m of the United States atid Br:l.tu.in during 
tho \1'-J'ar had been to lteep the Hu.ssian ar-my an c;;)f'feotij,ve 
fighting force against Germany by ah:tpping esaentiul sup-
plies and by coordination of military strategy. ~\ttch joint 
pls.ns .as had been rnt~de prevj.<>us to Yo.l ta were virtually 
aonf.ined to the ag~eemen·ts made at the time oi~ the Normuntly 
invas:ton on .June e, 1944. At tha:t time thet'e were s:t:z:t;r 
German cUv:ts:tons :tn France and the low oount~riea and one 
divisions on the ea~1tern f'ront. Aooord:t:ng to t;lu.~ 1J~eheran 
• , 't.,. , .... 
10 Steti;:Ln:t1:w1 212.• 2..!:!?.• t pp. 110 .... 111. 
ll I~ D~nltschcv, St:3;l:i,:J1!. A Poll t.i.?,P.~ £.tofttr.~J1,l~:ii: ( Ne·a 
















a.g~eem.e:t1.ts, Rues:la Vfll$ to sta'l?t an o!'fens:1:ve on J\me 22, 
19441 to t;le dovm th:ta l~azi fo:t-»ee. Hussia dld so .1.2 
Beoaur~e~ !lS prev:tousl:r mentioned, the rapid advance 
of the Allied arm:ies fot*ced eonaideration of both pol! tical 
and mili'ti{ar-.r p:roblems of' lllurope, HootH~velt, w:tth tb.e agree-
lnent o:t: the others. bege.n ·the eon:ferenoa by suggest:l.ng as 
a topic for discusslo11., What W(;} shall do with Gerrna.ny.13 
Hegt.~rding rtd.11tary operat~wns~ G~neral Georgo G. 
Ma:rshal1, United. States Army Chief of Sta.i'f, gave a concise 
summar:r of the operations on the western fr'<>nt and the :tm ... 
1.nediate future plan~ ther!:). It VIO.S obvious that he made an 
:tmp:roessi011 on the Huss1un repre.aent.atives by his e,;,tempor ... 
a.:neous ta:Ur~ A RU$S~.an nl:tlita::r.-y man urged e. apeeding up 
( 
o1? tho advance o±' Allied troops on the westelm fl ... ont and 
recom.memled tlU:tt Allied air action be tu.ll!:en to hinder Ge:roruruts 
from shit'ting ·troops from Italy,_ Nox•wa:y.,. and the western 
front to the ~Hastern i'ront.,.l4 However. the Russ:l.ana wetta 
Xront to d~tte and t)Xpected the wa.:.t" to be shortened gJ:•oatly 
if' \~'fe went on at the aa.me rate of :r.n:ogress.15 
12 Harriman, .O.P• .~.:ti?.•, pp. ::)71•3~"/2. 
15 E;rrnest .2.!2.• _c1;~., p. 24. 
14 El'liott:brlua., .9£• .~At.•t PP• 106 ... 107. 





8ta11~n agreed to thQ J\.mor:i.oan ttfH.? of a1rfiold.e :tn 
t~h.e Bttd~pest v!o:Ln:t•ty :ln Ol"'C.k~t· to bomb Germe,ny an.d agreed 
to pertnit a group o:e Arner:toan .e:Kpa:r~·ts to malto sur•vErye of 
21 
the of£eets of.' 1JOl1lh:l.!lg in the O:l(~eas liberated by the Heds 
in eastel:'n and southeastern X.!t:tJ .. "'<>tlO .16 Stalin also pr•omisod 
that Ame:r:tcan sc~1.ent1str3 oouJ..c1 v1~1:l t the Gal:>man . .subraar:tn.e 
e::tpe:~:-imentnl ~ltat:ton J.n Gdyn:ta as soon as the Russians cap ... 
tu:~:-ed it. However, as a result of later dif'.fe:venoaa ot 
op3.n:ton concerning the oX!gan1zation o:t• the Poliah govern~ 
men·t, Russ:tv. ~.n her d;tspleasu.ve t'ttJ.:t:'i.llod r1one ot these 
p:rom;tses.l7 l!"o~ instance, Huss!a, after IH~::t:>t1itti.ng r0p1~o ... 
santatives ot t~he .t\:i.l .. Got~s to lo(>l' ove:J? possible a:l:r' ba,ses 
so the Air OO'l"'PS evantuall·;y· dropped the :tssue beoause the 
need fo:r> them eventually d:l.St\I?P0&l"Gd,.l6 However, it would 
have baen val.uablG :t'or· tho :rntu~e mil:tta.ry pos:ttion oi~' the 
Un1.t~Hl states to l:m.ve been able to inspect the G·erman ::rub ... 
Un:i.ted states in the qua:tity of ;tts eubma:r:tnes. Aa it 
I ' .. I • '1iq, 1' I. ' * I 111io4 ~ ~ 
17 .ro:tul 11 11 Deana, 'l'h<~ S:t~?ttl~ Allin.rlce (New Ym;ok: 
1J:lhe Viking f'rees, 1947), p-;-1~ · ·. --
18 Stottln1us, .9l1' S!.~·, P• Sl.l .• 





But ·!:;he B:Lg ~tthl"'Oe c1:1.d lay plemEt to:r th~£> nontinur,.d 
t;tdvi:mce of thc:dr O.l"nt:i.os., It v.ras axmo1...trwed at the cloa(;; 
of' the conference that the~'le nd.l:ttary l:rtee·td:.ngs y;are u Bat-
closer ooo;:rdina.tion of th(1 ln1.1.:tt;r.:vy effort of. tho thre<) 
allies i:;han ever befQr·e t tf '11hi~~ J:>eport asnert~Z~d i)ut-ther 
'•that the Vr..)t';J olo~'H-; work:tng pa:c·tn.e:t~sh:tp a!uong the 't.!h'Pee 
s·~aff.s attained ~.t [Yalta w·ou.ld] re£-mlt .in shorten:tng t~h$ 
war, nl9 
go:tng ·t;o divide Germ~.il.ny 1n~to zones of occupation, w:tth F:x.~~mce 
to t)G given. on.e zone as 1uent:toned previouf!J.y,. Howc~ver, 
thQy d:ld not eve:n try to WOl.,l\: out the impl:tcat:tons of this 
d:tvis:ton of Ge:rma.ny into tout• zon.ea1 and they only bx•oaohed 
:l:t;a constitu.t:l.onal and ecorwm.ic aspects. 20 They t.1tated 
in the confer.enco report that to h<f}lp carl .. ;J' on this multiple ... 
power occupatton a 11 eoord:lnatad adm:tn:t~1tr•at:ton and cont:r•t)l 
has boen p:eovidad for 1.mder t;.ha plun tht•ough a central con ... 
trol com.m:tssion. 11 2l 
• !at ...... ~~~ ... ,.. 44 u.•• t.• r 
19 nn,epox•t of ·the Confarenca,. 1' quoted :i..n 1&1.2 
Bx~:tt:;l:n:rdca Bool::: c1~ the Year, g51. 
~··..,.l'io.Mf .·'.;a::a~,......_~.lt"~ 
20 Dt:n'l.tschoa.~ 1 .2.12."' .9.:1-.:~·, P• 52'7 • 
21 Bepo:t:~t, 194,() Dr1:tt..~r~n:I.oo. Book of the YO{U.,~ B51, 
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of the Control 0orJt':n1ssion1 Rusc~.ia nrmoun.cod :t t wna not send ... 
:tng any cl€)lagatas to the Londol'l meet;lng. 22 No one lcnew 
v1hy. And this wns ;Just the beginning of tihe d:1.f:t~:tcultles. 
rrhe fou:,r ... zone £W:IU:trl[6e!i1Gnt W$.8 a:nnotmced by the 1\ll:tat:; 
Allied Gontx•ol Connn:tssion wag set up in Berlin. Austria 
was also ruled by such a corw.nit.Hll~t.on, coru~it:rb:tng, as in 
German:y, ot the Un.ited Statesll Br:ttnin, Huas:ta:~: and fi1:t:'ance. 
But the West soon found out; that thia t:1.1')rangem~.mt f.o:r.• Ger ... 
many was not going to work because of Fh:~.s::dan. u.nwillingness 
to coope:r.>ate.. Pln.t'l.lly, t.he t11roe western zoneH:co~ were mel,'?gec1 
ixrto one uxdi;;:~~ brln.g:tng int;o he:tng West Gerrnany. The n.ust:d.o.!li~ 
corrb:tnu0d to :r.:ul.ttl th.e:tr zon\1} t:leparat;eJ:y1 it being lnlOYJ:n 
t;.uall-y i;he s~.~.xne way all Go:m:nttny had. been split;, th<) om.mnis-
a:l.on h~:~.d (:Wen f(:)We:t~ :t"'EH~aons £'or ox:I.srten<.H3 * 24 JJo~Nevor ~ 
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Aust:tliia is still jolntly occupied under th~~ All:tod Oo:r.1.trol 
Gonml:'!. as :ton • 
but the idea was 11.ever ca:r.•v::ted out be-cause of' a seeming 
change or m:il'ld later <.m by all t1tr£H' nat:tons~' 
i 1he 'b::i.g problem in. connection with tho G(:)rmt.m su~ ... 
secui~:tty o:r F.}urope dema.nded that (let~m~a.ny be divided into 
24 
a nurnbe:tJ of stataa. This suggestion was m~'lda by nooeevelt, 
and tltalin broughii ·th:ta p(>int up at Yal ta.2f> J\.11 three 
M.t Yaltu. agreed that Germany should he. out 'l~P into aevE:n~nl 
states. H.oosevolt S1:tggested th~vb th~y o.11 ag~~(H? to the 
J 
d1.Hmatnberment of oerm~n1y and Just :lxu'orm~· ·the Gerrrtan.s of 
the p:r:·:tne:tpl<i'H! and not the cleta:U.s in the Sln~render t;erms. 
sist, but Btal:tn ~:md Hoosev~lt did not t;hink so. 'J~hcy :C:tnalJly 
<:.lec:Ldecl that the ·hex'ln rt.m:tsitnenlher·ment" sh<>uld be included 
eo.oh of them. sttuly the matte:ro and send recommendations to 
ea.ch other w:i.thin ·th1.t"'by days. 2? Vlhen Ilopld.nn went to 
25 £tett1n1us, .22• ~· t Pt! 122. ' 
2t5 .~.~~'\., PP• 124··0:l2El. 


















that Btal:tn wus then aga:tnst d.:i.smeniberment b~H'H.1.us<:~ he th<.rue;ht 
the Ui1ited S'l.'i~~tes e.tld Br:lto.in WGl"O now op;>osed to it. 
Hopkins told him thls wr:~S not the os.se, the.1; 1 t WtiUi st:tll 
an ('1pma quet~t:l.on. Stalin then suggosted t.hat the-{rn:oblem 
be diweu.ssed. whe:n the Big Three again got t.ogei;hor,_.2B l3u.t 
at this nex·c meeting, the J:'ott~dam O<>nfe:r:>enco, t;he Big 'fhve.e 
had all vc:}<~:rec.l away tx•(;>ln diamembel-.ment, and th.o ~t:Hme cttd 
It should be mentloned that 1.n the Y.nlta. P:r;lotocol 
this wa.y: 
Th.e tl'nited Kingdom, ·()ho Unlted States of' America,, and 
the Union of' Soviet Social:lst 1'\e~t.thJ..:ico sht:.l:ll posness 1:!. ,I 
supreme authoP:1:l;y vdth 1""'0specrb to (}(:1l?'n1any. I:n. the ex... 1 
mrcise of such autho:r-:1.-ty they will ·IJako such a'bepa, 
1:nclud.:1ng the cmnplot.e d:tsarra.aml$nt, d(\<m:t1:l.tariznt:i .. on 
an.d the dimn~mioex•mont . of G$t'lnang as they do em requisite 
for t•utttr.re peace Emd. f:H;<.mr.:!.ty. 3 
G-erman question, the pt>oblem o:f' :r•epa.rat~ions was the chiof 
2'8 Shal?iltood, £2J2.• ill•' P• 904. 
29 B-y-rnEH~; 1.2.9.• £ll• 
Husolan :Lnter.•est., Tho Un~~ t(Hl Sta:bes al~so attaahEH1 g:t'EHtt 
j_.m.portanco to reaching ·:?,gx~~ern.ents on cert~:dn Gel:•man econ• 
'l'he x"eparations wcn:tld be demnnr:led ~.n. two wa:y$, he said, 
J?:tl"'llfrb~c vdthch~o.wals f:rom the nat:ton.stl wel:."l.lth of G~n"nmny. 
~Phnt· raeans f'ac·l.icn.:•ias~ land, maehin<-.JX''Yt mt'tObJ.ne tools, 
r•oll:tng stock of rn:llways, lnve~~tmm:;,1;s :tn foreign o;n ... 
tex•prise, and so on. ~'loconc11 yea1:•1y p~tjcli11~~lts in l1:ind 















l1.fe, I'tepars.:tions t:1ho1tld 'bH ended 5.n ten :)ff:H\t>$1 he sa:i.d.; 
a .. nd the removal of faotor;tea and oth~r woalt~h within GeX>..,.. 
27 
'boon sh.o1Nn, d:td nnt ;f'e¢ll that Pl,.u.nce had done enough to 
wai~J:~ant oqual:i.t~r :t:n tho ma-tter of reps.l .. t::\.tion~h At one time 
o:nJ.-y· eigh1i d:i.v:ls.:i.o:ns ln 'tht1 wa:C> Vlherens the Lubl:l:o. govern ... 
to bo :r:-emoved at; onco, and the rest wou.lcl be :peJ.d over th() 











Th¢~ nat:tons.l weaJ.th of. Ch:)J:Ilit.ru.1:y at the beginning of: 
·bhe war, Maiels:y df>¢ltt.red1 £>.mt.>ttn.ted to a. hu.narad and 
twent·~r···t~:tve billion <mllv.,:rs-. . Du:r:•i.ng the course o:t' th.e 
wa:111 the Soviet Union eat1uul1;ed• this na:ti.ont::\.1 wealth 
would be :r•od1 ... toed fo~~i;y perc~mt, · thu:::: l£M:vine (}0rmany 
with a 11a:b~.onal woalth of aeventy .... filte billion dollart;, 
Their ur:ul:t:ysls of t;he no.tio:r1.al t;'7(~.~lt;l\s o:r the :m()t~e 
h::tghly indust!"i~':tl:i.zed oou.:r.ttt"iee h~\d l"'evealed, Maislcy 
o'bse:c>ved, ·that the mob11.e YH3alth. 'Nhtch (;ould. bo b1:uns .... 
f.or:t"'ed abroad amotm.tad to a.ppr•oximately ·thirty percent 
t)'l'':~ in ·ch.e CD.se of: Germarr;r, to ·br:~n'ty-two to tv,re:n.ty ... 
thrae billion doll.ars. 
'11htD f5oviet Union, th~refore, Ma:taky declt'l.red~ p:r•o ... 
pcH:liSd at t:he close of. tl:te war+ th~ :t")emovo.l ot ten. blllic:m 
dollars oi' thia mor.d.le wealth" rrhe remainder .l.eft to 
(i(r.>·1"'l",~"'~"\r '~'0"~J (;"l J"'"-'"1~ bl .,..l+t;>vtit<;)"l">('J 0"" l:t't>'"tn·. fY "'"iWrt)(l""'.llble t"'· .,. w..;. j~>.!<~~-... ~t:.\tl '"' ..., \.~~ .. ;1~ n.\;.H..t• ..... _... t;.'\' \)-c.1o.td>t.,t.~.t .. ~ ~. . ~\. . ~ · !J ~ , W "'-"r.,..;:,\·• .. J,· " ~· ..:,.1... \.;-' v 
w};'.uxt t>:revailed in cantrd.l 1'\:ur;~op<h Al'bhough th~ ~~tandard 
of li vlt1g o:f:' c E.~n 'tt"£>.1. 3~iu.:r.op<;} vm.s 1 ower thttt1 ~.n Ge:t"'l'll~.nxy, 
it was still a decent stttndard~ he auld:. 
As to the :r'eparations to be expected e&~.eh yea1"' :Co~ 
a t.en yee:r Jpe:r•:i .. odll' t;he soviet th1.tm.1 had <~et:tms:bed~ 
M1;1ic~lcy cleolarfH·l, that ·the national 1ncmne o:f.' Ger.r:•ma.ny 
'l"H~fore t1'1·:E1 war 1~J:wu..r.1ted to tht::r"·hy h1.llion do1lax>t3 iil.n ... 
:t:lUtally"' rrhe wax• WOUld lOWGr thiS ino:ome to tl.pJ0:t'OJti-
tl11.1tely eighteen or twe:r1:cy hill1(.:i:t1. ':~he. Soviet iJn.:ton, 
ilhorei'ore, pJ:-oposed ·that one billion dollU1"S ~:n:nuall:r. 
f'or• tht) next ten yfntl" pfn:~:I.Qd; bf> e.xt:r•ac-t~cd. I'!:; \:Vas 
theY'efore not a large aum,o4 · 
Ohureh:tll :L"$ared that taking too much money out oi' 
Germany would foroe the v:tcto:r>El to provide :t"'or those who 
we:r~e etal"'Ving :l,n Germany. Ho also did not be1it5lve th~J:b 
said that the Un1.ted. .statar3 wanted nott.d:n.g in :r•epal(CJ.tions 






















it1 tha last VT$tl." v·ro.s not tht~.t tho :x~<Bpara:t1cms were t0t1 high. 
but that they were d;f)mando d :tn raone y. 36 r.ehe need to 't;t.,t1ns .... 
.o0"'' t"'"" 'bi-] ·1 4 "'."" ~1 "".1 1 ,...,...~., ..,.t tt.}·><~" .,,,.,.,v 1J".''~-l_·t ,G ',','"•"" OY>l<rr lC) T'"'Y' .l. .<- OJ.~ · ,..! .• c,.v"'"' \:i.v, .t.q,;,._ o::. ...: J.,.L;.) .~v ~:>.<H·•.; ~ •~-- , "·'·~ . ·~- .; • "-"""'-






















peOJ:Ile should lesu.~ to obey their leaders~ 39 
r.rhere \VS1'*0 no 1:~:tnal decisions mad.e t;tt Yalta . on the 
repo.t•ation.a t quest :ton. In th~ public 'l?oport; 1 t vm.a stated. 
only 'bha:t Ge:t?mttny would be f.o:t•oed to oompeneata as much t.J.S 
po$s:t'ble for tho a(a.tl1t::1ge it; had O!luaed* A ootm·n:tsa:ton was 
to be set u,p ·to wor•k owt the extent of ·the r•etpaJ?a:bions,. 40 
The actual preJ.irninw:ay agr~H)lllGt:tta Y.t1ade 1 as sl:u:Hrm in the 
. . 
Pt•otoeo11 wa:t?e roa:tnli based on t>h$ HurHJitm proposals ,given 
by !1Ifu1.is1cy, as related above" ~r.~b.oae agl"O~n~ents' prov:tdQd;_ · 
:tor the setting up of' tan All :led. Hepi~.:t .. £tt~o~s' Cotirt:a:tssion 
:tn MosaO'~N to \'mrlt out the above pl:•:tno'ip).es~ 41 A (It should 
' !d 
be mentioned in this QOl'l!leci;ion tl:{a:t; 'bhe J:ttg rl'l'WilG t:l{f.]Nlled 
,'·/· 
that F'rf.mae should not hnvo much olr.d1~ tc) :t'oi;aration~1 that I . . . 
thoy themselves sj1ould1 como {trsi reco.rdlng repar~:~.t!sms and 
should be the, only onen on th~ ~e;par:atio~1s t eonn7litlls;l.on!l42); 
"'1' ' f.<' '' 1 
~· / ' f 
I:n the Protoeo~l was' aC:.lded one line sta·t1ng tl:lo.t ·bhe nuse 
of Germ~tn labor,11 ,~w~ls ·~t~ 1:!~ ono t:.J1!H') <?f' ropur:;.l.tioxh 1:3 .!\C• 
. • . ' \.' ·, ., " .; ·/ ,< 
eo1'lding to' Byl:>ne.a44,: tlll.pro was no: d1.scues:J.on of t11:l::j oJt:oapt ,. 
\ 
59 Sherv1ood,. 2£• ,g_;!Jtl, P• nel. 
40 Hepo:rt; .fJ..t#.§. li~A:t~'-l!.~5,cJa: }3?..2! a£.. !,l}.! .!.~.!, B51. 
~~l (~noted ln ~1t;ei~t:lnius, ?l?• .. 9.f..~·, P• :54:5. 
4H Ibid.., pr:, lz:,~5.;.J.~34. 
~~· ii 
43 quoted 1n lg;1,S. 1 P• ?545. 
~ i 
-- ··--. . ~ 
a paa$:Lng remark by Hoosovelt that tha United Gte.tes could 
not take man:power aa H.ussia can. Maiaky enta:red this in 
31 
the f'r•otocol, and i't was ag~eed to by the other delegations. 
Byrnes said. he lr.:x.tev:r noth:i.ng at the t:tme of tho sto.telnent 
being raa.de 01~ baing inclt\ded in the l?1:otoool~ 'but that if' 
he had 1~nov>1"l. of it he would hnve urged HocH;~evelt to opr1ose 
the inclursion. of ru'ly such idea in the Protocol. 
With :t'egard 'bo ·the sun1 total of rer,H.ll'~ations m1d their 
d.~.stribtttion among the All:tes., the :Protocol usGid as a basis 
l1ooaevelt: had said tha:t; the oonm11ss1on. on :reparation:J should 
rttaka:t in its 1n:ttia1 studieEf eA::J a basis f'o:~ d:tscus~lion, 
the suggestiion <>f. tb.e soviet governrn.ent, th~:t,t the tcrbaJ. 
a:mn o;t• :r;>eparations shottld be ·t;went:r bilLLons and t~ht~t i'ift:y 
pex- cent of .it sl:toulcl go to the Sov:i.et tJn.:to:n.u45 Thr.;"Jse 
very wo:rds w~'l~~ late1 .. lnclu<1ad, ;tn ·che Ijx•otoool. Acoord.in.g 
to Shet"wood46 'l:i:b.e Husslana tooli: tl:ds to n1enn ·that HoosoveJ.t 
Wt.:tS supporting theil,. oJ.ail:ns of ten billion dollara in ;~.""epa­
rations who:t~eas Hoosevelt me:t~a:ty !t1eant ·bo twa this as a 
be\ sis fol'J futit:t•e dlscu.sa:ton (partly because Ohu~chill did 
not wan·b to mention any epec:U':tc m1111) 1 l>ll:)li~iV'ing he was 










lef1Ving the cloor 01Hm for all moJ:."·hs o:e rutu:.l?E.l da1.1bor;at:1.ona. 
Stettinlu.s also states th!-lt no ryonnlli·trao:nt~ "+NHS given by 
HoosoveJ.t as to ~any deti:r:dte atml regt~Xilding rep~rr::rt5.ons.,47 
The Allied Cotmn:tssion on H~:po~o.t!m:u~, arJ a ;r.esu:t:t 
~~he commission t'OS.Cht:•d infor>mal a.gt•eoment 011 a ifl.an 
p~ovid.ing :t'o:t": ( l) max:l.tntun poss:tblo compensat1.on :tn 
k;l.ncl11 (that :ls, in matet,.iala,. e()mmod:tties m1.d Ct::\p:ttal 
equipment as contras1;~d w:tth pta:vme:nt in money) to the 
Allied na:t.:tons on the bas:tt1 of tb.ei.r :t~espoot:tvo contx•:t ... 
butiorul to,. and losses sustained in, bringing about the 
clf)feat o£ nazi Gen'l.1f:'-n:y; {2) el:tln:l.nation oi' Ge1:•many1 s 
·wal"•maldng poweZ>,. th:t•ou.e;h removals of macb.lnet~y and 
eq:uipmen.t; and ( :3) mnil1:cenanco o:f sufficient means of 
liveB.hood within Chn:?l'llf.my to ensure ·thai;; no other nntion 
noed. atumme th.e bt:t.l'*d.en o:f.' suppol'lting the Gemnm1 }.:Jooplo, 
UndOl" the plan, o1aiu1S of" tho u.8.s.n. and 1'ola:nd 
were t;o be met by removals f~om ·!.ihe ~c>ne o!' Gerrn.a.,Yly 
~:U'ldox~ sov$.et occt:tpat;:ton.., and eltlim~ of o·hb:lr AlH.ed 
m~tionli.i we:t ... e to be mot by l. .. etn.ovals f~)om the westex-n 
zon.EHil oocup:tetl by th{'; Uh:t:tec1 Statot.:J, the United Kingdom 
. and li'rance. The lat;·bor ·trtr•ee nations in Au.g. 1945 in-
vited 15 <>tl1ex• oountr•ies, mernb~x•s o:e ·tiho Un:t·tod l'Ic:bion~J, 
to px'*esent the1.l:' :indi.v:tdual claims for reparatim.1s, 
with a view to cottf~xl:t"ing subsequently on tl-:te mo.tte:r 
ot a division of the Gerw.an afHHi)'bs ~wail~:l.bJ.o fo~ meet .... 
ing tb.oae claims. 
Also under the pln.n, the sov:tot u.:n:ton was ·to l"'eeoive 
15~& o.f the :tndustrial. equ:tpmen·t. dEH'lmed .removable :Crom 
the w·estovn zones of Germ~.:m:y :h1 e:;1Cchnnge for equ.lvalent 
va.~e oi.' food and other cor:Unodit:tos, artd. another 105~ 
w:ttHo'ut o.ny obl:tgv.t:l.on :tn re':btt:r:-n. 




































:.t'owe:~,.,.. o!' decision on ~Jp$c:t1:'ie<1 romove.ls fl .. Ol"ll Germruly 
was vested in the heads of. the militru:'y govem:unents in 
tJ:w;tr. reapoct5.ve ~ones. 
'l'he repe.ra'l:i:Lons plan wa.s a.pp:t?oved. Jat; the conference 
of ~;~:Pcs:tde~::b ~rJ?ulnan, Prime M~11:i.ste:t:" Attlee e.nd Ilifa.rshal 
Btu~U.n in .t>otadnrn, Ge~many. 4B 
It can bo a<~en tl'lllt the program dt'afted by this coln ... 
m:l.ssion contained no p~ovied.on !'ox• slnVt;') l.a.hox• $lS mentioned 
:i.n the Y"aJ. ta Protocol~~' 
There were ma-ny t11ore d1.scua~d.ons and dJ.se.greementt.l 
bet1l!Taon the. West and Hussts. l"egt:t)?d;i.ng the pa:yment of repa ... 
:N~t:tona thH.t ar(~ not w:tth:bl the $Cope ot' th:to s·bud.y. Suf ... 
of fl .. ;tf.;l:trf,) :t:>ep~~:J:"CI.tion.s, ~Thnd 1;be Ht.:HlS.:'Lr,w.tm went tho:t:r.~ own wo:y 
:tn t;J1e:h~ zona. By the r:md cJf 1950 the x•ep~:trat:ton.t:d Pl..,og:~.-.a.m 
f:tgur<)S;. b·y tr1e <~:nd of' 1949, the U:n:tted f3't;at(.H1 h1:1.d reco:tved 
ln :r."epr:.~.ration~~· ynt:~nnenta :{~102, 56!>, 186., the Ur1ltet1 K.1.ngdom 
';"--~... .. '- ... . 
~~B41 %140,2~W, PJ?anct~ ;~68 1 0f)4.,72B:J and the Sov:V;~t Union (es ... ... ~ .. 
f 
timl\t.t~d) r.)ver ~j~:u:4 1 oqo 1,000 1000,4.9 11'h.ia is even mo:r•e "than 
the ten h:i.ll.:ton dolln1 .. :lnttial f:l.fp.:tl:>e px•oposed 'by the Sovie·t 
Union. ut Yalta., and ;ret, thl'"oughout. all diBcuss:tons of the 
48 Edv·d.n w. ;P~ulo·,;r, 11 A1lif.J(.:t Gomm1.ss:'l.otJ. on Hepta.l""t:ttions, '1 
l9tJ:o Hr:i. ta.11n:tca Boolt of the Year, 42'*43. 


















!{Al! .9Ji.~J1.::!~!~11--In th~ comrnu:n:tque to the 'iiJO:t"ld it 
wa.a ~~tatted that it had been the put>poae oi' the Allies to 
destroy German m:tlitarism u.nd Na:d.sm. The s:tgnuto:t~~tes stated 
·IJhey intended to punish all w~l.r criminals, but e-mphaf;liZedt 
however, thLlt they did not ir1te!ltl to destroy the people 
of Garrn.an.y but only the Na~:ts and miJ.its.rists~ f£'hey pledged 
a pl~;~.ee tor Gel:>}nany in the oo:mity of' the 11-at:lons of tl'J.e 
world. 51 
its :tntluences Wfi'l.S eax-r.led :t?r;n:-wtu:>d vie;ovous1'3·, espech1.lly 
1[:'2 :tn the Amer:J.cr~n zo:nth 0 '11ha ptll'l:i.slnn¢;J:tth o:L' wn:r Cl"'im:i.nt.i.ls 















~op:N!?4];~I~~~ ..... Again, noth:tng defi:n.:i:ta came out of' tho 
conference. Roosevelt raacle it plain that; his chief concern 
was in establl.shing a satisf'nctol.,Y Polish governxrient and 
not in the c~etting up of any particulnr• boundar:tas,.l 
This discussion began. vihen Hoose vel t said that the 
Polish eastern bo·u.nc1}y should gerw:r•a.lly follow tho Curzon 
Line. He ~H:dd the southo1 .. n end of the Line should be t:\d-
,jus ted so ·bhat the o:t t·y of: Lwow and part of' the o:tl f':l.elds 
would be :lntdde Polir:i!h tePr:>i box•y, ChlU:'~Ch:t11 said he sup ... 
porte6 tho Gurzon L:i.nG but would !\lgPeo to HUtiH'da having 
LwovJ lf Stalin inststed.. Stali1:'.1 wn.s no·t in favor• of the 
Ctt.'lnwn I,i11.e. 2 He said tl:':tis :r.:tne was not :tnvented by Hu.ssia 
•'7 
but by Glemenoeau and r~oxl,.l Ctu~zon af't;er World 1i~al' I,..:; 
Htalin wanted to extend l'ola:nd. h1 tho west to ·the Uoisse 
Hiver to compensate i"or· Hussia.' s tak:tng Pol:lsh ts:r'r:i.tot•y 
i.n tho east, bltt nf'tero a long and otl.:tmest cU.scusr-.. d.o:n. in 
which Ghur•eh:t11 sa:td that taking territory in eastex•n Prussia 











































~rould n~<~eS€:l:ti~atf:J tx·t~.n.ste:r.~:l:n,g n:tr.m m:lll:lot,, t¥o:f."'t\1l"1:n.::~,. :;ts.l:tn 
aoo~pted t.h$· (h:t:t'zon t~:tnQ;; i~l 1H.~.~.neir}l{»,4 . 
<>r;1.tn:1~1t1: of \(b;¢ ttt~~'N l"~ll.f.lll:t e:,;;ov·{i;)l(ir~~l~·~::d:; ~·nfi th~ rat~lf'ltoat~~t<.>:tl. 
(~'£' ttf'l(i) ?!'(H;?plkH~t5\ VQ :()$~;)j'Je eonr~~anel!l <! 5 i!(J!:f;"(~ H~)(:J tfS0'V'tl}l t ~~()~b 
tih~ ni£.&1Jv P<>l$.r\d.' }~ r.1:t.ic$ or ~1arJt G~l':'l.ru),n;:r.~~ will n.ot 't:t$!} l:tt.~td~~ 
final un1;;t:f. t;.l.t'to:r:t the' w~~:r._. rtG 
·b!F.Z~c::r· .f'~}:t> l::'oland ~J.10t1~ tl~.e Od<aJr %);nd !.dtt.u.~;ttr..~l." ~~(w:i1:1We, por~dlng 
·t.h~?i J:~i1'lfi1l pe~J'.!¢ tx~ea:~y .. l:7 'rhi~,\ \14\\fS bt:t~ed on t:b.o Yt~tlt£~ aop:'tH;-
C\t1 r\u;:,~i+ u:~ • * ,.. )\J¢lo1~!7k\i' • , • o.nC. l\t. tllft'i:th!·~fl:.•"l\:!(ilt"~ltiU$\c:l 
'"'' 4 ~···· ;;H~ ljv, \'·,'(•"< ,, '"•b'i.'·l •'I J"'""""':; i,,;f ...,~,~· T'll'' /lot). 'j 'ih.· I tP t;·1 on, ()'1~ ~-,~ .. l:""} >4'}-~t;.~·J,\\f\.r,;'\.~lt ,..-..... ~~ .HI,\.\o"i;~1i:"<"l..#~J ~~•'if ·~.s.·'t~'f;~v};f \;Jo1'.,1~ \.>'AI.~} ·i<~,t;:I.,.~I~·r f, · ;;li., .,..-~1 • -. 4f •\ 1 .\9 
g;;;()yle~:, ... ];1(}J.J.Oh f:t~•Ortt.\t'rJ:'' U.x.·:tdO:~' \;IJ<t::t~~h tb<; rJ~;;~t.(h\:(,. {;.('H](':Id 
t.o l'ol{~.nd two t:tnlt\.lJ. *·ll:'*'O.t;t~ (:}D:.mt. ~~f th~) ~tJ(;,...c: . .tll(ll?; Gu.:~:;zotl 
:~U.n.~~ on.o ~itbout. t:\0 r:d• n~.:;;,;:''tbfiflGi; t.):f' IN1<.)\.'f t1nd o.r.,.~? .:l.r~ 
tl:.1.e DJ~;J.l<nltiiti:;l~ i'<n~~ti31¥. Urt.det' t~hes<;i ~1£~'t:toc~rtU1lrl'i!C .~ .. OltH'ld 
.,;tr:i..r:) t~.i:-dft<1d \1i;'H:~tvn~r·d. In thi:'~ ecu::,t J.t :u)~~.t B'<i,HoQ ~q,, 
:m.i. w·H;h, 1.0 1 ??fJ 11{10G :tnhn.h:i t~tnts, .tn.olt~:.J.:tne?: tl?:,pr•(nr.:lmatC~ly 
'7 11 Hepo1~t on tl.H> ~J~l:>lptU;"'t;n.t~t1 Gt>ni'.ot.'Ol''H':O f'if'' ;.?.tn"Pl.tn, H 
£!;~~ ~;.~~!..'·!~.!:!. }49!:;1£ ft:!: ;t~f:lg~ ~!!, lH~~ .• 
I 
i 
5, 900 1 000 !'ole~;;; in the west; (if the new f'ront:it.n~ wex•o 
1~ecogni:r.ed by the peace conf'e:rence) :tt st('>Od to gain 
38,986 sct.t1'1i., wh1.oh. bef'Q:ttC the war had. a population 
of 8,62l,ooo, · inelu.d:i.ng l~ooo,ooo J?olos.a 
AJ.l the Gormarw ht the latter a:J?ea were removed by 
194B i<l.11d. were :r•oplaced. with Poles who had e:lthe;rt .forme:t>ly 
11 V'f.Hl in. teJ?Pitor·y ceded to R:uas:ta, :tn Germany, Ol"' in other 
ot.1u.ntrie.s. 9 
Thus, as a result of the Yulte. accord, HUCM1ia ob ... 
ta:tned 4/'1 per cent oi' Poland* and what 1:-en:tnined was turned1 
into a f~oviet Pl'9V:i.nco in nll but num.e.-10 
GOVE!H.NMBNT-... :More t:bne Wf:la orH:mt on 1';h:ts su.b;Ject ·than 
........... 1.'1"11:111F~ ..... ~III><~ 
arr:r o·tiher problem discu.ssed at Yalta., Rooseveli; ~l.nd 
pol:i.t:tcal par,tios. It would be prov:tsionfal, w:tth :tt8 trHA.:l.n 
Job l:Jedng to establish (II, P<~:r~me.non1/ government. HOOfJ0Velt 
said he wanted l)o:tn.nd to he fr:londl)r to HURHia, and he .t'elt 






























brutal att;o.ck~ wo ccmld n:evo:t" be (;on1;~.:mt w:tth e:ny soJ:u.'liion 
thut <Jid not hJa,.ro Poland a f:rao n:n.d indopendo:nt sovox•o:tgn 
ste.te .. n:t.l 
anoas against .Polo.n.d and ''ranted to end 'them. It; wa!.l a.. 
i'eellnz;; ·to :t•of'urH.~ to crr·oa:te 1;1 Poliab. governmm1t w1 1vhout 
COl'lSU.ltlng the Poles. 'J~ha Lub:Lil'l ~~ovo.r·nrnent could contx•ol 
tl:.\e people and c.oltld :p:J;'ov<~nh c:i.:vll vnt:t•, he oontint?.od, but 





















govel'~n.tnen:t cUd not :t•epref:l<.Hlt th~~ people; and. l~ngland. would. 
neveJil suppo:r•t 1. t .. 12 
~Phe leaders of the T..;rtbl:tn government wexle poptl.lt:'ir 
:ht :Pnla.nd, Stalin l.ate:r.~ s~t.id, hec~:ruse they he.d not .. fled 
the :Lond.on Po:J.es did 11ot p~:u•t1.clpa:l~o in ·bhe l:tbet"ation o:C 
I'oland, He e,'l.dded that; Poland was l.ilH?l'~atecl by the Red 
th.en ~rt;,ated that, it wu.s easier to deal with n p:t?ovis:tonr:ll 
irr:nnedlr:ltel:y, but •J.:p to now i)he WH."P httd p:C1tilVented 1. t.l3 
Hyx•nar;; fe11;14 'tihe..t i:;h~J?oughout flll of th:t~ d:.tscussion, 
dom.:tnated by 'i:ihe Hu.r:H:d.n.!1S. 'U,ti Lubl:tn gove:t?nme:nt :ei ttcd 
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40 
would. be :free elections in Polo.nd. In ft'l.ct, Hoosevelt be-
lieved. that the elect:tonrJ we:t .. e the crl:tX oi' the Polish td, tua ... 
ti(>l'l*15 Stalin E.H.:.d/i that; ·tJ:1e question ot' electlons might 
be poss1.bl(:l in a month p:x'ov:tded thex•(.'> were no mllita:t"':V ro .... 
·v·ersalls.l6 Actually, as will be ::Jhown, these elections, which 
"<'lt'll"O not fi:L't>EH:~,n were held twen.ty-·tl-wee months 1t~tel".l7 (-.... 
ment, it wa.(~ atated ·hhttt a comrn::f.ml!ion oi' Big 1I'h:r•ee repre-
sentatives Wi:tS to meet :tn Moscow and c:o:rumJ.t w1.t1h the LubJ.:Ln 
reg:J.me and with othe1 ... I)ol:tsh democratic leaders fl.,Onl \Vlth:1.n 
and w:t thou.t Poland .w:i th a vlew ·to·wtu .. d reOl"/.yliTtzatio:n. of 
the Lublin group. The l"GSttlt:lng govermuent o:e National 
Unity was to be pledged to holding free eh)ctions on the 
domoo:r.•t:ttic and a.nti-l'luzi partles wo:r.~e to be able to taJ.r.e 
part ru1c.l have ea.ndidatf~s.18 th10ll10Ve1t :tn this corm.ect:l.on 
g<.:>t across th.is poi.nt: that the l'ol:lslJ. gover•nJ:uen·t, tt even 
when broadened, w:tll have only • prov:tsion.ul' approval until 
the pE.H.)ples COl'lO(':lJ?ned have a chm.1.00 to vot(.hul9 
1'7 13yrnes, 12.£. ill• 
lH Hepo:.r·t, 1~146 Bri tr.J.nn:i.oa. Book of' the Y'au:r, Hb~~. 




























Admiral Leahy once remar~l<:ed to Hoosevelt concex•ning 
ao elastic that the Russlans can stretch it all the way 
:f.'rom Y.albo. to 'N~J.shington without eve:x~ techn:tcally brcnJd.ng 
:t t. 11 fioosevelt r>eplled: u:r know, B:tll; I .krww :i:t. 13ut 
it • r:~ 'i:;he best I oan do £ot• Poland at this tJ.rne .,u20 Never ... 
belief' that ttd.s dii~:t•:toult l'Jx•oblem had ref.~;ched a.n honoJ:'£tble 
and equitable solution. 'J:hey EH:>on l(r.arned ·that tha~l were 
v.rr·ong,.'•2l 
luunediately after the oonf'ere:n.co there was a disa-
greement between Husa:ta on the one hand o.nd t~he United 
s·tates and Br:l. t~dn on the other ooncerl'l:l:ng the int;erp:r•e ... 
tation of the Yalt<a o.g1:~eements r>egarding the Pol:i.sh gove.r.•n-
comp:r.laed of hicLtviduals chosen f:('lom the Lublin and ot;her 
to be the IiUbl:tn l:>eg:tn:H:s meN~ly broadened by new members. 2~} 
20 Leahy' .22. m. I pp" 315 ... 316. 
21 Sh<.n:'ifiOod, OI)• .. <?.1.'!2.•• p. 864. 
22 nean, o·r>. cit., p,')• 30 ... 31-. 
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!: 
to connttlt w:t th the con1nd.ssi.on prov:tdod for at Yalta 'tha.t 
Wt:l.S to handle the p:r.•oblem.. 11'he Uni ·tad :!States and Br:t tain 
05 greatly ol,jected to i;his.~ 
On Apxl:tl 1, 1945, nooaevelt cablt)d stalin, sa:Tir:tg 
};),e was r:U.sappoint:ed :tn 
42 
the lack of prog;r<HlS mt-).de in the CO.l"~:t~ying out;, wh:l.ch 
·the world expects, of the polit:i.cal decisicms which 
we :;."'c:>a,ched at Yalta, pn.rt:l.<mlar·l:r those r•elat:tng to 
the Polish questlon [and] any such solution which would 
result~ in a th:tnly d.isguised continuat:ton of tho preuont 
government would be ent;lrely tmaot;}eptable.t and would 
cause OUf people to regard the Ys.ltta agreot:nent as a 
failmJe. 24 
Htalin in hi(~ reply said that the Un:t·ted States and 
Bri ta.in were 1ihe o:n.es1 violatlng the agreements, that t1'.1ey 
were t~r·y:tng to liquitlat~e 1;he Lublin regime whereas it should 
only be expanclod and be friendly to fh:ui$s:ta. 25 
on the wor.k:tng out o:l.' the Yalta. oon.elusions rega:r•c.Ung the 
:Polish governmorrt1 .Poland was not invited tio th.e co:t1.f'e:r."enc·e 
at San li':r:anc:t nco • 26 































was tnerc.;ly t!n1 enlargement o:r tl10 existing govot•nm.ent :tn 
Poland, just as Huss:l.a had ins:tst@d. '11he government was 
only f'ive wet>a newcome:r•ti:J. At 'th& same time they withdrew 
:t"<:wognit:ton of the government in :London that they hritd up-
helcl D.t YH.lta. This showed •lihat the Bov:tet :1.nterpreta·tion 
o:t' ·the Yal·t~a d(:Polaration in th.:t.s connection prevaJ.:ted. 27 
Slowly but su1~e1y Hussia tool~: over the Pol:tsh gov ... 
ernmmlt entirely, using the core of communists in the gc:;v ... 
ernmen·~ to bring it about.. l'i:lections held in 194:"7 (which 
vvere not fl:>Oe election.s) ~;;howed :::~.n 89.8 per coni~ vote for 
the Con:n:m .. m:t~rt. Party. 28 Poland then beca.me, to all intents 
ostabl:i.sbment of a Unitied r·Ja·tions. It was :Co:t:• th.:ts reason 
ovox• ·co prov:tde for e, United Nations the t.mi ty achie<t.red. 
27 Ko.zim:i.e:r:z Smogn:r:•zewok:t~ 11 Polo.n.d," 1946 Britann:tca 
~~ .. " ..... ~ .. ~ 
















by the Allies durlng 'l.ihe vn:tr might have dw:tndJ.ed. ·thus ma':tk ... 
ing :tt doubtf'-ctl that a Un1.ted Na"l:;ions could be net tlp.29 
Dttmbarton O~:tks Oonferenee of: 1044 1 the 1n1.1in :tssua tb.at .still 
zation was the '\70ting i'ormula o£ the Secnn•.:tty Council .. 
0l'"~h The United .Stm.tes agreed. ·tht.i.t 110 d.ec:ts:ton committing 
our military :eorces to action should be talren without our 
approval bu.t d:td not l:>elieve tha:t tho px•tvil<:Jge of the veto 
Hhould extend to all mo.ttera,.SO 
Hoosevel'b opened thi.s d:tsou~HJion by urging adopi;;.ion 
of the Amer:tean formula for Secu.r•1 t;r Counc:ll vot1.ng. All 
<>:1~ th.e peoples of' the· world hoped, hf:) sa:td, f!or the a.bsr;)nce 
sible,31 
29 Stet.tin:tus, <2!?• cit .. , p. 178 .. -
30 Byr·nes, .2£• g;t,t.~ , P• ;34. 










l-l'iach member• of thG~ SEfcm:-:tty Gou:n.oil tJb.ould have 
one vote, 
2-Dee:tsions of thf> Sooul?i ty Council on. prooedur,tl 
nlt\tters sh.ould be mad\~ by r::rn af'i.':tr·m~tt•iva vote of ~lavon 
momb<ill" s. 
3-Dacioio:rlH o:f: the Socu:e:l.t-y Cou:nci1 on ul.:I. otho:t" 
nu:ttters ~111.cmld be made by t:m. stf:l:':tr•matiV'e vote oi' seven 
mem:~.'be1~s including th.e con<mrr•:tng votes of the permanent 
t1embers; p:t'Ov:.tded thn.t1 in deolHio:nM U:(td.er Chapte:r: VIII, 
Section At ~nd under• pal?.agra.ph l of Chnptet• VIII" 8e~tion 
c.,» a pe.rty to a difJpute Hh.<.n:tld abata.:tn. i'x·om v<>t;i.ng. ,,g 
In <.):~Jder to be stn~e t;ha.t the:ve would be S1;tppo:~?t fen~ 
t<;) th~'.rlr oorn:tng to the Yalta Gonference dinct.H:a1ed thia plan 
vri th 'both HepuhJ.:i.oan ~u\d D€rn1oc~:Nil.t:tc leade:rs in tht:) Seru:d;e 
and t;.ht;} Hmu:H~ ot• H&pJ?eseni;a.tives. I·c was only a:t'ter this 
g:t~oundwo·p1t h.a,;t bean la:i,.d th.at1 tho plan i!l~ls presented. 35 
Under this rortmlla" any member or the Sem..u~lty 
Cow.:te11 that we.s a ·pa.rtic1.po:n.t; :ln any dlt\lpute should abstain 
men.ts. Hu:l>, on th~a oth<-n:> hand ~t docir:liorts :t•el.o.t:l.ng to the 
:NH~ognit5.on of the e:ids'l::,enco of: s. iiln"eat to wo:t"ld peace 
_ .. _11'!>--~ ..-· --
---
~~----
eou.ld b~ no tttc.n:,.~ t1f'feot:tvf;) j'u.st:iJ.'ios.tion of tho special 
:ptH:li t:ton of the Gveat Powe:t:>s us gtl£ttld:tu.ns of' wox'ld peace 
thi:t11 t;o ab:ata:tn in a d:lspu.te to whlch thoy tH~:t•e a r.)arty. 34 
wo:t?ld~ ~t1h(:>y all krww, he sa:td1 thlilt as :tong (\S the ·th1Jee 
o:r them we:r•e nllvo none of them would involve h:ts o01.lJ.1i.".l"''Y 
the hor:t"ors of ·waz'1 wou.ld b~ :ln cont1•ol. lt was thei:t:t ob ... 
l:tga.t:ton, then, he st/i.ttecl, to c1~eato :f'Ol" thj.a future gl:"oup 
nn organiza:t.to:n 1"vhich w·ou.ld truly keop the perJ.oo fox• f:.tft·y 
a covenant should. be wor•l::ed out, }.':lo said., which. won.J.d :pl~e ... 
vent eonfl:i.ot among th~ th:t~ee GXteat Powers. 35 
34 lb:td., p. 47 • .. --
46 
~--
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. itl!J vei;o prev~.nt ·the Gouncil f:t"'om considel?ing und: ther;(;)by 
I:tdve:~::o·blsing thAl ;tnvolv()ment oi.' th:tr; ·powe:r in :::r.ny disput;a.36 
Thus, :tt 'Irma dtH}:1dect ~ott Yalta that ·bher~e we11e two 
t'Y9es o:e matters on wh:i.ch the 8ecu.l?:t't.:.:;r Gou:rwil could vote: 
proe~dux•al ~:natterr-r:1 (question::~ :t:n:vo:tv:t:ng 5.ni;ex•.n.s.l governance 
of 'l:~he Council) th!!'l.t r•eql.lit'ad tille u~'/'<;11!Jtt vote of any s~ven 
tnembers, perr.nru1ent Oll not; O..J.td subs1;a.ntlve matte:r:ls th.at; 
roqu.:tx•ed s0ver1. votes inch·~,t~;tng 1.a ttyEHJ" vote tx~om all f'iva 
Bot/.1 1\'atb.er and f::>ta:U.n approved tihl"~ co:n.cep·b of th<:> vot;o 
powet~ :Cor the lH.g rrh:t"eo, ha.s:tng the:tr argumt:m.t on the 
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ma:tntadned 1 t c:;:n1 he maint:sd .. nt"ld onl:f :t:r all the w·orldi ci 
greatest povter$ aon01..1.l"' , • • Only un:tty and integr:tt·y 
of rn.trposc can sr.wc~ the peo.oc. • * • 
PB.th-en:• was (}O.tegovically il1~~1st.ent on tho need to:t:> 
maintaining the utmwst intogr:l ty arao1'lg :nat lone • • • 
And thlu .f:l.PP:t'ORoh i;o t>ho veto pr:i.rw:tplo px•os(()rvocl tha:t 
integrity. 
'lihe a.nnounet:unent of ·tih.o voM.n.g pl?ocodu:e$ V~w.e. with-
Jaeld f~om the world. in the conference report, 'be:i.ng includ.od 
only in the Protocol. 1rl:d.s was becauf:le the 131.g ~:hroe wanted 
man$nt memt.'H'.r.t~s o·J.l the Security Oounci11 bef'ox•e the voi1ing 
agreement WfU~ macle knomhf:>9 
rrhe Yal t•a vot;:I.ng fomnula waH latev t..tdopted at tha 
<.rpposed. nny suggest;ion i;he,t wo'\.lld t:tllow sm<"1.ll nat:tons to 
r:)peak u:p n.gainsi; b:lg powe:1. ... s in ·the Un:lted No.h:ton~J.40 :tn 
all o):' h,:ts :rorma.l (irtd :tn:Cormr,.l di:.'.lcusa:to:n.s St~a.lin would 





cou.:nt:r.y. Ohurchill tHlidJ lf~eho 0f.tgle .should !HS~rt!li t; the 1 
} 
mnv\1.11 hit"ds to sh1g .n.n.d ca:po no'!; whe:r~,?to::ee t,J1.t3Jl' fH:tng. n4l. 
on memba:t>::JJJ;:tp of ~tll t4ix:te~;'nJ. fSov:t.et :~~ep~::tbl:tas ln t.he TJn~~ ted 
!{at:tor1s (as th.e Ruas:tl'ms · ~.njc.:trMited they v.rould a:l~ Dumba:r:•tcm. 





acqu:lesenae of h:i.s asso¢:i.o.tea~45 
At first HooaeveJ.t. had bt3on opposed to tb.e H.uEu:do.n 
}n'opoaalB for ext:t"a votee1 but Churchill s1.~ppor·ted Bt~alin 
ti\.·~ he ~n1.s influor1ced by Br•it.:tah impe:r:ta.l <mnsidel"'D.t:i..ons, 
50 
ee:~poc1a.lly thE~ px•oblem of Ind.:ta and :t ts m.Emtherah:tl',. Becaum.1 
Ghux•chill did not support hlrJ.* Hooeev(:)l t ngrtiH~d to suppo~t 
the .Hussiarl !)'PO}}(HJ&\l at the oomin.g United Nl'lttions Confer ... 
ence, 'but Roosevelt irts!sted thfd; it muet be a matte1~ for 
full discussion nnd .fr~a vote at the ccmf'eronoe and ~1hould 
not he considered a ;ra.,:\,j? !!~.O!UPl; at Yalta, If' there should. 
be o. furor in Oongr~eJH! over Amer:to~:.m sttpport o:t' the Soviet 
ex:tx•a votes, atalin agl""~Getf to support AtJ'Hr)r:tcan cl.a.inHl to 
two oxtra votes o.lso.46 
and both StEtlin and Churchill ag:t. .. ead to suppor·t bhe Uni·ted 
States :tf it Wtirxtted more than o:ne vote in tho Un.lted Nations, 
be;bl.g tha:t nusaia. ha.tJ 'th:t•ee votes and Bri tai.n htad 1 ts Com-
monwealth. Hoosavelt• howevtn:", ju:rlt bef.\1re h:i.s deuth, dEl ... 
ciclecl ·that the Un.i·t~d S·t;ates would no·l; ask for three votea 
in the United Nations Assembly~4? 
'l'he ex.tra vote ar'f.-.angemen1~ wae not :.l.noluded in the 
41-0 ~~tettln:tu.s, .~2· .9-tt.•, P- 187. 
46 Shel~WO<>d,. .212• m' I PP. 066 .. 857. 







or tlelibOl"ately to the p:v~sa on. Ma..roh gg, 1945, cu.using 
much adversE> commerrt throughou.t the country. Sherwood re ... 
fel'lx•ed to it. n.s ttone of. 'l:;h(~ wo:t. ... st all ... ar1oum1 botches of 
tho Wtt!' and a ~leel:ni:n.gJ.y lXnnec<:Htsur'lf one. tt'lH .And H.os<:nll:na..n 
v..n"fote49 in om') o:C hi.t!l inter•pol~lt;ions: 
51 
His decia:i.on not to diaclr.HlG it v;U;ts the Id.nd of mistake 
he had neve,;. made before in any of' h.:ts :.t~epoJ:>i:a~ on in ... 
teJ. ... no.tion.al conf~)x~ancEHl_, and I have :never been able 
to under>atand the reason :tn th.:i.s c~u;e,. • • " 
The only !'0$HiiOll I ca.n assign • , • wat~ thflt the 
lJresiden't tb.ottght that he mtght be able ·to e.gm;)e w:tth 
8ttalin to drop ·the projt:H),t so thi:'l.t nt:d:l:.lhex\ coun.tx~·.r ~JOuld 
make the demand. a.t San Ii1l?anoisco fo:r• 'hw<J extra votea 
in the Assembly., 
Hoosevelt tH!l.x··tly expla:lned v1hy he kept it secx~et nt a :Press 
Cont'er•enoe on. Apr:tl 5, J.945 t wh0n in refor:~."lng to ·trJ.e extNt 
vc)·~ee in th.e Assembly; ht:) sn:tcH 
It is not :r>eally of any gx•eat :i.l'llJH):~:•tunoe. It is 
an 1nv<.Htt1gato:t'~-y· bcHJ:y only " • • I a111 not awfull·y lr.eon 
:f.'o:rY th:r•ee votes in t~n~ JU-3.aemhly. It; 3:s the JJ:ttle fel-
low who naod}J the vote in t~he AtH:HiH11bly, 'l.*his business 
about the nmnbev. of votes in ·the Assembly does not make 
a greo.t da~l of d:tffeve:cwe. 
Q, trha~r dontt decide arr:rthing 
rr:m.~ l~nBSJ:DBW)}: ·w0 50 1.~ • 
Tho Big ~l!lwee decided i.n their 
48 ShErr.·wood.; $J2• .!1.~-~~·.; P• 8?6, 
49 Hosernnan, .91~· .2.:ll• ~ P• 545. 
5~ !b:td., p~ 611. 
do they'? 
di:l!CUfHJ:iOn of who 
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they would follow rtoosevel t t s suggestion, 1,Ph.e United Nat:tor.ls 
au th.ey existed on l''ebx-uary 8;; 1945,51 plus those assoc:tated 
n~:t.tions who dO<Jlared wnl? on the enemy by March 1, 194:5, 
It was a.gx•eed that th.a co:nfe!"enoe was to open on 
iNednesday, April 25, 1945, in Sari J!'re.noiacm, Calii'o:t~n:ta .. 
Its aitlt was to be nthe ea.~lieat poss.:i.ble eatab15.shntent with 
ou:r allies of a general intevrult;ional ox•ganizat1on to nn.lin ... 
sion of p:rovis1.on~~ :r.ox~ ~\ sys·t;em of :tnternat:i.onal tru.stee-
ehipo in th0 v1orld or·gan:lzation. Th:ts was to :h1Clt:tde Leo.gue 
ot Nations. mandates• 1;er•r:1.to.r~:tes taken f':t"'Otn ·tho onemy du.:t ...... 
ing World War !I, and arJ.y ter:~?itor:tes th.tl.t mlght be vo:Lun ... 
t;ariJ.y placed under.' tl?us·beoah:tps.54 Hoosevelt also urged 
that the proposed pel->tilmlent memlHn:·:~ of the ::5ecu:t~i t~r Council 
$hould consult w1 th each other px•:tm:• to i;he confe:r•ence on 
th:ts mt-lttel'~ and. prepare recomm<?ndations fov 1tr~ disouss:ton 
51 Stett:tnlus, !?.E.• .. <? .. t~·, P• 341. 
52~·; p, 200. 
5~$ Hepo:rt, 1946 BP:tt~a.nnlaa. Book of' ·!;he Year, Bf)l• 











at Han P:t~aneisco. J1e did no·c contempl~;:tte any detailed 
discussion of pm.:t"'·t:tculnx• islunda or tEn:~r:t tori as to be uncter 
international tJ;~utrteesh1ps 1 but he did w:tsh to eai;ablish 
the I•:tght of the wo:r.•ld orgf;tnizo:b:lon to deal with problems 
absolutely ret'used t;o :pel .. lni t t:w":'i~T agency to dee.l with any 
territo:r•y u:ndeJ.,.. tlle Bl:~itish flag. 11f.l said he would never 
consent to the United J!lationa interfc;ring in the vet"'Y life 
of tho Br•itish J}!m:pire, remarking he had .s~aid bef'ol"e tha·t 
he wou.ld neve:t" yif;Jld one tH.'>J."'np o:f' Br:t i:;ish terPi to:.t"y. When 
he was informed t1'.1at the t:r.~usteeship id([la re1~err·EHi only 
to Japanese mandated islands in the :Pacif1.c,. he agreaa..,5G 
rl1hG Daola:t.-tation on L:lbera.:tod Ettrope ws.~; prepared :tn 
the Un:t ted States State Depar·ttnent, and subm:i.tted at 
X'a.lt:.a aa an Am.e:r)ican pr><>postt1., It was mo(Ufiod only 
al:tgh'l:;l-y at Y.alta--a.:nd not J.:'l.t any Sovle·t suggostion. • .. • 
This Dee:tar~J..tlon he.f~ bEH~:n uaod as the foundation 
















of a.J.most ovory d.:tplomo.ti.c pvo·test tho trn1tecl Statet~ 
has made in <~onnoo'b:lon vii th i;ho ovents :tn Bastex>:n Europe 
fdnca the and of' th~ wa:t."•· 
Hoosovelt, :tn h:i.a messago to Congress on the con ... 
1'\erenoo, ar:~.:."tcl; nwe •.•• dt'Jtemn:l.rte<l t'' settle i.•his m~:tijte~ 
a:t:>:&ive <l.t o. seti~lemen1:i ...... ·and, :hl<.d.dentally, a unar1imous oat ... 
·tlemo:nt. ... • .u$8 
illhe Premler oi' tihe U:n:ton ot Bov:tet Social.i~:Jt Hepub ... 
lice, the IJx>ime Mlrdster o:t.' the United Kin£~d<>m, and the 
Pr,•esident of thf; Unii;ed States of Ame~ioa , l!· .. join·tJ,y 
declare their :mutual a.greemen'l.; ·to con,~ert du:t."lng the 
tt?rC\po:va.ry period of :t:n.:3tabj.llt·y j,n libe:t~~J.tad 1;:uropo 
the policies of their th:r.ee goverl1111tin1ts in akH.llst1.ng 
th~~ peoples libet"t.\ted from the do·m:tnation of No.z:t 
Germany and. the peoples of: th<:1 fo:rma:r.• Axis :sntelllte 
sta:bes of r~u~·o:r:>e to solve tT~f democrtltio means. the:tr 
pX>essing political and economic~ p:t"'ohlelns., 
'.Vhe estt:i.1,J.isht'Mmt ot order J.:n l!Ju.rop~~ nnd th.a l"G-
l:.m.ild~tng o:r nat:lonal eoonomi.o J.:t:Ce m~.:wt be ac1:.t:tev<;H1 
by processes wh~toh. w:tll enable the liba;.:'ated peoples 
to destroy the le.$t veat:tgc.H'J or Nazism and Pasc:tsm 
and 1;o olJsa:t;e d.<!lmocl"atio inst:t i;uirlonn of theil:' own 
cho :lee~ • • " 
'I'o fot~tel"' the condit:tons in. ·which the l:tbE.n:,ated peo .... 
plea may exe'l"cise these l"ightB, 1;he thr'ee g;oveJ:>l'lli'lents 
w:tl:L jointly assist tho peo1):Le :tn any :IJJurop<%tn llbe~ ... 
Ett~d state or .f'o:r:•mer Axis .li.latell:t.te state in JJ;uvope 
where :in their ju.dgmf.:mt. oond:t t1ons 1 ..equir0 (A) to es ... 
tabl1sh conditd.one o.f internal. peace; {B) to c~Su?ry out 
emergency measures for the re1:1e1.' of dist:PetH'led peoples; 
(C) to form :tn·bo:t"im government.al au.tho:r.:ttlas broadly 
representat5.ve o.f! (..),:1.1 denl0Crat;tn el{~ments 3;.n t~he populu ... 
·tion and pled.€<;ed to the earliest possible cst~?J.bl:tshrnont 
----------
- ~- .:; - - --· -
---~ 
----
thl?Ol.tgh f:t"tae electi,)ns of govermnl!>ntz l?6spon:Ji ve to 
the will of' the pt~ople; and (D) i~o fac.d.l:tta1~e \\•here 
neeesau.x~y tht~ holding ol' .lfnwh elect:tons .. 
56 
'I1h0 t~hree governmf{)n.ts \vill corH~ult ·the othel? Un:U;ed 
Ne:l:;:tonH and provisional autho1~it:tea or otb.or gov~n-.nmonts 
· :tn I~u1')ope whon ma.ttl!;"n~s oi' cUreet into:.:•est ·!..io thom a.::t:>o 
Ul1det> consid.erElt:ton" 
When, :tn ·t;ha op:tnlon of' th.e ·bhr·ee governments, eon ... 
d:l tion.s :ln v:rry nttropean l:l.l.tet"IJ.i>ad. ata.te m:.~ atry i'onner 
A4.1s sateJ.l:t t~ state in ff1v.:r>op~) m~:~:.ke Hueh act~icn1 :neoo s ... 
&1;-l.l:~y .. tl1ey will it.-tm~dil,ttely consult together o:n the 
mea~m:ves ~lece·atsw.ry to d:tsoha:t1ge the joint reaponfJ~t..bili­
ties set fot*th. in th.ia decl.arat:ton. 
B1 this declaration we; reaf..fil:"lft OUl" faith :tn tho 
p:r:tnciplea of the A11li~t.tt.tc Che.rtel-., our r.>ledge in the 
dt)clara:b:ton by ·the United Nations, 1md our detarmina• 
tlon to bu:tld in ooopE~:t=•t;<tt;ion with oth.el~ pe~lce.wloving 
no.tions w'>rld <>rder under law; dedicated to paac.e, 
security~ freedom a.nd general well .... being of all mt,l11 ... 
kir.td.59 . 
Convention was :t11 foroE> 1 an agre~~:rrl~ttt whe:t"'o il'tu•key hacL 
He cured tlu;) 11 key ·bo her ovrn house .. n By :t t., rJ.'ttl"lt:ey was able 
·t:Lfic~ation and pr(Jcedu.re., wh1J~e non .... Bl~wk 8ea xwwo:t•c were 
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lncreJ.;:iSO in gJ.oh~al t<>:nru>..ge to a maximum of 45 1 000 11p,ar,i"" 
£..~ .. !..'!. with the inorefW0 of the largest B!.:~ck Sea :t.~leet, 
which in e:t'fect mannt Ru,tu'lia' s. ul)O nut U.' 1l1t:t:rkey became 
thege ooncUt~i011J:1 w0:re to appl~r; 'l1'Ul?1tey could then close 
tho 8t:t'lai ts 1.f it, v.r:tahed. 61 
sald thiJ.t Japan had plu.yed a b:t.gge» part th~:n Hussia in 
c'trnft:tng tho treaty, a:ncl besid<JH~~ th.e i;:t•erJ.ty was l:tnked. 
to the League of nations,~~ whiol·.1. was dead. . Under· the 
Morttrm:ut Convention,. Stalin sa:tdJ the Tui··lts had the 1:--igh1.1 
to olo (Hv the S.tx•ai ts not only in time oi' \vav but ~von when 
she felt tihera l."/'O.B a thveat of war. He stdd ho 1rn.ev1 the 
56 
·treaty was made whan nr:ttit{h.,.Huss:ta,n rala:!;iont-1 wore not 
per:tect, bu:t h(;;) d.:td 11.ot thinl-c that B:t)5J.aa:tn \Vf,mted to,,tri.IJ."'.an..-
Stal:t:n stated thtj).t l t VlaftJ :tm.poss:tble fo:r• Hr:.sa:ta 
- -- ---------
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throat. The rev:lsion Of the tJ•EH.:lty; he added, should be 
done so as not 1>o h.o.rm ~f.!u:r.>key' ~~ leg:ttinu;'.te intex'ests. 62 
betwe()cll nations, tand. :tt wo.s his hope tl:w;.t n~::> countx1y even--
tu~1.lly would need to have :forts 01~ a.J:>mecl for.,tH:Hl on any 
part of their nat:tonal bmxrtdar>i<w, He had a i'1.Vnl convic-
tion, he sa1.d., thu.t nusc;ia. should have unhu:mpe:t::'od access 
to a. we.rm-wa ter POl"·t,. 63 
(:J.::~;urchill felt that Jh.tas:ta~ because of her many 
:t:nte:rests in the area, should. not have to be dependent on 
t~he t:ua.:t"'XiO\'.T ox1 t, but s:tnee th:ts ra:tght affect tl1a Br:ttish 
pos:ltion in the li!:oditorranean,. the queat:Lon should be diu ... 
cu. a sed at a lat{3r foreign min:tstG:t?s t 1neating. 1J!h:tg w~1s 
ag:Nlod t;o. 64 
w<,uld not want control l:i.mi ted to the Blacls: fJen. powers but 
would wa.n·t the area i:n.ternD.i;:tonal1zec1 under United Na.tions 
62 8tettln.1.ua, .z.n• ill ... , p. 267. 





a powel~ t:c•:tendl:;r to the! West., .Actu.al:ty,. however, 
·hhe ;r.e;t'\J. oru~·K of th*' px·oblom did. not conH~ o1..:rt :tnto 
the open at Yal t.rh 1livei~yone knew· tb.at the 11uss:tana 
des:tx•ed tjo get <~o.ntrnl of t;b.is vitul watOl"wa·y. They 
had been tx~y:1.ng :ror one hu.nd:t')~d and fifty yE)o.rs to ae-
Cfl .. tlro sttt'h oon"til'Ol.- Wt'l kl"J.ow that 1\fi<HlCOi'' wanted a11 
arrax~gement wh:l.ch would g:t.ve Ruas14 tho authox~:I.ty to 
say who wcrtllrl use i;he na~(iar1el1(3~1. 66 
V., Y'UGO.SlJ\. V'!A 
'that ·the govt:n:'r.nm:nl.t o1.~ Yugoslavia was to he bo.sed. on an 
u agl..)C:H.:m:tent11 be'\.:.tleen. -t,1;.ro Yugo:3lav ].l)aders ....... ~~i 1::.o and. '/ 
5B 
joet to rr:~.tittca1:;1.on by a const:Um.ent astlombl:y. A Yngo~lav ... 
Itallan ;f.:ront:te:~. .. (as 1:vall st.~J f:\rl :rtal:ta.n ... Aust:;J:--:i.u:n f':r.ontler)) 
1flJfHll not dao:l<lod u.pon... 0;\l&:s·t:tons of a Yugoslnv-Eulglf,tr•1&t 
all:t.nnee v.rer•e also pr..Jstponod. 67 
65 Lawr(;)nee Chn:mbor•lain nnd Hlchnrd. Snydo~e, Amel,.:lcan 
lilore!_m 1:q1~·S?.l (N~3W Yo:t•-k: Hinehn:rt e:ncl Go:npany, 194'8);""·-
}?."'619"; .· 
6f) 1 h • t t;t: lr/ ,oa . y 1 £J2. ~<:.:.~:...:,. , }? , ,,_, · , 








It was believed by the We at u thai; the agreement 
reached on Yugoslavia gu.tu~anteed to that galla:rrt, tortured. 
country the oppo»tunity to achieve a representative govern-
ment in accordance with truly demoora-t:tc principles. tt66 
Upon he~:.tring the news of. the Yalta. agreements, the 
Yugoslav govern.ment ;i.n I1ondon said it would proceed inmted:t~­
a.tely to Belgrade, s}lowing ag1~eement with King Pei1er :Y?e ... 
garding :l-mplementation of the Tito-Suba.sitch conoora.69 
A coalition of: the London group and the 9:1to 1\nt:t .... Vasc:tst 
Oour.1<dl \~ms thus fo~med in Belgrade in Wfaroh, 1945. Of 
ment; the reet were men:tbers o:t' T:tto• s Comn1unis·r. Party. 
All power :rl!)ma.:tned in the hands of IJ.'i to and the Conunu.n.iErt 
J 
Partyt nnd Yu.goslav affairs 'i:Tere conducted in complete con . ./ 
formi ty w1.th Hussia.ri poli<ryVfO until 'l:H;o b:r•olte awr~:y :!'rom 
strict Hussiun inf'1ue:n.oe in 1047 and 1~)48 because he did 
not want to follow i~he policy of' the Gominf.or'm as put :t,•ox~­
ward. by 'Russia. 71 As a l"eBuln, ·the~e have been hopes in 
68 Sherwood, 2£• .,.qA.~· 1 p. 864. 
69 ~.1! X2.tl£ 1'1l'll€1Jh Pebrua.r·y ::~, lQ45. 
70 Hans Ko:b..rl, 11Yugoalk-w1n, n 194-:6 BrH;am1ica Bool~ 
· ~ ~ .1.<1 ~pe;;JUo...,~ ~~
of the Yeur, 854. 
~~~~-
71 Hugh seton ... watr:~on, nyugoslavia, 11 ~ .§r..!!?..~ill-.1£! 
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Vl:. KOHEA 
The:re waa an i:ni'o:mna.J. agreement as to th.e division 
o:e Ko:vea. :Cor .PUrposes of mil.:t tn'Py. occu.pation a:b Yal·ta, 72 
but, aeoordin$ to JoblJ. Gunthe:lfr~ 73 
It ie a'bsolutel-y' ;not true., as is often said., tho.t 
the 38th pal?allel wae speoi:f':l.oally drawn ut Yal tt~. o:t'l 
I>otadam 11 • • Aotua.lJ:y the line was ch'L:t.wn in early 
Atlgust :tn Washington by a group o:t: comparatively j'l~nior 
officers operating under the iState•War~Navy Coovdil1ating 
Oonnn:t. ttee • · • • Mainly, it was s.n A:~;-my job. 
After the etWrender of. Japan, MacArth1.tr ordered all 
Jo.paneao a.rmlea north or the thir-try•e:tghth parallel to su:r ... 
rende:t~ to the Soviet Arrn.y, whe:~?ens the United States would 
tal~e care of Japanese in Korea south of this Hilb:t trtu•y 
l:tno~ 74 nuss:ta then built up a commun:tst ... :tndoetrixu3.ted. 
responding to $.ll attempts by tho United States to u:n:t!y 
the country, ln. June, 1950, the No:r·th KoJ?eans, suppl:tod 
and. directed. by nusaia, attacked South Korea, 
At Ya+ tr~ there was aloo ~:m iru'or•mal agreement to 
Korean :lndepondence, and if a transition pel. ... :lod we1~a needed 
72 DaJ.l:b11 S!.E.• 9J ... t• 1 P• 26l~t 
73 John Gunther, The Hidc-Ue of MacA:rthul~ (!~·aw York: 
Ha:rper and Brother•E~~ 195!'f';' }:i". '·7'8• ·- -
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to obtain th:ts, a trusteosh1p was to be eotabl1ah~ch75 
Koi•ea has not yet obtained its independence. 
!ft!J:J;r;@II!} ... -It wnts ag:r?eed th11t they wou:td eonsidex~ 
late1~ ~!i control cwmm:tsaio:n :ro:r Bulgax•:ta ar.~.d Gti&ek claims 
upon. .this oountx~y,78 The Bulga~:tru1 1flethe;rlGJ:1d Front Gov ... 
&l?~J.ent had como into power :tn l,9{t4 and was still :tn. at 
61 
the t:tme o:r the Yalta Oonf~rence~ It vms backed h:r Hussic"'t 
and local oommun:tst; groups in marry countries. Elections 
were held in Nov~mber, 1945, to whioh. ·the United states p:ro ... 
tested 1:>ecauae there was only one slate of cand:lda:tes of ... 
:t'e:t->ed. ...... supportel"s of thE:> govel"nment. IJ.'he protestB ·ware 
in va:l.n,.. 77 'l1here was ~l Allied. Control Comrnissio:n in 
Bulg~J.t .. 1a; lmt it was o:t no h~lp in p:r•Xllvent1nr~ 'the oou.nt:r·y 
fronl becoming mo:.t'*e and more pro .... Hussia.n until it is now 
compl,erbely controlled 'by !Hlssia. 
t7l') of' o:tl equipment :tn Rumania, 0 In spi·be o£ the pl.edges 
'76 13yrn~Hl 1 P..l?.• .2.1!u Pll! 221. 
'76 Protocol quoted in Btet'l:;.tnius~ .9l?,• £~.t·, P• 34B., 
77 Haru;l Kclm, 11 .Bulguria, u 1946 B:rJ.tannica Book of. tl1e ·year, 158. .... --~ ..-... l · Ju .,. .. ,,~··(f~~· ~>R ~ ---








1.n th~l T)eclal?ttti<>n on :tt:thGl%tted Europe regard1.ng joint 
act:ton, thirteen d~1:yr,i after Yalta the Russit:U1 member o·f' 
the Allied Control Connn1ss:ton !'or fhunania :t:>efusod to c$.11 
the current gove:rr.uu.e:nt ttt:nd <lornand~d. the tol->mation. of: tJ. new 
gover:nment. He soon forced. t~he J.dng to a.ppo:tnt a govern ... 
man.t formed. by the pro .... comrom'l:tst lead01", Pete:t• Groza. 
Allterio.an protests at this v:tol.!ttion ,£)f the Declarration 
were bluntJ.:y rejente<;i by the Huasian.s. HooaeveJ.t was 11ery 
distux•bed about th:t£3.79 Thu.f.z, all the key mem.he:r.s :tn the 
Cabinet wet .. e comrrn.m:tst;, and so tho commu.nists l.,.$.n the 
ooun.tt"Y• In . .?tuguat, l94~S~ the king appealed to the Unitec1 
Si:,a·I.HJtil.- rtn.gland, &nd nussia for a democratization of the 
l"'OfSime, bU.t Groza :ttefuaed to r~sign. and ~U'ter a t~:tp to 
Moscow, h:U~ pos5.t1on WflS wt:rengthenecJ,80 I)a·t~r· c,iemando 
l:ry the Utiited gto;.i.i~s fo:r free. aJ.ec:rbioru~ were agt.d.n ign<.lred 
by Husa1.a.1 and thus Humanim., too, ·was to all inten.ta and 
~ ..... The thl~~t1 fore1.gn ministers d.iscuss0d this 
quest:1.on fo:r• a long time and. got. absolu·bely nowheve. · All 
r79 Stattinius, .2£• !!f ..:~··; PP• 193.,.195. 
60 Hans Kohn; nRurnnn:ta," l.'<~46 Br:tta.nn1ca Bool-c of 






-- ---- -- ----_ _-__ -_-
-
_-__ -_-_-
It was agreed that ·I:Jhis raa:tter should be pu~sued through 
·the d:tplomatic c!tal."l11el. 11 81 IJ.Ih.us, no "dao:La1on11 ::rb Y'tl.l·ta 
contributod. to the momentot.ts even:bs :tn th.ts l;tt·tle co1.mt:~"Y 
a.t·ber th~ war., 
the tn€\.intenanc('J a..nd repatriation of Allied we.~ pl'd .. soners 
63 
as they wal"e l:tberrJ.ted by i'ozteEH'~ e:nt{n~:b:tg Germany~ rgaeh 
ally wa.s to provide .f'ood, clothes, n:tedical ~ll.ttention, and 
othe:t~ needs for th~~ nationals of ·bhe others until tranapor ... 
tation was available for re;pat:rtia·t:ton. 1:/!ht-):J?e wns no tuen ... 
tion o:C pltJ.ns for b.r:i.'l:'l<U.:tng; pr:UJonl1llrs oi? vts.:r. of othex• nat ions 
Qonf:tn.Qcl in German prisc}n and c,.viliun concentr1ation carnps.B~J 
beh:tnd its lines to deal w.:tth their own :u.ba:ratecl pr•iso:nersj> 
Ai~tev Yalta, h(>wevor, HtJ.saia woul.d not allow ru1 American 
:m:1 •. ss:ton to ope:~.:"s.te heh:tnd Husa:tan lines. 83 
Sl Stett1l'liUs~ .2£• ,£!,j;_., P• ;:>41. 
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l\u.st:t .. :!.an f':t'lont:ter. They d<Ho;ided R.lt::o i~h.o.t tho fore:tg.n 
mird.stars should meet as often a·s necessary, pl?Obttbly every 
three Ol7 .four months,.84 And Hoosav6lt told Stal:Ln privately 
tha·t he thought Hong Kong should be given baok to the 
Gh:tno:~e or :tnte:ene.tiona.l:L$?.€)d, lntt :t t :ts not known if' he 
U'lfo\de thls ::nlgget~tion to Chul:>chill. 85 
84 Protocol quoted in ~.bid. t pp., :348 .... 349. 
hiU;II ,.. 
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ment:ton<7lld in the CmmnlJ.n:tquo or· not :r.ully developed there 
bee~ur:H~ of m:tl:ttar·:r ¢(>naiderationn at tho ti~no oX> ·hhe noed 
J."<~r fm?the:r st1:t~iy~ 1 
r.l:ho ag;reernents on. Poland, Ytlgoshwia1 and. ·the De<~·· 
que .for f'<t)a:t.. that meni;:ton:tng of i i.~ migh:t 1.nc:rea.se enemy 
5..t cou.lt1 ho announced._ A:tt.:~o, the d.oc:tsion that the :t3ig 
l qt.~·t·~~~ua ·~ 





o.n the quest~ion o:t' ter:r.:1.tor•ial tl."usteeshlp$ did :no·t &pJHHlr 
fn the Comra.uniqu.o beea:use of the :,n()ed of.' JP:r~xloh and Chinese 
W0l"e not ill the (h:m:mn.tn1.q;ne beoaur.H~ r.tQ deotsions v.'<:rre reached 
on any o1'; them:r and. they all ~eqtt1.~"t:H:::l ful:"·bhe:t~ stu.dy.. rrhe 
de-cision that the l1n:t1;ed Bta1H;,n and Bnglaud. would .support 
Httaa!a J.:-ega:ttding two axtrs. vot{~s :f.n the United Na.tions 
:i.n i1he l)roiil)Col WCiS that the American, dolega·bion d:f.tw.greed 
ove;;."' it"B The ~t?ar !~aatc:rn agreel'n.en'ts 1 which will be d.;ta-
et.un:,~ed lateJ?~ wer•e no·t i:nclu.ded .in €d.ther Jcho Protocol or 
the Oommuniqtte, 
t:tons of the \Vt;n~ld. to the col'lf0:'(.t(~nco~ with w·h:teh th:ts chap ... 


























'J:h(~ Pre r:l:t d.e:nt; of the tflti ted ~3ta.tes of AJJ'lel?ica.~ the 
Premier of the Soviet Un:lon, ~~.nd t}he Prime ~~1inister 
of. (f.;t:oeat Bt .. 1:~ain., llOOonrpt:l.n.t~d b~ the:tl" Chloi'~' o!' Si;;r;\.ff', 
the three foreign Heeretal"'iea and other ad:vlso·ps, are 
now meotlng :tn th~) Bl~.w1,5:: sea HJ:•ea, 
Theit' rrurpose it4 t;o o~:)n.c~tn"t plar.ts .f~r:.n) compl(:~t1ng 
the defeat of the connnon en~:nny and for· bu:tld.:tng, 
· vd:th t}:)eir al:tiea, f;tx~m foulld.l:rtions fen" tt l!ist1.ng 
pelltce.,;~ 
The Comrm.mique wH.s relee.sed at th~ (])nd of tb.e con ... 
ferfntce. At the Wh:lte Hou~e these first de1.H:tila were :ta-
.su.ed by tTone.:bha:n DaniHls.t~ adm:l.nitrtratj.v¢ at:!Slstemt to tho 
J.l:r(.H~ident. He opened his ru:1.nm .. u1<~err1vmt. to tlla V(f}:r.y 5.mp~r.tt:tent 
cor:~:tes:pondm1ta w:tth the b~:te:r statement th.ey had. all been 
vta:tt:tn.g fo;r ...... '1Th:ls 1.s it. 11 4 
Tht} ove:r• ... a,ll, :tmmediate raactlo11 'IU~ls f 1avo:rublo. 
An edi tol:•ial in ·bhe J§e;;v- Yo:t"'k 'l'inte.a si~at~d: 5 
~~-..... *l>'flli,. ...... 
rl1Jla long and detallad o.g:t•eement s • • ,.. will. ttl.ke 
a detailed ~U:'lt:tlys:ts f::\tld a d<;)mon.J:Tt:t~at:t<:m of th~:lv ap ... 
·plication :t:n t\Ci'iual p!"'ao·c:te& to measu.:t~e th.e:tr full 
scope and final inrplica:tions. But wvon tha :f':J.r>nt 
glano~1 gi1ros liUH3U.l"fJXH30 t,ht:~:t ,. • ·~ Uwy ,justi:f.'y ruad 
erurpu.ss most of. tl'w 11opos plta.ced. on 11hese f.'at{~i'nl 
· r.floetdngs, and 1:n th.~):tr 1l1ms and ptw:po.sea they sh.ow the 
·way to an elU"lY vicrbo:r·y- l:n. :ff:upope, i;(:r n fl\~C\n:)e pe9.oe, 
and to a brighteJ:> wo:tJld • 
... ,.._ ... -~l"l}fOj~· 
:3 J1~~~,,~~ X~.r!~ 1li:m.QE.1 B'ehru~:t:r•y 8, l9t.l:5• 
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By any t:'rbandnrds:t i;he C:~J:tnv.ua.n Confer•enae was a great 
achievement. All do1lbts about the Big Thr•o$' s ability 
to cot:>pa:rate, 1.n peace an well na war, s(!lem now to 
have been S\':l'apt awa:y. On the bas:ls of ·the B.:i.g Throe• s 
cot1nnUl1lqu.e1 no oit:l.zen of the u-.s .. , the iJ..~~ .. s~n., or 
G:N~at Britain could eomplai.n that hiB country had been 
sold down tho r:tvex-. 
For A.me1~1cans, th~re was a specie.l racogn:ttion of 
ee:t..-.taa.in pl .. eo~;mts which funericans have always held dear, 
and ~Hhieh would rea.asure rrun:~y a cit1.zcm that W(>:Pld 
War II was not be:tng :f.'ou.ght in v~11n,. 
~l::t1e l.''eaoticm of. the Cong·x·EHH3 of tl1e U:ni ted States 
vvas not une.ni.mous in support of the eon:.eeren.ce il hut it 
wus fa:t ... from fit partiaa.n roae·bion. Both Ht;.~:pubJ.:teana and 
D<:m1.ocr•ats sa:td, 11Wall done • "" ., li'ew of Mr. Hooaaveltt s 
:eeeent state papers !M.'lve baer1 bottexl !'¢celved t:tt first 
glance o:n Gli:l-pitol H:.t.ll. ne 
S.en.atox·~ Wallace H .. WhJ.te .. Hepublica:n of Maine and 
ter•m . .a u ru1.d said he i 1 el t good wor•k vnl.fJ Cl.c)ne. :f.' he ma.1 ori ty 
leL\dcn., i:n. the Sentate, Albe:n. w • Barkley, eal.d: ''It is a 
-------
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aout""C0 o.r gre~:t. g~at1:r:toat1on to r.1e. 11 Heprasentat! vo Sol 
Bloom, Demoo.:r•at ot Ui;)w YorJc, .t'elt that "there i13 a. reaf;tr ... 
ma·tion of the Atlantic Oha.rter and- ~.f we a:l?o falling baek 
again on th(~ Atlant;ie Charter, woh.re got a pret;ty good 
basis to work from 11 11 Setllld.iOl? Al.,thu.:r H. Vandenbel'\g, Hepub ... 
liean of T"t:tcJ:dgan, l"eaoted in this way: n:tt :t'eaffirms 
basic p:r>inciples of' justice to wh1.ch w0 are deeply a·ttached 
• • • 'rhe total d(:}mil:ttat•ization of Germnny nnd the pledge 
to proceed among our allied friends on the baEli.s of the 
Atlantic Ch.ta.J."tel'll are g:r•r:Hatly eneourng;5~ng.lt Senator Harley 
M. 1\ilgo:t'$, Democl.""a·b of' west Virginia, stated: nwe (-:tre 
getting whs.t I have hoped for all tho way through, the 
questionably., th~l oonf'et~etlo$ should :.:1peed a clean ... 'l.tp of' 
the Gerrnan s:ttua.t:i.on., ug Cl~1ude Pepp~x·, :Democratic Senator 
:t'l."C.ml I1'1or:tda, r~a.id it was one of 11 the greataat steps towar<l 
last:lng peace .th&t hae ever boGtl taket.t. u R~1presentati va 
Helen ti·ahagru'l Douglo.s, Dsm.ocrat of Ca.lifox"nia, stated th.at 
it wa.s nbatter than the tllost; optim:tstic expectatlons. 11 10 
Bo~nu:rd Ba.:ruch stated 1.~hi::tt 11 th0 oon.t'e:rence has le.:td 
the :f.'oundat::ton of' a just and durable peac::le. 11 lie said n 
i'oundat:ton was be:tng erected tllat had. n apil:'itual valuet.-?1 
9 !~~~ ~ :t:t.nwJ!!' Ii'ebruary 1~:>, 1945. 
10 !~!~l·" J?ebruo.ry 14,. l9t15. 
-~---
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as well as fo:t;totDs and economic potent1a;l1t1es as well 
o.s military sunet5.o:ns~ nll 
70 
Aa soon as Hooaeveli:i came on bo~d the qu~a.~.I on 
G:re~1.t 13i.tter Lake (so om.inously and perhap::J so appro .... 
p~iatel~r nrmH.:Hi) he received floods of tnessages ·telling 
<")t the e:nthus:taetio response to the publication of' 
·hhe Yalta conmtuniquas in the Unit~d States. One of 
tho cables quot~d Herbe:t"t Hoover as may:r.ng, n:rt will 
offer a gJ?ent hope to the world. n William :L .. Sh.ilo"e:t• 
called it tta.. land.lnt;;~.rk :tn hum~n history." Haymond G1':1ru11 
Ehving said; ttNo more appl."opr:tate l'lOV.fS ooul.d be conce-ived 
to celebrate the bix>thday of Abrahan1 r..:tncoln.. • .. .. 
Joseph a. n:~trsch wrote~ 1n the OJ:u;~:tl';ltian Boienee 
r;tonitor~ nTh~ Ol"itnea oonre:roence atiahcta '"oht"""f'vom :PJ:~'G ... 
VI'O'us'"'"Sueh c<,nfe:t>encH.)e because of 1 ts mood ot clecision. 
The moet:b1;$S' wh~.oh p:~. .. od.u.ced t11f) Atlt•.nt:tc Oha.x•tor,. 
Oasa.blanca, ~~eheran, Q,uebec ..... all those were dominated, 
politically, by d~claruti1re moods. '.rhf}'Y we1 ... e deola;ra. ... 
·tions of policy, of aspi:cati<.)ns, of intents-. l3ut they 
W<):re no·t tli~et:tngs of decision. The me~.}t:tng at Yalta 
was plainly dominated l>y a desire, willingness and 
deter•m:tna:tion to reach solid deoisi0ns.l2 
A survey of public :reaction showed. that the Atne:&?ican 
people cons:tdeJ."ed ,Yalta a success ancl a step toward per-
trHll'lent peace. They approved of' the way noosevolt and the 
State Department were handling their intereats.13 
The first reaction :t.n London to the Yalta Commun:tque 
vuHl one of r.•el:tef that :tt conta:T.ned among other things 
ni;he bones and elne·ws ot .future collabore:tton :r. .. ather than 
the., -l!l0re rhetor:tct.\1 shadow of a p:N;}SG~nt a.grtiH1tn.ent. u Thus, 
ll .!!1~ 111 , l'1eb:ru.ary 14:~~ 194:5. 
12 quoted :t:n Shel.~wood, ~· ~J...~·, p .. 8'70. 




11 relief11 "·1~.a ·the key word there.l4 
The Soviet pt-ess hailed the aoeord at 'Y.alta us a 
U\lan:tmou.a one,. hav1.ng 111'10ti only 3.te hlato:t'"ice.l yesterday 
and its viotor:tous. toclay, but j;b.s gJ..,eo..t tomor:l?ow as well. n 
They said i.t would bring victm?'Y' nmah more quickly and 
would :tnsul"¢ a lli~stint~; poace-ll.l'5 
1I'h(() two leading papt.:n~s in Argentina, J?rense. and 
¥01 .J "'""~'-· *-'. 
£ti!C..~?Jl, both approved of' the Yalta. deoia:t.ons1 l6 
:E1ven the P:vea:tdent of the Atm~ri<H11~ J.redel"~ation ±\or 
Polish ·J'ews h1~ilNl the decisions on Poland as cont:r~<ibttting 
a.s will be shown, many of tho in:i..t:i.al cviticisn:w of the 
Yal·ba. Confe:~; ... enoe were ecmcerned vd .. th the Polish quost:ton, 
l\1oat l;'olish groups in the West we:t>e especially bitte:r. 
rJ.Ihe United Committee of South Slavic Americana also 
hailed the conf.'a:t"ence. They said: 
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The reecmn.11enda1j1ons rega.~d:tng Yugosle;via • • • guar ... 
antQea a. bette:.:) future for all South ~;tla.vio people-S 
who in their stl"'Ugg:te for liberation t1ave established 
the foundation for a new democvat.j.('~ Yu.goslavia. e:tt the 
cost o:f" tx,emendous sacrii~1oe.l8 
-14 Ha-ylnond DardeJ.1 :tn the !!.! ?.{.o+:t~ !+J.Jt\e_!, li'eb:r•unr:r 
13, 1945. 
15 W. n. Le.wrenco in .~:.1!*9:' .Pebr,u.ary 14, 1945. 
17 ~·ill· 








~- _-- ____:_ ___ _____:_:__:: 
-------------------= 
~-----------
Th.arl;) ,~vox~~ somH p~)ople~ avon at this t:tme,. 'Nho wer-e 
hesitant to go all out in prt\1a:e of the eonfe~ence. Ra~llond 
:Oaniell wrotel9 thQt in London 
it wat'J recogn:i~ed ·1! , • that aome of the most d:tf':f1..-
auJ.t pl"'Oblams conf1.'onting the Allies had not been 
settled, but postponed and delegated to o·thera to 
rasolvu in detail after tho three leadec:rs h,.~I;~.d ae;l?Ood 
on f'o:t•mulae and general.ities.o 11 .. car~ful analysis of 
the commun:lque malees it qtd. te appa:t·~mt that,. while 
:President RooeGvelt t!!pol<+.:> eloquantl,- and forcibly f.o:t11 
Amel.,.:tcan p:r.•:tnoiple.a; Pl'iem:tel"' Stalin was pr~etty conv1nc• 
ing about the realities ot 1Sul."opean l'ol:ttios aa h0 
S0EH!) them, • • • 
What :tt all s.n1ounts to, 1.n the t;:tow of several smal1. 
GoverruM;)trba in London, :te th~t tho big povte~s have 
U$Ur'J:lad sovereignty . oval? all .~~urop~ and httvo accepted. 
jointl-y the resp<)nsibil:i.ty of r·unning it at l~aat until 
t~b.ey fall ou..t amo11g thorasolves ... ~~an eventuality againet 
whioh they have sought to protect thfimselves by estab""' 
l:tsh:lng mach.ine~y i.'or oont:tnu:tng the all1a.noa afte:t .. 
Germany has 'been beaten. The cy.rtical view is that,. 
:faced with a common enemy, the-y' ho.ve postponed cruc:i~al 
decisions because none of them wlshea to face them 
at present, when OaJ?manyt s defeat is pr.•iority No. 1 
tunong them all. 
And Do.niGJ,l wrote20 very prophetically a few days 
later: 
It would bo oou:~:•ting fu.tu:~."e disillusionment if' it were 
not reo.ognizE?d at once that unpubllr$hed. :resn.:tl•bs or 
the eon:fore:nce may have as strong all 5 .. :n.fltv~nce on .fut'l..U?e 
events as tho$e that have already been publlshed, • , • 
Only when the pl.~:tnoiplas enunciated· by i;ho J.eadera 
begin to bo put int:o practlee w·:tll 1 t be po$e:!.bJ.e f'Ol'* 
the wo:t"'ld to ,judge ·?J~1e'tihe:r'. th~) cortte~enee 1I1 the Crimea 
oa.l~l"':l.ed i'_O~f'ifHIU:>d the pvogram of Teher•an, rove:rt~e~.-1 tl'.tese 
19 .f:.9.:1t.9.:• ., f!f.Jbl."~Ual;"Y 13, 19r15,. 




trends toward a re~burn to povtr:.ll1 pol1.tlcto"t and spheres 
of lnf1U'I9nce, OX' merely modif:ted them. 
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The :Lntrins:.to evidence oi' the doou.ment itself hints 
at :L"GVersal of poli¢',1, but i:t m1.ght be 'b~tter to l"egard 
1 t as a ntodif:tcat:ton, &t J.etll.st until the;t'e has bean 
an opportuxd ty to see how $tloh term a .as n dentocraticn 
and "froe and unfettoa"'ed elect:tonsn at>e intcn"preted 
:tn pl."'aot:tee., 
hoat:lle to tlte agreema.nta. Burton K. Wheeler~ Democrat 
· of' Mon·lia.na1 stated the conteronce waa 11 a g:veat victoxly 
:f'or ~1ta.J.in and to~ Russiarl. :ttnpe:t>ialisra, 'i 21 
R~p:resoo'ltttt:tve Alv:t11 B, 0'1\:onsk:t1 Republican of 
Wiscons:ttJ., stated; 
The aeol:tne; QU'b of 11oJ.and :l.s a stab in the baek ·to 
r:r.eetk.>m arld a £:<~tab in the back to the :f'x~eedom ... lovi:ng 
cow;.try that has done mo$t ·t() a:vur.~h 1-Ia.z:tsm. • .. ~ 
'J:h:ts sixth partition of Polru'ld ia a denun.cia.t:ton 
of the Atltmt.ic Gha:rtor, ·what r:·ole w~a ever consulted 
bofo:t?~ th.e Big ~r.hreE~ t'l'H:~t? .. • ,. 1.Phe Atlantle Chf.;:t?U€!l1 
has been torn up and. thrown. into the~ Blo.clt Seo .• .r .... 2 
Hepre.t:wnta:t:tve Ola.:ro Booth Luce, Hepubl:toan of 
Uonnect:tout, was dj.sappo:tnted. vrltl:t the cmtr.e:rence1 saying 
that the l)as:tc s~i'ttl~tn~:mt u d.oea :n.ot correspond ill. my mind 
w:tth ·what 1 thought X'rasldent Roo~H~vol'l:. and P:t .. irne Minister 
Ohl.t:t:•ch111 hnd in theirs when they pl~<-)illUlgo.ted t~h.e Atlantic 
21 11:?..~~·, Pal1l?US.l."'Y l:3t 1945. 
22 t~oc. e:t t, 
....  ·~~-,f# 
--~----
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'llfH7 Hat~.onal <~onunitteo of Alnel"'icans ot' l>ol:.tsh ne ... 
scent went on l?ecord. as oppoa:lng the ttr:.ti'th. :partitioningtt 
of' Folanct,.24 The Pollsh goVGl'ntxlent in l1ondon rofusod to 
a.oaopt~ tha Yalta agreements~ saylng they v:tol~rt.ted the lei;"" 
t.ev ancl $:p:lvit o:e the A.tlantla Cha:r.tc:t>. A P~ovisional 
Govlf:tJ:nnw:nt o:r Natlbnu:t. Un1,t·y,. us set up at Ya11:;a1 said the 
:r,;Jond.cm group., fleal'l only logalize Soviet :1ntel .. ft>rE:>nce :tn. 
Polish int~rna.l a.f'f'aira. 0 And a l)o11Hh diplome:b in Amerlc~ 
stated.# "Our l<.HHH~f;l have been specifically s-tated11. bu.t 
out' eomp(J)naation l"enta:tns vague and :tnd.efini:bo. n~35 
.. 
;;i~*~~'e :tn i'li$ x•efusal to niHtke eVf)U the f'irst step tow:t:1.rc1 
ending the wo:~, u P..J"ld stt'l.ted tha:t ·the contoren<.'e did nc)t 
uphold tl1e Atlant:te 01un:•te~ l"(1gD.l'"'d:lng r:•o:U:~,nd. f:~6 
a:u.thorits:bivo Va.t:tean c:p:tarter:·\1 ~ommet.1.tot1 g:toom5.ly ••• 
On the ]3ig rJ:llwee t ti deci~Aion.s, 
Thet axp~essed ttrt.Xi~·c:r lest the se&<le oi' D. f'utu:~."e 
war• be aown in cs:rry:tn.g ou·~ tlle t1.g:t .. eement$. ~!:he out-
stan<ling disappointments, :tn:fo:t~m(mts aa:i.d.1 •trere Polandt 
to which the Pope has oft0n :r-'Ofe::t?red as n,;u~ belovedn; 
the omission. ot Oatbolic Italy and t;hs likf>lihood that 
Italy will have no part; :tn the pea\.te oom·er·ences, and 
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the omission of any ment:tm1. of' fl'!l(;HlHl,-:Jll'l. of r·e11g:ton, 
!U! p:r~omised b'3' the Atlmlt:tc Char•ter. 2r1 
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l'rewapape:ra in Spa:tn 1'$lt tl'Ult the y·alta ttooord :Pl"e"" · 
c:tude<l the 11poss:tbiJ.lty of Husaie.' a atta:tn1.ng pol:t. tical 
anc1 ~uil:Ltary predom:tnnnce :tn IZnste:vn Jj;uropth n2l3 
1Iihe l."eaction in Ge:rnna:n:y· to the Yal·l~a. Con:C~:r-ence 
was ver~y violent, 1l'hey labeled it a program oi' 11l:Laters,n 
of a grou.p ot men pla:o:ning new crimes aeainst huraanit;y. 
'rhay sai<l ·th.a.t the men at Yalta wet>0 im'bull)c.1 wj.th the spiX~it 
of Old 'J.lestarnent Jewish hatred and were attempting tha 
gx-ea:test political mu.rdex> of all t3.me.29 
cast stated the:b th.e decision$ of' the B:Lg Tl:.U"Oe at Yalta 
vrere "nothing bu.t a:p. indication of an absolu-te Anf~lo ... Amer:toan 
S'1.,1.bnl:tssior.\ to thi:!! overwhelming influence o:e th1!3 s.ov.:tet 
Union. n.30 
Yt.::t.lta ·~v.a:-J one of sllpx~cm0 oxaltat;ion. :l}he·y- believed., as 
did the Dri t1sh, t.h.at this wai~ tlV.il moat e11.ooux-aging c<:m ..... 
:r.erenco oi~ .o.ll.3J~ •:J!h~'Y' felt th~"tt tho foundation ot~ world 
S,/ .~.Ja;i...r.h, .i?eb:t~uacy l'~" lttt.t5. 
28 .±E.l_q.,, Il1 ehruax~y- 161 19i:kl5, 
29 .. li!~? ... <t1:'.~QB J!!:~?.P.r,r1~ Ti'ebrua:t'7 13 ~ l\345" 
30 !!.~!! ~£P.~ ~, Fehrut1ry 14t 1945. 





peace had. h<~on laid it:~. tl1.tH oight .... da.-y· :meeting"' 32 Hoosevelt, 
in a r.neasage 1~o St;a.l:ln n:tl th$ end of ·the oon:f'el~enco, wrot~H 
I wish to tell you l>.ow deepl·y gl"~Otltful I l':.u"ll to :rott 
tor all ·the ldnt1noHs you hav<!l sho~.11:1 me wh:T.lo I was 
you1• guest in the Cr:tmQa. 
I am O(}}:H:.1.rt.5.n&~· 'rtl'lt(';h, on.eOUJ.1'1,lg0d. by ·the l~0$l.llts or 
the czH:>:t:t.f oren cO:,. • .. • 
The peoplos of the wol?ld, I !tnl sut~e,. will se~ th.e 
~chi~vem<:mts of' ·this -con:.t .. or·e:noe ~l.S a 1,eaJ. gur.n...,~ult£~0 
tJ:mt ou.r th.ree graa.t. :nat:tons can wo:t'k :tn the peace 
as well as ill tho ·wa:t."'., ~3 
Jamee Byrnes teJ.t34 tha:t Y~:tlta was tho uHigh •r:tcle o:r Big 
Thl"ee Un:t ty. u And Uarx-y Hopkins said to 8hel"'Woocl: 35 
Vie :r'Elally believed in our hea.l?ta that t..~is was the 
dawn of' the now day ...,,r~ had all b()E)n Jrl'.t•a:ying for and 
t.;t-:l.l1~:1ng abcn,tt 1'011 so m.an.:r yo(~J?s., we wq:re absolu.toly 
certain thai~ we hl:td. won the :ri~s'li g:r•0s.t vi<Ybory <::)f 
the pee.ca ...... and, l>y tt-.I'Je 1 n I mean all of us, the whole 
civilized htuttal?. x•ace. \l'he Huss:thrie hud. prov~d ·chat 
th~y COUld be l70Q.SOt1&ble &r.td fal"See:i.ng and there \'let.Sn ft 
a;Y:ry doubt in th~ minds Of' tho .P:t .. esid.ent oJ:> any •::>i' u.s 
th::.rt we cou.ld live with ·!;hem and get along vd.th thexu 
p(Jo.ce:t\\lly for as far in·to the futu:tYe as ~ny of us 
could. ims.gine,. Hut I have to m~:.tke one araendm.ent to 
tr.urd; ....... :t think WtJ all h$..<1 in our m:t:nda t;he x•t:H~ervat:ton 
·that v,re could l'lO't f'o:l:."et<\>11 what ·the results would be 
if {;\l'lything should happen to ~a::alin. We felt sure 
·bhat W<'.l could count on h:i.m to be1 ;;::•easono.ble ~:md sen-
:i:li'ble and W.J.t:l.aratand:tng ...... but we never cou:td. be ~n.u~e: 
wh<) or wl'U:tt · m:tgl:rb be in 'ba?k of h:tm thoro :tn the Kr0mlin. 




to coope:r>ate wi·l:ih Hussia, ln h1.s !Spe0eh l~oo ::11\Wel.t shov!l'ed 
that he at:tll l"egQvdod. ·bhe oonf~e:r.~)ttce as a oomple"tH;~ suo ... 
I oor.tw f:t"'t:nu ·i;ho G:t1 :1.liWo.n Co:il.i'orif.mco w:U;h. a. f:t.t.•ln bel:tef. 
that we have m-o.d.(~ a good start 011. the l:'oa.d to o. WOl .. ld 
of p(;al10. 
1.Ch(\U10 wer•o tw~> m.ain pu:t:>pos~s :tn th5.s Ol'~itnaa Confer .... 
enoe.. 'rhe first was to hv:t:ng clet'ent to Germany with 
·i.ihe grea:tc:mt _ posafble apeod and vdth the small. eat pos-
sible loss o.f Allied raen. Tha;t pux;pose j.s nm1 being 
CH!lt'l:->ied .out in. gveut f't:>rc(h t • ~ 
!fho aeoond pu:rp.ose was to cont:tnu<;~ to bu:tld tho 
foundation for an :lntarna.tlorw.l Q.CH:o:rd wh.i<}h would 
bl"':tng o:vd.er .l.'il.rJ:d ~:;;ee, . u~:tt·y ai'ter the chaoH o:.e tl-1a wu.r 
tiU'ld would. give some a;s~ur•anco of ln.s.ting pefwe runo:ng 
t~he na1;.:torls o:t: the world. In thai.~ goal,. toward the;t 
goal~ a tr(J)mendout::J stir:1.de was mad{\1• .. ,. • 
At ·the Orim.eru1. Goni'er•el.'lce • .. • the t:tme had. corne 
f'o:r· gt~t·bing do.-.,,n t;o spec:Lf:tc casea :ln t;h~ poJ.iti-ea.l 
field. fof'hore waz~ on all a:td:ss a~t thi~~ c~onff;}l~ence an 
enth:uslt.-\st:lc .ttr.fo:!;"t to :.~:•~ach ~u1 agl.'le<~me:nt. s:tnoo the 
t;:tme of• 1i'ohe-t~~~n,. a yee:r ago, the.rQ lta.d developed among 
all of' u.s o. • 11 , gl.,..ea.ta:v f'flO:tlity in l'lf.llgo·t~:1 .. atlng ··idth. 
~:;a.oh othor, which o:u.gttl"'S welJ. for• ·the pea,.ce of th~) 
vtorld. we l~no\\lf oaeh other bette:r~!i • , • 
fleve:r l>e.fo:r•0 have the nlLtjor Allies been mox•e closely 
ux.d tefl .... .,.not only in JGhet.l:• wa:r< aims but also in their 
peac~ ai.msil An.d they are detarm:tned to cm'ltinu.e to 
be unit®d. • • • 
With 1.~ospeot 'to voting B.n the secur•ity Council] .... 
I th.:J.:nlt and I hope • • • :ri:m \Vill find • .. • a. f'~il:> 
solution of th:ts compl:tcated. L~nd. dii':t':tcul·t :p:r?oblern. • .. • 
'l:l~e stx•untu.:re of world peace • • • must be a peace 
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ot· comp1et;;t3 pe:~·1'oct:I.<.n1 o..t fi:r•trt • ., • Btd,; I run. su:t.."O 
'chat Wldt':lr tho e,g;r,•er~r:torrbs ~tg;acJ:\.ed Nr.-IJ Y1alta there will 
'be & morE? r.ttar.llt; pol.<l:l:i:tc.al :mu:.t'l<>p<:;~ than e"'it(;}J:' b~i'oro~ • • • 
On.0 ~n~tstr1.nd:lng e:v;nntpl(.:; of joint flCtton by the ·three 
rna;lol? Allied powo:NJ v1as the solution X"Oachad o:n Polnnd 
• • • W<:) eru~1t; 1:;o th0 ooni'e:t•ence dt:;d:;er•td.:rH~d to .f':tnd a 
'"''''''t'~')O'~ f~'"'""""~ '~ ?"'""' •1 '1' u. "'0. J 1 ~''"" 0"'1 · ··~~(''1 •~n~. d•l r'i, .. ,,;,,,., .• '·" t;;>~· ,,,~ .... (). ~ "-"·• ... !~"'' "·' . ...,.,, ] .... ill """'" ... '""' .. ,,.,., .• 
Ou.:c· '>bj{~ct:tvo viiM'i tq help Cl"'ento n f.stro11.g 1 :ln.depend ... 
ent und prosperou~~ l1..D.:t.ion • " ~~ w:t·bh a Gov~t":e::ment u.J. ..... 
timataly t;o be sel(~cted by ·tb.o Pol:tsh. people tllom:.H;)l:ves. 
The d~cis:tt.·n1 vd:bb. :~"'asr;HH.~t to the 1:H:>undo.r:tEH> o.f .l?oJ.and 
wa.s quite fl eompromise._ , • • 
Q;uibe :natu:t'Jally1 this confar~n.oe ooncer.n.ed i·hself 
only w:Hil:t ·hhe g,.n.,opeH.n \'UA.t> ~m(l with the polit:tca.l prob ... 
l(:lnl$ of J:lilitro:ca~~ a.nd not ·with the J?uei:Cio wtu'). ,. • • 
!l1ho oonferQnce in the 0J."~~it:Ie£t was t~ tu.t"n.:tng poi11.t; 
I hope, in our h1.stQry; t~nd tl~(rrofort;J in ·t:J1'l<:l h:lstor~r 
of' the wo:c<Ld., • • • 
we sh~:~.ll l'w.ve to ·tako tho :~.~espons:i.bili t;r tor wo1:•J.d 
coJJ.t.:tbO:J.'1<ation,. Ol"' Wl~ cihal1 hav(!} to bt;)(:tr> th.e responsi ... 
b:J.lit;:y· tor anothe;,.; wol:'~'ld confl:1.ct. • • .. 
~l'he Cr:trno~;m conf'eronc$ was a suocestJ!'ul e:f':t:"ox>t by 




St}pe,rately. In tb.:t.s chat:> tel" pve:li.l:ninary conclusions will 
be d:Na.wn rega:t?ding the ~est o:t' the matte~s disou$sed t.u'lc1 
agreed to at Yalta. 
r.l!h.ere wo.:11 one centt'al ach:tovemt0:nt at Yalta,, on.e 
mat·bex• that.· was accomplished thu.t none of the other fail-
ures ca:n. detract fron1, Th:ta :t,.ela1H:;s to the d.ee;J.sloru:J 
r~achecl regarding tlle ending of the war with (h\)l~mf.m:y. 
There was ach:iave(l at Yalta complete agreement between 
the tln'lee powers on unified moans to end quickly ·th.is phase 
of' the global war, and ·t;he end t:)f this war did como rela-
tively soon af'te-v the con.:t.'erence, fJ~h:ts was all to the 
good., But 1 t cannot be assumed. 'that; thts. was a v:to·tox•y 
fot• eithe1~ the Wet:Ji:; or• H.uss:ta.., for it wa,s to the national 
as qui.okly as pOiiHeihle.- Stettinius and Roseruruan he.ve stated 
tllat it Wi'-i.S a Hussiun concession." for• st.alin to have agreed 
to coor•dlna.te Soviejc and Western military act:l:vities.- But 
it mu1:It be asked: Yfhy is tho uni t:l.ng of endeavo:t-. against 
other'? It1 is t:r. ... ue that up ·to this ·time Httss:ta had been 
vex>y- difficult to wox•k wit;h l,.ega;rding eommo:n military plans1 
---· 
~c-.·.-. _. ·.-·-.. -· C 
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but, after all, wu~1 ther•e much need for this up to the time 
of Ya.l'l;a'l 1.l:he:r.le had not been yet any occasion for the 
t:t.~oops of R'Q.ssia and tl:~.e West to come togethex•; up to than 
the flghting had been on different .fronts. Jioweve:r·, when 
the o<;tcas:to:o. deman(ied :tt, the Sov:!.ets, even before Yalta, 
had ug:veod to common plann::t::n.g to a certain e:x:tam.tl! li10l"' 
:tnst~u1co, a sho:t?t t:tme befo:tte tl'liil coni'el,ence, vvh<:m the . 
G~rmo.ns began their last counte:roffena:t.ve :tn the Ardennes 
on the '//astern f~ont, th$ H\.'tSs1ans, ai'ter a. req:u..aa·t i'ror•'l 
an Eisenhower depu1ry, mounted an off'ens:lve t~' divert German 
prer..u:;ure. l\.t the time of the Y.alt~3. Oonfel"El)nce, b(lloause 
the tu•raies were nea.~itl{$ 1;he point: where they would soon 
be oc:mvel"'{!ing, co1nmon m:tl~t tary plnne{ fox~ the fir at time 
vte~e urgently needed. Russin, consequently, 't;aa coope:ra ... 
tive"' 
The question must a1ao be a$ked. ;J.n th:ta ool"l:n;ectio:n: 
lNould the Un:tted States 1anc1 Brit:a:tn have been ~d.lling to 
altex- the·i:r.'- m111ta~J plo.nl~ :tn. or~de:t' to work ~nore cl<.)Sely 
w5.th rtuaalil~r .Tb.is seenta doubtful, It m1.u>t also be won-
d~n.')od if' a clotJ0l .. working ttr:r>~mgera.ent with. the Sov:l.eta 
wc1ttld have 'been mox•e bene£ieia1 :i.n the pl;.~oaacu.tlon o:e the 
war in th.e fi111-ll l?eclwn:t.ng. 'J~he Ru.as:J.ans r:uaed~Jd mainly 
f'igh:bing equipment; we suppl5.ed. them with tl1:t$. Bu.t the 
type of' \var they fought was al:ten to us, was peouliur to 








sepn:~Ja:te1 dist:tnot froniis • 
It seems olea:r1 Johen, that it was to the (,mmmon. 
lll;llitary advantage of both s3 .. des,. at this time netal" the 
end. of the wa:r, to bring about joi11t milital."'Y plans, But 
this was not a gl"eat Westa'l:'n v:tcto:cy as mt?.ny hH.ve con.sid· 
aracl it to 1'Hh One w:r:tterl brit1gs up a..Yl :lnrportan.t poin.1; 
in this con:n.eot:ton. 
Why the assumption that America fl!ld Britain, rathe:t' 
than Huasia, hav~ spacial ~ausa to :t ... a joice over the 
united f:r>ont agfl.ins·b Eitlel"? 
Lr.:)t t a :Caoe the simple ·cru.th. Underl:yins such as ... 
sumptim.1s is the :.traplicat:i.on that Hussia is ·t:;he recal-
c.i trant- unpred.,.otabla t~tem.ber of the terun, reqtl.il"'ing 
subtle handling ~and extr~.:~ 1.nducements ·co k~ep it in 
line, ~n~os~ who lu .. e loudest :tn their hurJ.?aha fox- ·bho 
new militt~t'Y un.ity ....... zoinething that might hm:v-e beon 
tru.(en for grantod--hetrm:y that they are the most .11t ... 
tex•y about Huaa:ta.• s larger purposes... '.t'he • • • €Hlh~e:v ... 
ness to blow U'P f'JVf!J:t''Y marginal Russian. 11 concesslon·• 
:tnto a major t\Ccompl1$llrll6nt or Allied diplomacy It •• • 
8J. 
:t?et"leots an. i.:ntlel"' conv:i.ct:lon that for eow!e reason Moscow 
mu-st be placated, • • .. 
These '\'lords of L;yona must be kept in m:1.nd ~1-s the 
·~:>est of the agreements are dieoussed., for as will be pointed 
out later~ RooseveJ.t above all w~lxrted Ste.l:tn t<' c1groe to 
beoome a mombet• of.' a world orgardz&tion. »~o:r this,. which 
he cOJ:lffidG:t"ed to be th.e only hope fox:• p;rese1~v:l.ng th.e peao~t 
he VH:ts w:tlling to agree to many t;h:lnga that we1~e not; e;x;actly 
what he v1antod th~m ·bo be in hope that th.e Un:i.tod Natio:t'ls, 
l :n:ugene Lyons, "The State oi' th~3 Union: Appeaeeraent 



















oneo it was sot up, wol:tld l"ectif'y .m.s:l:ite:i.,.m. The question 
:t.s not only, Was it worth tho p:ttio(El~r l:.n:rt al~w, VIas ·tl.l.e 
price necessary'?' 
~i?ha woakn1.1a.se~J of the agr•eaments conH;) t;o light when. 
the t'ea·t of the pt>ovir~d.o-ns of the Y'aJ.tn e.o<~Ol"'d ~re studied. 
'!'he agre(:)ments seemed ·co many at the titne to raeet the.il., 
dot.'l.bt;s on twn :t:ror)orta.t.~.t isErt.tc:.Hl, the :ftrbure of aastcr>n 
lli~ope and tho eatabl:tshrn.ent o:C a. worl.d organ:Laation. 
'11he. form.ex~ WOU.ld be b:r•ought about by the iJeela:t"ation on. 
l~iberated El..1t•opo e.nd the lt:.tttet"' by the conf(;)l:'ltlnce a.t San 
Irranoisco1 they :felt.. But vthell the Polish agv0etnerrts1 
:t:or :tnetancot ~tl?a st.n:tdied. ag:L"Geme:nts th.at were much mol"'G 
ooncrote, it is fo-und that a.. gt"aat doal of' doubt~ should 
I 
have still ·bean prt-;s.ent (a dotl.bt, t(.'} be st,re, ·~hai; was in 
the rt~:tt:td of Hoosevelt l!lhol:'tJ~:r befol ... e his death). 
The Poli~3h sottlemonts were not only agalnst the '·~·· 
sp:tr:t:c of the :Ooclars:tion on Liberated Europe but also 
the AtJ.ant:to Gha:oto:r•., 'I'ha Decl£~ration~ :eo1" i:nstml<:Hl!; guar ... 
antatcH.l clemc:.wrutic governman.ts :tn gurope l1ased on un.fett;ered 
elect:tons, b'ut in l)o1and, although free olect:i.ons w~re to 
be held 5.n tlr.e futm~e, the r~ov¢:rnment w~ls to be just a 
x .. eorgrox:tzation of the Moscov.r ha.nd ... piclced {;f;l'"Oup f.').t Lublin 


















Germany i'J:lom the beginning of the wal!, supported by th.e 
Secr•et State of its un.dergrol.:J.nd and the l)ol:i.sh nr:roE-)d i'o:r-
cos irl the Un:t·ced Nations, and recognized by the rest of 
the ant:t ... Al~is nations was ignored. '.I•h:ts was not a guar-
ant.ee of' a democratic government in Poland.. At Yalts. 
Stalin made many violent remarks about this London fs:t'oup 
that Hoof,H~velt and Churchill lmew were not tl'•ue. 111his 
:tn i taelt' should have partl~v t~ipped o.ff the West to the 
real motives of Ruatde.. .• 
Stetttnius in this co11.nection states that Huss:te. 
compJ.et<-;~1~ .. occupied Poland, and lt was not a question of.' 
vJhat the United St~ttes and Britain would perm1.t Huss:ta to 
do in Poland. but what we could persuade Hu.ssia to accept. 
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rrhus, in this line o:t' :ceasoning, by maldng Stalin gu.~:\rantee 
the nenlt'\rgementn of tho Lubl:i.n gl"'oup and. hy getting his 
agreement to free electlons, we were obt~S'dn:tng conoeos:lons 
.from Stalin.. But if we bel:loved tha·t; we were fortm1ate 
to ge·li Stalin. ·to ma}r:e such a .niggardly concess:ton, how 
could arlyt..)ne have had hopes {which many did have) that Huss:ta. 
possibly had some good will? 
I11 his r~epor·b to CongreEH> on the Yalta Gon1"erence 
Hoosevolt; stated: ttl11h.€;) whole P<>l:tsh question was a. poten .... 
tial sou:t:'c<-:1 of t:r•ouble, in post vn.u"' .BU:t'Ope • • • We came 
·to the t}o:rlf'erenoo determined to f:l .. nd a common gl."'ou:nd fo:c 












of Jo1n.t t;tc·c:ton. 11 2 
Bu.t evCln Stettln:tua o.dnt~.ts that it vn~s simply all 
the West <H.'>uld obtain under the c:trcumstances. Lyons was 
justified when he wrote3 :I.n th.:ts eonnecti<';\n: 
Had 
0 
tho sacJ?5.fiea of Pol$.nd been I:'eportad b;r our 
President as a gr•:tm 'but unavoidablE> act of mil:l:~a:ry 
necessity, we might have awalJ.ovred our pride but sal ... 
vaged some l .. er.'lnants of our conscience.. When it is 
pa.EH::<lld off on a gullible publie as a just settlement 
,.. • • we are race to face with a moral outrage that 
vtill haunt otl.r h:l.('Jtory whatever its ultimate conse-
q1lences. 
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Unlike most of the count:r1es in ea::Jtern Burope to 
which we pledged democratic governments and free oleotions, 
·Poland l'tas neither a .t'riend nor a s&'ttell.;tt;e of (h)rraany, 
England went ·co war ov$:r Poland; Poland always l~~Hliated 
Hitler; it was made a charter Jnember of the United Nnt:tons. 
I·t.B leg:t t:tlnate goverrune:n:t :nevex~ ',"lavered from tlle connt1on 
cause. Uut at Yalta ·the J.eg:.t·bimate rights o:t k'oland. were l( 
Not only in the mattE.n .. of' the l'olish gover:n.nwnt 
but alsQ in the quef3tion of ·the bounda:riefrl of I~olnnd the 
Wesi~ was unfall? a,nd li'l"oplc in :ti.;s treatment of Pola.na.. 
1]he propounl t;o give eastern Pc>land (that pa:r."t east of' 
the Ourzon Line) was made by Hoo~tevelt, nnd in return 
Foland v:o.s to obtflin a pe.rt of ea~~tex•n Germ~;.ny. 1l'hus, 
--
2 Rosen.man, .2£• ~., P• 325. 
3 :t~yons, .2.2• illo P• 465. 






the terriblCil l"'esultk1 of attempts ·~o pu:c a huge group o:C 
people of one n.ational:tty tmd~l"' aJ..:ten dom;tnat:ton., o.s at-
temp·ted in Alsace-r~orraine 1 :tn the Hudatenlands, and :tn 
l~ol:l.sh CH)rl~io.or settlem.ents of' the past (which cer·t~:dnly 
helped to b:r>lng about nevr wars) was .ignored., 
Th:ls Polish agreement 1.s signif:loant, thenll not 
only :tn its mm right but also because it is s~mbo11c of 
the thinking ot both s1 .. d~s in regards ·to other ag:t·e~ments,. 
Aa stated oarlie:t~, Hoosevelt helieved that if he could 
get H.uss:ia. to agre~:~ ·to a Un1.ted 1·latior1s, then a:ny poss:tble 
wes.knosses of th(;) a.greemot1ts made tlt Yalta oouJ.d be. ttec ... 
ti.fi<EH.l lat<n:~ on. He wus willing to compromise <!>:n whnt l:l.e 
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considered. to be these relatively minor mati;ers f'o1~ the 
present in ord.fH" ·bo bring about what he felt to be l;l larger 
good., nut it is cttf'.f:tcult to tn1dersta:nd how one oou.ld 
believe tho.t by comprom:lsing with p:t•inoipl~s (which is 
oe:t:•tainly whl::1.t hfq;pened in tho Polish agreements) othei' 
princ5.ples could. he aoh:t~vecl. The questio:n of :t'oland was 
not a mino1~ one. If ·nussi& we1~e not wil1:tng to play fair 
in Poland, would it later be willing to pla.y :fair• b<H,H.tuse. 
inao :f.'a.cto, :t t wore a membe:t' of the United Nationt~? The 
~.,......_ ..... ...,~ .. 
In th:i.s connection th<1re :La a mi~loc:>ncep·bion that 
should be e;;.r.posed, Contrary to the mor'e or less general 
vieW};:wint that is held, it d:td not ta.lre muoh persuasion 
~--
t~) ma.lce HutHda. a.gret3 to become a tn<)mber of the United na ... 
tlons., Hooaovelt felt that his main a:J.m w~ul to con.i':'l.nce 
Stalin that ho ahou.ld jo:tn the world o:rgttn:t2at:ton~ Ii"or 
th:ts he \">,'as w111:tn.g t~o agree t·<) a. gre.rtt dea.l he said lte 
would not otherwise h.ava agveed to.. But :t:r1. study:tng ·bhe 
matter closely it. seems thf.tt H.usaia al:ll'vays intended to 
become a lorlernher~ that 110 persuasion 1.vas needod,. It is 
believed, tor instance., that W@ had to ag:c)ee to the veto 
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in o:rdet• to get Hussle. "to ,join; but this :ls :J.grlOl"~.:ng tb.e 
±"'act, as even .za~ettinitta adm1.t::q~ that membors of the Ame:ri ... 
can d(';)l<;;)gat:ton, on advice of the Sec:Nrti~:l:viea of War and 
Navy n.n.d o:f.' the .Joint Chief's of' E)taf.:t';; an :well us the United. 
ent; on the veto. In. o·thel" words, we 'vou.ld not .join vlithout 
·the veto ei thli~r, so tl:tM:> ms.t·tel" ot the veto af'1}orded no 
st·urnbling; bloc!< in obt;tatn:tng ll:u.ssit::t' s consent t;o jo:tn. 
Huss:la actually, in several wa.ys, gave :tn to an 
Amor:tcan position in this matte:~:~, whS.cJ1. showed her w:tll:tn.g ... 
ness to join a world OI'ganJ.zHtion (alway~, of CO\l.rse, with 
the :lns:tstenca of. tho veto·) • li':i.:t"'~St, 3tal:tn o.greed to the 
.:eol"mula. of the IJnlted f:ltate:;;1 for Seourit-y Cm.mc:tl voting, 
:tng the peace -would not have the right to prevent the au.b ... 
m:i.r.:~sion of th(0 d:tspute fo:t.~ th<:l cons:tdel?at:ton oi' tho Socur:i ty 

























It is a sizeable concesa;ton on the pa:r:~t of' th~) Pow"" 
era who possess military force, ea:peo:tally on the part 
oi, t1u.ssia, th.a t the srualle:r> na:c:tons Ctil.n haul one up 
to the bar of the O:t"§l~Mi24ation and mt1.ke their ehavges 
of g:rieve:nces and injustice aga:tnst a Gre~J.:b Power.~ 
Seoond, Stalin withdraw his plan for sixteen votea 
in the Assembly~ agx~eeing that even the two extr•a votes 
that he still wanted would h.ave to be first voted up<:nl 
at San lltranoisoo, ~d he pledged su.pport !'or two extra 
votea for the United Ste.tes if so desired.li Stal:tn also 
agreed to the American def'in:t. t:ton of' countries to be in-
Ot oou:t"set none of· theae matters is very impo:t>tant; 
they are even, to a certain extent, hypoorH:;:tcal1 because 
all the while the vett"> would be available to aa.fegtla.rd. 
even though it had no :tnt~nt:to:n of following the dictates 
o:r. a \Vorld. oon:rerenee; vuuil at le~st w:tlling to become a 
member with the aarm~ strings a.ttuohed tha·b tho Un:i.ted states 
demanded,. 
rl'he only other possible ooniprornises that Stal5.n 
made ttt Yalta. wero those :tn connection with l~"'ranoe being 
given a zone in Germany (taken. out o:t' Br·:ttish and Amel"i.can 
terr:i.tory there), Ii'l. .. anoe be:i.ng given a seat on tho Control 












Cornn1.iss:lon tol"' Ga:rman·1, anc1 the figure of twenty bill:ton 
dollars to bf» US<Hl only e.s a bo.a:te ;('or .future discussions 
o:t.• ·t;hs amotmt of German repal"'ations ~ If' we assume th.at 
s·ta11n m~\de a oonceasion regarding the De¢:tarat:i.on on I.:t.b-
ora.tecl Bu:c·ope (both Hosenman i\nd Stett:tnius 1i£:1t this f.l.S 
a ·tx•iumph. of noof:~evelt at Yalta) then. only J.ogieall:r we 
must assume that Stalin would not have signed. the agl')ee ... 
ment otherwisf';). It is clear that Hoosevelt took ·the lead 
in bringlng about the Declaration. IJ.lhe veX>y :ract tlvit he 
nerHled to ta1te tho le!td in th5.s matter should have l:tlade 
him suspicd.ous of Htal:ln' e motbrGs. But h(~ dld not soern 
to be. 
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Ac·bually, this D<llcla:r•at:ton is merely a glitterinf.~ 
g~narali ty. It :i.s compriaf.HJ of noble and high sounding 
phl"ases t:t:u1t are concerned vdth items tha:t shot,tld not ha.'\re 
to be n agreed" "to beca1.:u~e they should be axiomatic w:i:th 
ind:1 vldunls ~~nd nations of good. trl:l.ll. Signing tl1a Declr.tx~a ... 
t:i.on was not a coneer::~sion by S'l:;alin, not only because a[i;ree ... 
ing to be decent cannot lHi) regarded e.s a oo11.(msalon, but 
also because the Declarat:ton he.d not.h:tng to do w:H-;h the 
~~%...!£.;~ o£' tb.e s:ttu.at:ton :i.t Wt:).S concerned w:tth. It was 
m?.de up of vague prom:tses :ecrr the future at a tlnw when 
sP,ec:i.i':tc plans vrex)e needed. And as Joh:n <htnthex• stated~ 5 
---·-----------
5 John Gtm·bhel~, f~O.<?_!ev~l~ ihi! .!~e.t:.~os11.e.e_1 (New York! 
Havper and BJ:-others, l95oj, P• ;,56. · 
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no on.e, not even nt t:t1a.t time, should have been fooled 
by the Declars:t:1.on. Nothing tn th.e paet aet:tona of the .. ; 
Sovi<?Jts would lead to ar.r:r hopes in this connection. 
All ot th<J agreements now being d:tscuased form a 
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clea.!' pietu:~e when thou{;';];.tt of. in terms oi ... the l&l"ger whole. 
Not once did Stalin g:tve :.tn on. a p11inelple that wot:tld r:to ... 
tue.lly p:t.'levent him in the :t'utt1re :f'rom doing just as he 
wanted. It is fa:h""lY c~J?ta.1.n t:ba.t he wanted to become a 
member of the Un:I.ted Natione (given the p!:"ineiple of the 
veto, wh:tch was equally insisted upon by Am.e:r:toa) • r.rhus; 
any seeming concesa1.ons he made in this eonneot:ton must 
be regarded :t:n th:ts light. In Poland he hta.cl l.d.s Wf:l"S'• 
~~~h.e we stf:irtl bound.vy was to be decided at the peace con.f er ... 
ence in the w.a.gu.e f'u·tul"e• He_ r.Ud ·s.ncept th~ Ourzon !J:1.ne1 
but hia troops occt:tp;l.ed Polan.d, and thut~, if he SCI des1~red1 
the Line would hfl.Ve no meaning :ln pr~wticnl:t ty ~ Hegurdi.ng 
t~he Polish. gover:t11:nent, many say thflt Stalin comprornis~d 
in. th:ts mf.l.tter# but again his 11 compromisen was a·t most 
only a pl!omise. Stettin:tus feels th~~t here Stalin gave 
in because ha agreed to a re<>:t.~ganization ot' the I;ubl1.n 
gx~-oup with <-lem.ocrat:i.c leaders fJ:>(!tll abroacl to be included 
as well as agree:tng to· f'ree and un:t'ettered elect:tons in 
tl1e fl"ttu:re., But Stalin all 1~he while sl~.ndcved the log:l.ti ... 
i 
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ra.thex> was an ag1 .. eement to enlt:1X'ge an unlawful one• •rhus 
again vague te:clnS only were Uf.HcHl, Who could aa.y what "en-
lal?gement" J.'1eall·y mGant'? It ia ttrllYd.stakable, At no point 
in the Fol~.sh agtteemH~nts did Stalin comprom:tse with his· 
own 1.:tl timate inberests. 
Jnveryth.:tng that Stali.n I'.Hd and said at Yalta should 
have made it clear to everyone concerned what his inten ... 
tiona wer•e, The tragedy is (and this will be discussed. 
in mor'e deta1.1 in tl:.te general eonoJ.usions of' this study) 
that vespona:tble Westel"n of:t'ieitlls t"lt '!:'alta did 110t reoog .... 
1:1:tze what Stulin f. s oJ.ms we:r;-e, ~.1here 1~~ 110 reason wh:y they 
should not r.ttlve. 1i1or :lnste.noo, l~verill Harriman, at that 
time Ambassador to Fhtss:ta, later wrot~u 6 
We had constant dii'ti.oult~ies with them through<lut 
the wur and they treated us with g;r•(!H:J.t sttspfbc:1.on • • • 
rrh.et>a were ind:tcationa that they would taka (J.dvantn.ge 
of' the Red Army occupt:\t:ton oi"' neigh.bor:tn[o; couJ~:tl:>ies 
to maintain control, and they we:<1e supporting Communist 
:pa:t1ties in other o.ountr:tc:HJ to he :ttl E\ posi t.:i.on to r.:~e:tze 
cont:r.~ol in the p<H:Jtvw.:r 'turmoil. 
But th.e West seemed to 'be in ignorance of. this at Yalta. 
McGeol.'1ge Bun.dy'7 believes that the st13.te oi" mind 
O:f' the West a.t 'Yalta was one of eagerness to f'ind cause 
for confidence in the people a.nd lead.e:rrs of nuss1.u. When 
·the :t•e.f.lu.lts were announced. :tn J.H~.rt e.t ·hhe t:tme of military 
--•-~u-., ''""-.or +I~· tr ·~'~'~' •••~ 
6 Ha:r?:t":i..man, 2.11• ~9..:1~~·~ 1'• 3?9, 
7 Dnncly1 .22• £.:.1J!,, PP• Bl€J .. 6l~). 












of WO.l" than ar.a u clear.• hnx•h:l.ngm:> .of poacrr~:trn.e ooopox•at:ton~ 
It gave x>Gn::H~U~t;U:.tco to AtrteJ?ioans on the question; Can 
we get along w:tth Huasin. At toot time we recognized 
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Russ:ta as a dlctatorahip 1 l)ut we believed, Bundy stat;es, 
that a wovk:lng friendship with :Russia was wor'th contsidera.ble 
effort. We 'believed thad:; Huasia d:td not intend to export 
her way of lif£:h we 1'elt1 he conoludo·a, th~t possib:ty 
the United Stt\l.tes an<l Russia m:mld meet on some coramon 
Tho only thing wrong in Bundy's analye:trll is that 
he used a wrong word" He shouJ~d have substituted tthopen 
tol:' "bel:tof." 'J:ru~ West tthopedn tht:;~.t I'\us~liJ.:t was sincere;· 
t;h.at she w·ould coopaa~ate. Th:i,B SMdea,; ol'!l genet•al otttl.oolt:, 
on tl:le part o:e Am,n:•:tca was ln ~rv:tdenee as early. as 1943, 
.f'or at the t:i.me o:f' the q;v.eboo Oon.ference Harry Ho:pld.ns 
had. in his files a d.ootunent; quoted frmn a ver";J high level 
Atn.eriean stl~a·t.ee;ie m1.1ita:t"~y atSt:b:uata~ +t stated~ 
Russia* s post-vnl:J::f poa:ttior'l in Europe will be a dom:t-
n.a.nt one. W.ith German:y crush.ed, thar•e is no povtex) :i.n 
}~U:eope ·co oppo~Je her trern.enc'l.ous mS.J.ttax•y foz•ees., 
It is tJ:•ue tlnl.t G-raa·b Britain :ts building up a poa:tt:tc.:m 
:l;n ·the itioditarranean. v:ts ... a-v:ts 1\uss:ta. the:t she may 
find use:Cul. in balanoi:tlg power in El.ll?Ope. Howevo:r··, 
;even here she m.ay not; be ablt~ to oppose Hut:H!i~:1. unl~HH:1 
she is otherwise suppor·t;ed. 
'l1ht~ conclusions .from ·the i,orego:tng m .. e obvious. 
Slnae Husaia is the d(;JC:tsivo f'acto:r• :t:n the \''W.r, she 
n:m.s:!t be giver1 ever..-y assistrance and every ei'f'ox·t must 
be made to obtai.n her friendsh5..p"' L:lkevdrso, since 
without question ::-:~he w:lll dom:i.nate Ieurope or1 t.he defeat 






of the Ax:1.s, it :l.s even more es;~ential to develop and 
maintain the most .t'r:tendly rela:tio:ns w:tth Russia.. 8 
This estimate r~hows that the United Slta.tes was a\tttre of 
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the po·bent:tal potirbwar position of Russia, 'but it also shows 
that the conclusions reached fr<.1m this correct estirna:be 
did no·h have sufficient basis in the realities of the situa ... 
'l'his idea of hopefulness., wllioh was especially ev;t ... 
dent in Roosevelt, will ha discussed. in greater detail 
later on. tat it suffice in this connection to se:y tht~.t 
nothing in tha past actions of~ the Hoviets could pos~ibly 
lead. anyone to be hopeful.. The Soviets not only- had never 
hesitated to break such pledge~1 as were mt~tde at Yalta, 
l)ut alao had Pl"OV'(H1 5.n the pa€.1t that they would ev$n breaJ.t 
formal ·tx•ea.ties wi't:;h little has:t ttt1t:ton. As will be shown 
up 1 wero ~~v1ll:tng to breal:c the CUI'!" ant Russo-JapanEHH:) 11'reo.ty. 
How1 than~ oottld the West b~ aware. o:f thetie things and 
stiJ.l ubeli<.weu tlw.t th() :le.lt~t agreements would he carriEH'l 
out? 
All of the agreements :111 Yalta re:tn:Corce th.e position 
that Stal:tn conceded nothing,. liegard:tng Jlrranoo,. he lost ·}-,, 
nothtng. The Px•er.1.oh zone of· ocout>ation Wl;lt;1 taken out of 
the BJ?itish atld AUH:3r1eal~ zont)s. rrhe French beina~ on the 








Oot1trol Oorrnnission could not affect a.n.y Russian plans, 
And in all of' tlte other agreements discussed so f'ar,. the 
terms were always vague enough, or the will of the West 
was not ·S'l~rong enough to uphold their sp:b ... :tt, to allow 
Russia t'fo do as l t !)leaf:ted .• 
I!' $omething directl-y· af'fGcted the Huss:lan m:ilita:t?y 
or tJolitloal positions or its postwa:t:~ claims~ stn.lin would 
agree only to vague items for the futuJ?e. If an :ttem: up 
for d:t$oussion re:Ce:rred to something Stalin wanted at the 
Pl"'~tH;emt (the United Nation$• military coordinati.on) he 
would make concrete agreements., If tl-.te s.gend€t refel?l•ed 
to somethi:n.e; that d:i..d not really affect Russia (l:ttrance • s 
zone in Germany) ~~talin was also will~.ng to agree to some ... 
th:tn&~ spec:tfic. 
!n concluding this p:r.>elimina:ry surve;{l the write~ 
must mention thost;) item~ not oven agx~eec1 to in v·agua te::er.a.s., i 
What about ;t,~J.tvia, Be·ton:ta and L:t. thuanie/? What about i•:ree 
apeeeh1 press, and adequate provision for United Nations 
obse:t .. vation in Hus~ian ... oont:c•olled aroas? What, about the 
Soviet campaign :f.'ox~ don1iru:.tnoe in the 11ear East, so plainly 
ev:tdent du:t'llng the Wtltt>? Such m~;~.tters as ·these should havo 





There was a eomparut:t valy small amount of disouaa:ton 
on this v:t tal querrt:lon at Yalta.l It :ta t:r•u.a tlult soon 
after 1-looaevelt fll"r:tved fl.t Yalta he had top level confor-
ences with S·ba.lin over B.usaian en:trance into the J"aparwne 
wal?. But rnoat of' the Amex•ican dolegates pl~l~sent l{new noi~h ... 
ing about these cUscusslons, ncn"' Vlns the question ro.ised 
a:b the :pltmar-y sess:tons of• the B:tg 'J~hx•ee or l3.ii any of ·tha 
fol"'eign min:tr~ter meetings. About hali'wa:y through the con. .... 
f'(-ilre:nCH:), ~-lecretary of State Stettlniu.s was info:t•med by_ 
Hopk:tns and llavriman that such talks were gol.ng on. 2 
Uooaavelt pel"'Sonal1y car:r>i.t1d on tl.1.ese negotiations 
·'!, 
lvith Ste.lin nonca:t:>ning the Far F;ast with th.e help .of his 
•z 
to do with "l~harn.° Churchill was no·b present at any of' 
the pt~ineipal discussions, bu.t he signed th<3cse ag:reementis, 
saying lJ.e had gre;at faith in Jloo sevel:b ttnd i'el t h<:) could 
rely on his .~ludgment in tho mat tel"• 4 
.... :1 ·-· _ .......... t--~ ~ ......... ~Itt 4 ........... 
(~ 
(J Stet·cin:i.us, 2.!2.• _ill., p. 9B. 
i3 Ha.rrimt?.n, .2£• ~·, lh 374" 
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que[~tion was not settled at the planned clos:tng time. A 
J.ast; meeting had to be called~ &ncl tb.1.s was th.e clo~:HHrb 
arld moa-t seol?etive of' s.ll. In 'but1 a few wopds, the dec:t ... 
sions wer•e :rettched~ Wrote Zachru:o;tas: 5 HJud.g:tng try his 
through his growing 0::ii;ha.ustion., s1'1owed signa of elation, 
Chu~ah5.3.1 hta:~:tdly opened his mouth. n 
A copy or these decis:ton.a ....... a Wl":ttten ag:t?eement :f:or 
H.uamla to join in the wo.:r- ag.,;dnst Japan along wlth bhe 
conditlons m~cest3ary to br:tng this O:bout":-... was placed in 
the private saf~) of ltoosevelt. Very f'ew of· Hoosevelt t a 
collfidants 1-r.new o:f* it. 6 $'or ln.stanoef J'ames ll1 • Byrnes, 
an aci;;tve Ame:t,ic€!:n delegta.te Q.t Yalta., did not lmow of ·chis 
agreement un·t.il a:rter ho beorune Seovetary of State seve:ral 
months after Yalta. .. 7 
Discussions with :Huss:ta over 1.t;s entry into the 
ll' 
o Zachariaa, .2£.• ill•, P• 1?)• 
6 s·bett.in:tus, 2.£• .~i:t", p. 94. 

















into the war when ~t was in a position to do so, but Stal:tn 
said he wa.s concerned over a pr•enw.ture attac1t by Japan. 
He said he had weakened his Siber:1~an forces fen: the defense 
of :)tal1ngl~tid1 so th~ Japanese could cut off h1.s vital l~tne 
of' supplies coming through Vladivostok if he entered the 
wax• at that tirr~.-e.a In Jtrll'lUary, 1943, Stalin promieied to 
go to war against Japan when Ger.tnan:y was de!'eated, 9 On 
Octobex• 30, 1943; Sta.l:tn stated to Cord~ll Hull,; then· Sec..-
:reta:r-y or State, "elea:rly <lnd unequiV<"Joally that, when 
tht) Allies auectH~ded in d<;)f'eat:tns; C~exomany, the Sov:t.r;t Union 
wo·uld then. join in det'ea.ting Japful., ulO Hull continuest ll 
'11he r.lt'l.r•ahall t a statement of h1.s d~:;loia:tml was fo:r.•th:r.--:tght;. 
He made l'ti emphatiaa.ll'Y, it was ent:h')ely 1.rn.ao:L:tcited, 
and he asked noth:tng in· ret.a.:t:r•n • • • When Stalin m1ade 
his promise to me fOl" tranatniss:lon to the Pl~es:tdent, 
it had no st:x?ings attached to it. 
At the Tehe:ran Oon;f'erGnco stal:tn ~-again s&t:td .Russia would 
en.ter the war aE;aiilSt Japan,.l2 
8 Harriman, E.£• .<1:1:~ • , p ., 372. 
9 Sumner Welles, liH.oosevelt !iitnd the :F'al" Bast,. Part 
Il~ n ,!Ia~.P...E.>Y.~ Ma,~a.z:IJ1.~, CCII (March.t 1951) 1 7~. 
10 :£.!~. Memoirs of' S,Lo,;r:de,l:l, l!.\~~1,1 II (New York~ ry:he 
Jv1a<m:lillnn Comptil.ny, 194(3~); p. l009. · 
11 l121£ .. , l'>P II 1~50H-l310 .. 















Yalta Oon.fe:~..,0:n.ce to f:1:nd ou·t sp(;)c:i.fically· what was neoes-
sa~J to bring nu.ssia into the Japanese W&l'"•l3 This was 
not c11ff'icu.lt to ascertain because in. septembe~, 1944~ 
S·ba:L:tn a.skod Harriraa11 if Ho<:ls.evelt still eonaide1~ed :it 
to be essential for H.1..tssia to enter the Pa.cif':to war (as 
a repo:t.,1; by l1oosevtJlt to :staltn on thE! q,uebec Oonfer~noe 
which had just b'~en concluded. did not ment:ton the nw.tter 
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ot Huaf.lia in. th~) :Vacifie war)., st~l1:t:n se..ie.1 th.at he wus 
aurpP:ttHHl that af'ter his ~\SSUJ?nnces te> et'ltai" the wttr wer~ 
given at '.L,ehQran, H<.)osav0lt and Ohu.rahill had not taken 
~3ov:tat l'>articipa:liion in tho war into account il'l the:t.r plan ... 
ni:t·lg, staJ,in sl;d.d that -~hero l:u1d been no change in the 
Huas:tan nttitudo, but :tr th~ iJnited 8tates and. Engla:nd 
p:~?ef'errad to b:'l:l:tng th~ Japanese to their 1-tneas without 
Husslan par-t:tc.:t.p~J:t:ton1 he tfHaic11 he w.s.a willing to agx·~~e • 
Jfu.1~:t~:tma.:n and i~he B:~?:tt1sh l"'<:r.Pv~Hlent~ltive Pl"'asent assured 
8t;al:tn tll.at both. Roosevelt and Ohu:vchill were depending 
upon nusslnt B help in tha JJ'al" East, but Johey ind:'l.cated. 
that the vvest had to fulfill the job 'themselves until 
StaJ.:tn. was t .. es.dy to pm .. tic:tpate in ,1o:tnt plt-mn:tng :t..._or 
the heat;. use of the combi:n.ed resou:t .. ~es. Hm.,r:tman enrphas:tzed 
------------------




w:ltl'l the West to wol~k out.· th0 P1"0blem.14 Stalin ~t this 
t:tt110 wae certain the.t he would have to be it'l th.e war a.t 
the moat two or three mo:n:bhs .,15 
'llhese mil:ttax~;r d:tsouss1.ons '~Nere than held, and. ac ... 
col.~dtng to .ronn R~ Deane, lf) Amer:lean m:tl:t to.ry ttd.visen:· ~~.t 
thoso discussions., Stalin sa:td thu·t; 
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the Hed t\t .. m·;r would have to have aixty d1:v1s1on~~ :bl. 
th.~ l~f.'ll? East bef<n ... e :J:t; coult:l. take the ottens:l:.va-.. ... th:!.:r:~ty 
more than those a.J.:~:~eacly tha:~:~a ...... an.d the mc>vement woul.d 
requi.ve tlwee months mftex> Ge:mnany was defea:bed. S;tnce 
the 'rrans-Siberian ra:t.l:t~oad wottld not be. able to eu.ppJ:y 
e:txty d:l.visions despite its capac1.ty oi: thirty ... si:Jt 
ta:•ains a d.a:y1 a. :N~tsexave of two to three monthat sup-
pli.es W<)Uld hftVe t~o ba atool{pilod. :t.n Siberia before the 
start of opertt.t:tona. In r·~ply to a direct question 
:e:rom Harr:trnan, iJtal:tn said the Soviet Union would tat~e 
·th~ of'f'ens:t ve · aga.:tnst Japan throe months afte:t~ Gerrnanyt a 
do.fef.1.t provided th.e Un:}.ted States wo1.:~ld s.ssist in bu:tJ.t1..; 
:tn.g up the neeesat'try re-sel?v<e auppli4lls and prov:tded 
t~hi.'J pol.i i~it1Hitl aspects o:C Ht.tst.d.a t ~ pa:t:"·t~t.cipeJ.tion had 
been ole.rl.fied. H:ts lo:tto:r• proviso rGfer:t."ed to the 
reoogn.:lt:lo:ct by Ch:ln.e. of HutMsian claims ag~:1i:ctr1t tho 
Japanese in ·bhe 1~1ar F.last, stalin ! 1UJJther ag:t .. eed that 
41.1r bases would be n'UH1.e a.vailable to tho 1\ru.erioar1 Aitl 
r~~orces in the lvta:ritime Pro·v·:t.nctlH! hut impli<~cl tht.a.t we 
would have to rely on the I>ae:tf:l.o I'outa for otn~ supply 
s1.noe all the Trana ... ~li:tbe:t":tan. :rail capaelt;r would be 
othe:t,vdse. ut:tJ.:t21ed.., In ad.d:t t:to:n1 h$ O.sfrt:t.x)ed us the 
·u.ae ot f'etropavlovsk as a llflV&l ba1:H·~, VlJ(;} ad.journed 
with tll.€) C()l1V:tcrcit)n thai;; progl ... oas was being mat1e <:JVan 
th.oue~:l the immediate aot1.on was to co:nsiat, as usuaJ., 
of St.1lldin.g more Amer:tcan equ1.J)lno:ri'b abroad. 
Stalin also pJ?om:ta·(h;i tho.t joint• t<md. df;taiJ.ed planning would 
14 Deano" ~· .St!~~', pp. B~l0-241. 
15 .~b!.~l· f p. 264 ... 
16 J.:b:td.,. lh ~147. -
------ -------
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begin, but after many- delt~;,rs~ when r.onf'<~t~ences tinaJ.ly 
began, all tht~t; the Huss:i.tmfJ we1~e :t:n:ba:PasttJd in was t~l")l"ang ... 
lng :r~ol? the immediate del:lver:tee of Amel?ican supplies, 'f. 
All othe::tl pJ?oblel:ns wexla b:r•u.shed aside. 1l'hus, Htht:l: end 
resu11< was t~hat tlfE? Iht$sians got tha:h~ suppl:tes rand the 
Un1:bed fJtates go·t :nothing e:x:dept t:\ belated and last minute 
Hussia.n attack against the Japanese,nr'l 
ln D~HHi~mbor,, J.944 1 Stalln outlined to lla:t'l1 ii1ltal1 his 
obJeoti'tJ'es in tl.te li1ax> :maet. lhtseiaJ s place :tn the Far 
riia.st as it; was before the Ih,tsso ... Ja:pan{)S0 Vvo.r was the hnsis 
· :~Jaill1oacls which VHll?13 bu:tl t by H.uaa:.ta under li'l. contract w:t th 
·t.he Oh:tneae:. n~ sr:idd ·~.tha.t R.ussia would not. interfere with 
the sove:t'eignty of Oldna over Munohl..tl?ia, and ho pt""omised. 
thnt he v,rcn..tid help m.aintai1'l the s·hatua quo in Outer Mon-
golia.. These ware 'the ba:..d.s of thv; discttsa:to:na at Yaltu,lB 
the ag;~.~eeraon.i;s i~ollowing v-ery closel7,r theso :t1 equests by 















realized by St~lin. 
II,. THE AGRl'flEW1ENTS AT 'Y:lfiHA 
headway had been made :tn d:tacusa:tons :J?ega.rding this :tmpor ... 
tant m...!it·tt(n"• As prev:tou.s:ty 1nont:Loned, priox~ to the last 
meeting wh.11,m tho ti:nal agreements were nutde, sovera.l top ... 
level conterenoea between Hoosevelt and Stalin took place. 
Dttr:tng these meetings Stalin again str•essed1 as he had 
done ·co llr-.tr.l'l:tman ear11er1 wh~~tt he H;neededu in the lt1ar Ela.st ... -
nH:li:.ters, he said, that; we1'Je :necessary t•or the Rusaian entry 
into the war. W1 thout thesE;~ cond:i:t1ons beine fulf.1J.led; 
would quest1.on why ·they ha.d erltered the fi1&l? :illa$tern war. 
IJ.ihey underatood the German wa:t', he sa:td1 because oi' the 
Gerttlan a.ttaok 11 bt.tt ainoo there had been no overt act· by 
thf-) Japanese against Russin in the li1aJ? East, ooncession.H 
would be necessary to jtiat:tfy 1-i.'Ussian entry into the wnr.19 
1I'hus oame the final agreements, which WE\l"ie not re ... 
leased to the wovld until lii'Efbrtte:ry 11 1 1946. 111hey stated:-
. 'rhe leaders of the thl"ee Groe:t Powers ...... the soviet 
Union, the United States of At40l"lca a.rH1 Great Briiis.in-... 
have agreed that in two or three ~1onths after Germany 
has surrendered and tho wt-:~:t\ :ln Europe h.as torm:i.nated, 
the i:lov:tet Union shall enter :tnto the w~.:tr against Japan 
on the :s:tde of the Allies on cond.it:ton that: 
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1. The sta:tus quo in OutEn') ... :M,.mgolia (the Mongolian 
People's Republic) shAll be preael?ved; 
2. '.t'he f'orme1,. l:>ights ot Hussit~ violated by the 
·treacherous attack of Japan :tn 1904 shall be restored, 
Vi2h: 
{a) the southerr:t part ot Sakhal:tn n.a well as 
all i~he islands ad;Jaoorrb to it shall be 1:eturned 
to the [~oviet Union, 
(b) the commercial no:t~t of Pairen shall be 
:tnter·nut:lonaliz;¢ld~ the pi·e ... eminent interests o:r. 
the Soviet Un:ton :tn this port being sa.f'eg'1.:t&1:>ded1 
o.tl.d the lease of .Por•t Arthtll? as a. naval base o.f' 
the U.s • s .H. restored.~. 
(o) the Chinese Eastet¥n Hail:t:load and the South ... 
Manchurian aailroe.d., wh:toh provid.es an outlet to 
Da:t.:LJen, shall be jointly t)peratad by the establish-
ment of' a joint So_viet-Ohinese Company.; it be:tng 
't.Ul.de:tnltood tha·t tha pr'e-ern:tnent :tnterefJts of the 
r'1oviet Union slw.ll be ea:f'(;;'lgUal~ded an.d that Ch.ina 
shall ~etain full S<>Ve:t"oie;nty 5.n Manchu.r;ta.. 
3. The K~ile Islands sha.ll be handed ove:t"' ·to 'Cho 
Soviet Union. lt i4l u.nd<'JJ?stood that the agreel1H.mt 
eonael .. n:i.ng Ottter .. Mongolia and the po~ts and :t"aill"oa.dr:~ 
referred to above will requ.il"a co:nc'U:I:'rence of General .. 
isamo Chiang Kta.i ... shek, 111he l':t?asident will take meas .... 
ttttea 1.n ordev to obtain this oonourrenoe on E:i.dVioe 
from Marshal Stal:1.n. 
' 
'l1he Heads of the three Great l)owe:rs have ag:r:eed 
that these claims of' the Sov:tot Union shall be tlnques-
tionably fulfilled after Japan has baon defe~ted. 
l11or its paxlt tht~ Sov:tet U:a:lon expl?EH3ses its read:t ... 
neaa to oonelude w:lth the national Govel"tuuent of' China 
a pact ·ot friGndah:lp nnd alli!OU'lOf9 betw$en -the Ult8. s.ll~ 
and China :tn orde:t• to render e.ssistance to Ch.ina. with 
ita armed forces foJ:> the purpose of. l:tberating Ch:i.na 
from th<-> Japanese yoke.20 
This was !l top ... secret docu..rnerrh. It did not appear . 
in the :Protocol of the Yalta Oon:f'erence. Ji'ev.r knew of :i:t, 
It \Tas feared that :t.f too many people 1~:nev1 about :t·t, the 
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.tntorraation would 1ea.k out and reach Japan. With this )\ 
int~ormation Japan m.ight. upset the Alli<ZJd plans by launch· 
:tn~.5 an a.ttnok o:n. the sovi~t Union 'before Hoviet troops 
could be shifted to the lil~r Ji:ast. Tha Chinese we~e not 
notif':J.ed of the agt~ec1mont fott feaJ.~ the seerat wou.ld not 
be ltopt at ChUl'l({k:tng. 8tc:t11n i.-;old H<.K'>sevelt that thm 
l'htsoiana would t:;~tax~t 1mrnecl1.1at£:lly to send cUv1sions ao:t•oss 
Siberia, but he :tnaiHted that ·this be done in complete 
BEwreey. lloosevelt agreed, theref~re 1 that only af'tel? v/ 
tholllle troop movements w·ou.ld he e<.R.."}}lttin the deo.ir~ion to 
the Ch1n(;)so. He dld not live long enough ·ho do th:ts.,2l 
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It was also agl.ioe<l, it1 i:n.fonual diacuss:tons OOl'loem ... 
ing tho Fal? .East~ that t:he tate of Indo .... Oh1.na was to be 
' left open for d:i.scuasion and that Siarn vtas ·to be eventually 
an :tndf:>:pendont state* Stalin also agreed to Amor.ioan 
ba.aes at ltmnsomolslt and at N:tl~alaevsk~ th<\'1 .former on the 
lov;eJ:l reaches of: the Am.1.:tr.·~ ·the lt:).ttel:* at its mouth, in 
Ol"cler fo:r th~ United. St;a:tl'i!HJ to bomb Jo.pan. Stalin also 
stated that he had :r:~.o ob,1eo·ti:ton ·to the aatabl:Lahment ot 
znentioned p:r•ev:tously, Stal:tn had. already l.ndicat(1d 'l:iho:b 
he would. agree ·to allov; the Am.er:tcanfJ these bt::tS(HJ, but; 
21 't:b::td .. OA .=.,__" ' p • <J•;t •. 
•::.t::> L' 1 r.tlO 

















a.a things tttX'Xled · ou:t, they hnd nothing to do vV:i. t.h the eou:Nle 
Aa shown e.bove, H.i1.asla. agreed to conclude s. pact 
of .f:v:tendship n:nd. all:tance with Ch:J.rta and. to ;l?'an.ounee ·the 
Huse-Japu.n.eso nettt:J?al:t t·y pa<~t of 1941. One raon'bh after 
:Y.alta~ Russia 1.ni'omed Japan o1? the ending of the pact •. 
rrhis treaty· w~a due to expire in April., 19461 but only 
if noti~o fol,. its ternti.na.t:ton wero given one year :tn ad ... 
vanea,. On April 51 ],945, Molotov h&..'l'lded the JaprolofJO envc:Yy 
a note l,..cmcrunc::i.ng the po..01!. " 1l'he tex.t t>f th:i.a U(.')ta led 
Japan and ·tJ:1e wo11ld in gener$.1. 1Jo au~mise that th0 paot 
VTOi.lld :rema:tn opeX\ativo unt:ll Ap~?il# 1946, and that the 
Soviet Union did n<.)t intend to enter th0 war tm·t:d.l that 
time.,'•23 
Tho S:tno ... sovi~t Treaty vms signed. on Aug;u.st 14, 
1945 .. 24 :r:n th:t:3 in:~eat~v· 9 Ch:1J1a r~)cogni$~t1 the ind.epeml .... 
ence of nuss:ta.n··dom:h'!ated: ou.ta!' Mongolia. ( wh.:toh China 
st:tll claimed) • Ch:tna a.llowed certain p:t."'ov:tnoes o,t' lnnGr 
c..,..i;. . • 
t•v Dallln, .9J~· .2!.11•, PP• 195 ... l96. 
2~ Ai toh~n. wu, 9.h.:!-.n.~ ~ Jill! ~s~y;t-2.,~ ... Jl~.~~lt.~' A ~4x 
ot Sino ... Boviet Heln.tions Ulew York: The Jonn Day Company, 












t;o h&we a rtvory liberal aixtlonora:.r. n China. !"GCOgni~ed. 
Huas:ta• e 1.nte:r.>ests in f:Ie.nchlll'ia and settled H.uasia.n claims 
to th$ Chlnase :U:aetern and south Manch1xrian. 11ail:voads. 
Tl-:t.el."e waH to bG a11tonomy fot- B:tnldang :prov5.noe w:t th a roc ... 
tifiaation of the :rrontie'l?s :t:n fs.vo~ o:r tzussia~ China got 
a Moscow pledge to sv.ppo:ttt Ch:tner~e claims i~o tE>:l?rito:r?:tes 
whS.ch othel.? n:eore~.gn co11ntr:tos have S'tHlceedec1 in ten~ing 
~Avw:y trom Ch:tn~l\.11 ...... au.oh as Hong Kong, ~r:tbet, and :&"~x~ench 
Indo-Oh1.na. Moseow v.ta(~ to a&eist China in economic x-econ ... 
st:l"'UCtion by sending tecltnie:tan.s, ~1uppl~v:tng heav~r in(lus ... 
tr:tal tnater5.alrJ1 rebuilding comml.tuicnt:t.o:nth and so torth, 
Hu.s.sio. said tl:~.at the Chinese o.omnltu:til3't quest5.on W!l.S a 
Oh1n.ese ~:n.tetmal a.i':f.'g.:trr)' pt>oble.nu but prm.u.ised. to \:Vle its 
:lni"lJ.:uemee to help prevent a o.i v::t.l war in Cb.:tno.,. 25 And 
th.e very sign:tt:tcant Art:tol(-; V of t;he treaty statedl 
ThG HiE~h Oont:t.~acting Pal't:tcs1 hav:tng vega;t?d to the 
interests of' tha seeur:tty t-tnd economic development 
o:fl eaeh of them.1 agl?ee to \W>:rli: together in eloae and 
friel'ldly collaboration f-lft-e~ the corning of peace and 
to a.ot acco:r•d.:lng to ·the prin.c:tples of mu-tual :rs.hepect 
for theix) sovere:tgnt:r and ·l:;ert~;t to rial t:t'ttogl'ity anc1 
of no1J.interfe~ence in the intal."'ne.l a:f'foJ ... ra of the other 
O<>n·tr•act:tng party.26 · 
An excb.ange o:f' notea betwe~)n t he two countr:tea 
:f'ollow:tng the agr~eme:n:bs stated: 
-------------- -- ------
----------
_--- _ ____:_:___::_ __ ---=-==-----
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In accordance with ~tho ep:tr·it of tho aforementioned 
'l'reaty1 and in order to pu·b into effect its aims and 
purpof~ea, "l!he Government qf the u.s. S.H., a.grees to 
:vend~r China. mo:t-al suppoJ?t and aid. :tn mi1:t·bacy fmpplies 
a.nd other material resources, such support and aid t<> 
be entirobr t;~~;ivan to the National Gov~,:r~lment as the 
0 ~ . ~7 Qen·tl"al gova:r."l1l11ent of China."' 
When tho d(~taila or the ~l.greemonts :t1EH1Ched in thia 
Si:no ... sov:tet 1f:t .. ea:ty are studi()d; 1 t ia shown that as a re .... 
sult ot ·bh~ Yalta agl"~H)men.i;s and thJ.s ccmsequent treaty,. 
Ru.aa~.n was in the :t"o'llow:tng pos:tt:t.on in th~' Far Elaatt 
1. A jo:tnt; commis$lon of Gh:tnese a:n.d Ht'IJ.ts:i.tms was 
rmxn:tng Po:r?t .l~lnthuJ:'t» wlth the fhlssians eontl .. o11:1.11S: tho 
comra:l. sa :ton. 
2.., Although Dair~n 'linls SU1)PO!ilE'~d to be :tnteJ."na:b.ton ... 
al;tzed w:lth Soviet :t-nteJ?eatf.ll baing recogn.izaa, this port 
was tu1der Husaian cont:r:ol boo~use of a special clau!lH~ which 
Pl .. ov:tdad i'OJ? complete Soviet domin&.:tion in e~se of' vmr 
vrith Jilpan~ and Hussia st:tl:l regarded :ttsalt as teohn:l.eally 
at wal.,.. w:tth Jtlpa.n. 
3. 1rhe two Manehur:i.an l"litilro~ds WlZ~ra und():r> joint. 
mane.gemen.·t;, w:tth China gua)."'ding th.em. but •l:iht} Ih.:un.rians nrun ... 
ningn the1n ( bt~cause the e;ene:val m.anager o:f the railroad a 
w~1s $,ppoirrl.;,eH.1 by the Soviet sido). RuBs:ta also: hQ.d npx•e-









ho.d ru:u. sove:t>$~.g:n.ty over Mt.\~t¢h'l-t:r:ta, nnd ho pl"'omised to 
witl'ldra\'1f his t~oopa from Mancht1l."*ia no la:tw:t• tha:rl tlwea 
111on.ths ru: ... te:r J~pfl.U t s cstp3~tulutd.on.29 
4. Huaeia got vil?i.;ual c<:mt:t.~ol o:t.' Inner und Outer 
Mongolia. 
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The so a:t~G jumt :brtmodiate gh"lins. EJt\bse!H~ttum.t Huaaian 
.advances co~d.ng later a.:re noi; J.ncJ;u.dt-'.3od. 
---- --- --- ------
HooS$Ve>l t was dete:rmined. to obtain Hur~sia t a entl""&noe 
1.n the wa:L"' against Jap6tn, ~:h:ts was at least r>a;rtly the 
J?esult of such a r'ecolm1le:nd.at:ton by tl1e Jo:l11t Ghiefs of 
start of the Urlitad Stat~a. As early as 1945_, at the 
Q.uebt\lo Oonf'e:renO:())t Hopkins had with him a repo:tJt from thE) 
ntl.lito.Xly which stated in this connect5.on tha:t 
th$ niost tnlportant f.aetor the United States h4a to 
·c"'on~·r;;.lei; .: .. n r·e:t:at!o~u'iata.""1.'s Uie'""l;~"Q's'ecti't!onot 
tlie' vTar:tn'""tl15-.t~1e:· ·-w!~I1 '"Hu'i:lu! .... as'' a.'na1l:y fn-~ 
't~i:i~ wii~ i'ga.!iiit .. '';Thpari; the war ctm he tel."roil1ated in 
less ti.Jue and at less expense :tn l:if@ and resm.:t.roclsf\ 
thm1 :U" the :s;><eve:t.""Se wo31e i;h,o case. Bh<n.tld the war 
in the Pac:ttie have to be carried on with an m11':t?1endly 
ox" tt l"logat:tvo at1-.::tt.ud.o on the pttit"t oi\ llussif~, the dif ... 
fic'lll tit;>$ will bQ :tmmEHlaurably increased and operations 
might beeonw a't.10J."t:1.vtS ~ l 
Thus 11 the Comb:'Lned Chiefs of the lJ:n:lted. St~~t0a f;l.l'Jci J:~ngland. 
a:t queheo recomxnended ·thcd;. Hu.:flsia join thfl Un.i.tod Z'*tates 
and J!.:.'l:tglru1.d :tn the Japanese war a.t"tel:" Germen:;r was dt7f'oated, 
•JJlte:Y~ fixed the dtttti> of p:r.ob;,l.ble v-ictor•;r over ~r~~.pa.n eighte9.n 





of do<.~tunentB rel.(~t1ng to Huss:tan participa:b:ton in the wa:x• 
age . .:tnst Japan,. !ilhey stated: 11Wa desire Hmleian e:ntey at 
the earliest possible d~ta consistent with her ability to 
engage :i.n ot:t'enstve ope~at:l.ons and a:re p:~: ... epared to off(vl." 
the m.a.ximum support possible w;tthou·t prejudice to our main 
effort against Japan .. n3 
The Yalta diplomacy ln thit~ oor.tneot:ton wne ;t•used 
with the fJ\.lpposed milita~Y neeeeaities of t;he Japru.1ese 
campa:tgns~ When Staltn finally underwl>)ote the PaeH'ie 
wtu", ltoosev~lt gt::d.ned for hls military advisers something 
they det!l.andoc!, rrhe deois:lon o:C th<H':H::l top mili tS.I>y advisors 
to 'bt•ing l1ussia into tho :Pac:tfic war vtas based on :findings 
.. 
or the Wa~ D(~paJ?tment G·enera.l Staff. :t:t was their best 
estimate of the Par EaErbSrl:l situat:Lon. Acoord:tng to th¢n 
Secretary o:e War, nenr-y f;,. St:i.maon~4 
As we tmde:t?atood it II!! ,. .. 1.~h.ere \Vas a very s-brong 
p~obtlbility that the Ju.:pan¢se Gove:vmnent might de ... 
te;J,4mine upon rea:tata:n.ee to the end ln all a:t'~ea:=; of the 
Far F.:ast under its oon·tl''ol, In such an event; the 
Alli.ea wc.n~l.d be faced with the enormous ta.ak of de .... 
st1~oying a.n ax~med force o:r .t'i ve mill :ton m.en and i'i ve 
thoum:ind. su.:tolde air·era.ft, belong:lng to a racE~ which 
had already amply d~mon~rt:('ated. its ability to fight 
l:lte:t"ally ·to ·t.h.e death. 
t 1 t t •.•rws 1 - 111 t\11 ........ 
3 ''·'uot""'d ""' ,.... in Stettin1.us, 9.1~· .g.:tJ!., p. so. 
4 Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bm1cly, .QU .&st1vo 
sex•vice 1n l1eaoe and wax .. (New Yorlc: Hal"P~.n:~ and B:voti·i."ers, 



















The atrateg:tc pla11s .of our armed forces :t.'o:t"' the 
d.~faai~ ot Japan ~ • •• had been prep(;\JJGd vltithout reli ... 
aneo upon the atomic bomb which had not yet be$:n tested 
in I~ew Mexieo.. We were planning an i11t~ensified sea 
and air bloeka.de 1 and gr!;)atl-y :tn·tenaified stro:~<;>gie 
a1.r bornb:tng through th& smnmer rut<l early fall, to be 
f.ollovted on Noverabe:t. . l 1945 by m1 j,nvas:ton of the 
southern island of. K:yushu. :Ph1.a would be f'ollowed. in 
tul"'n by an invasion of' the ma.:bt :J.slanc1 of HO.l'lShu. in 
the epring of: 1~~46. • .• • 
'Na 'estimat@d that • • • the major f'1gllting would 
not end unt:tl th~ latta~ pal1t o£ 1946 at the ee.rl:'l.e.at ll 
:t was infor~ned that suoh Ol:>"';rations m:tght be expeotect 
to c.oat ov$31 a mil15 .. on eausaltillHa; to Anlel?ican forces 
alone., Add:ttional lar£Se losses nd.ght 'b~ e:x:pecteci. antong 
our Allies e.nd1 of. course, if our carapa.igns we:&e sue""' 
c~.saful • • .. enemy causal·t:tes would be tm.t.eh la:rge:r 
than Ol:tr own. 
"l'huJJ~ the Joint Ohifftta of Staff believed. tha.t there 
was s. Kwantung army ot Sapan in, ManchllPla with an estimated 
st:t:>er'J.gtll or El rnill:lon men~ i11hia was suppo sadly the cream 
oi"' the Jttpaneae army, with an ~:utonomous command and an 
1ndu.stri(il.l btat:IEh In a ntemo:ranf.;1urn. of Janua.J?y 22, 1945l 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated; 
:1.~ The t-.t-greed ovar ... al.l objective in th~l war agaJ .. nst 
Ja.plm has been expressed as follows: 
To force the tmconcHtlonal sur:t .. e:ndex> <>f Japan by 
( 1} towex~ing J·apaneH;o ability and. ·will to ttesist 
by eatablishlng -sea and ai:r l:>locltadHs, oond:uct:Lng 
inte;ns:tve r:t:lr bombardlnent; and destl:'oying ,Japanese 
a.ir ~).nd naval s\n;•ength 
(2) Invading and ae.:tz:tng ohject:t.vea in the in· .. 
dttstl1 la.l heart of J~4p.an, !0 
. ~7h:ls wras followed by a moo1orandum the next day which rrtated: 
'l!he Joint Oh:tef.l~ of S'bafi"' have been gu:tcled by the 





entry into tho war- against Jr.;t.pan. • •. ~ 
The objective oi' Huseia' s military effort; against 
J'apt:an in the l?ar East should ba the detea:b ot th~ 
Japanese toX!loea in M~nchuria, ail."' opel?atio:na agains·t 
Japan proper in co:J.laboratio1:1 with u. rs. air fo:vcr;,s 
based in eastern Sibel ... ia, and maxir11mn. :tnterfere:nce 
wlth Japanese .sea t~ailf.:l.c between Japan und the ma.in-
lo.nd oi' :~;'\s:ta* () 
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:NltHJe top tn:i.l:t:ta.ry advisers wnr.l.tad llusaia to pin d(nm this 
Ma:t1<)hu:r?ia.lt Sl"lUY so the.t Ama,;iotiUl fo:!:'ces could invade Japan. 
As late as the PotH3daxn Oonferenoa,. f:Lva months afte11 Yalta, 
the Joint Chiefs of 5tnff' waX*$ still plann.1.ng on tbe in• 
vaa:ton or Japan and. conaide:N:Hl it essential tltat Ruee:ta. 
be :.t:n thE> war • 7 
Tru~ American objective waa not to get a Hu.aaian 
pl~dge to ent;ev the Pacif:lc wm.r ...... this1 e,a ha.s bc~n sho'<'tn.:t 
was c>btninEHl earlier. The Amel .. iean objectiv0~ a.s set 
by th~ Joint Oh:tofs of Sta.f£, wa.s 1 rather, to :r:tx the 
date fo:r tho nusaia.:n. entry :tnt-o the fro.:p(1tnoae vH:t!l 11 getting 
Husa:l.a 1~n·to ·the war as estrly ~u~ p<.Htsiblth 11Beoauae of 
tltei1:• snib:t t1on ih the east, thellO 'li'ta.s never any do1..1.bt :ln _ 
my m.:lnd, n writes Har.>ritru:m,S "that ·~ha Sov:L0ts would attack 
the Japar).6se :ln Manchuria in their own clue tim'ih '* ':J.1op-
rank strategists :l.n i;ho Un:tted States never doubted thtlt 
7 lb:td., v~ '377. 









before the end ot tt~e wa:r:a tho Js.pan(lse and Hua$ians would 
fie}ht ttH"telt other. On Febl"'ttS.l .. Y 4, 1945~ for instance, :i.t 
111 
was sta:t$d that =~~ 
it is wldel:y rumored. that the Soviet Union intends 
to attaclt the As:Lat1e aggressor ae~ soon as its h~u'ldt:~ 
ar~' m1t:led in the weat., and the Moscow p:t:'oss hus taken 
pa:.tn.s. to po:tnt out 1 ts disa.pproval of evll):rything Japan 
et®dS for :tn the lPacific oou1bat. 9 · 
And Dean Acheson stated:lO 
Now1 .ther.•e was very littlG doubt that th(}y [the 
Ru.ss1a.naj 'V'Iould com€> in, but the grave c1.e.:rtge:r• was that 
they. would really wait until the we.r was over and u:ntil 
we had expended OUl" effort f.tnd bJ.ood to win the wa:r, 
and they would oome in and d.o \!¥hat they wished. 
fJ.'hua, HooseveJ.tt s top mllitary ac1v:taera wore most 
(iHlgeJJ for Soviet paJ?ticiru:ttiotl in the Japanese war as soon 
as poss:tble,. and lloose'\NJ~lt relied. upon tl'mm, :tt seem.s1 
wholehe~'l.rtedly. He ae(H~pted the strr:ttegy that tt was as ... 
sent:ta.l to defeat t;he Jape.neso at the earlieet possible 
moment, and th::i.s was the means to ach:teva i·t most quJ.ckly. 
The pJ.--ico th.e Un:'i.ted Statea pt.tid was :t.'~-or th5.s date, 
to whlch tr·emendt:.ua 1rnpo:rtanee was pa:td. An Amea:~ican in .. 
vaaion ot ... Sapan, wh:."t.oh was bolng planned, would oorrt, it 
was bel.toved by some ( th(>se, · :lt seems, who wel"O the most 
:tnfluenthtl), one m:tll:ton American <.~asua.l ties, SIJ'ld the 
9 !2.! ~R~l; .~~~!.12~~ l'llebx•uary 4, 1945. 
lO Dean Acheson, u American Policy To\vard China, tt 
~ ,D~;pa:;t>tn1~.n~ .2f. .!~~tute J2R.~·.l,e~:t}'h XXIV (June lOt 1951), 
. . .. 
------
_-----=---------------=-






l"i:lt~.t~~hnrl.n:r~ l\1k""i"'fr"fJ :1r~ ·~,t~tnQh;u;t~l.~l~ 1~ven '1.\Jtd'dlt~ {~1:~~0)0 C()llttt t;:ton~~. '(., 
... (l~natital. f!Cn:l(J;la.ti Hn;eJb?th:tl'l,.~t fer;~;• burb.~%~'.U\$1t~~ t~lt thet :tt Wf.>l:tld 
tt\\:1.~·$ r1i:no :rd.J.:l!c)n t>,e>Op f;l- ·tr(ii:i!:'l y~n7."tli tr> r~ltl~ltJtn:• thl~~ ~~5~ tu;~t-:JA>ll 
~t.~l Japan;~~ ev~n U! tht1 (J't,;\P,tt\l~Hj{;~ ~~ov~~l'tll:lt)ttt lt;let (~Ot.t.t:t~oa,. 11 
:f.ji'l.:iit tl~t.tlt~>tllt~h th~.~~ f(lf.ltr,~ l't~l.1;) to ,jtt$~•1t"'y ntl.t.l O;ll;;pj,Q1la 
~liiJO$~t~~)lt'V $ i\\fltl:i.Otl.$'*. tb~~; dt? Xll4>'b 'btlll bhe ~~hti1.0 f.itUl"'~h 
1Jy th.e f.'l\lt~1Xl ~1,~ li£!44, f).f:+tn·(fJ Q;f ~l¢:t;tt~~V~lt* }l ~>~<lV'i(.~f$l'~'$ f~)J;t 
th.ta,t t1~~~) jf:t~.p~Ul~'jS~ W$~e al~~a(ly to ~Jl:t iltt~j[l't;a ~i1':t'H5. 1)'1..\?t·~'>Q~(i)~j 
ditl:C~GJ.:1~~Sd~ :rtl-EJ:')l~J1t,~ th~tt tl~~) n~:l/~tt~:t tt~;t($ fl~:t~ bl:{;l<J~<ttitd(~· <:Jj? Jlltp~n 
w~s <l(nra~:llr$,t;l) M1<l ·hl¥,~~:~ it~ ~t,)r.~t:b:n~at5.f:nl ~O\tl~l l)~1$V~nt tl:M~ 
t:lilh:~~f.l~:tty o:r an :1t'lV~~r.it;1.f>X1. toy Arn-0:t\~.:*ll!)l.ll f'Ql1'(l~m. 'l1l.J\.!i;,H3(} ~(:tv.t~a)~.a, 
>ti!olld. t:thot~lt~ OO(tUpy th.{} l"'htt:'.Lj$}Pf~n:f:H:l ~\lint! J.ill~b~:&p:$ avrill'll ~}tl'"-flli.,.. 
1!~e~:te t>tdJo:h~~ tm t;h() eJ<.M4·~~t. o:r th~'Ji- c.b:tn.t>\ ni%d,:nllM~A<l.-. :IJJ o~;)};:!lf;r~.l 
:tl f:t~~'" ~:~'• GonJpt.cn~ tt:u~ th¢ AiH)l'ttu rk!iub l:i.;;t.d fi;,J>t 
.\'J(~Qrn. {J(~C!f(~ 1• n Atl.at1.b:l.<$ 1:~:_ont.hl3.i ·$1_ • (;J):tX\fll J: ( !)tfrC~t:lb{;)~?.... :19~!1): .... ,.,-.,l;'.~" ~!l'lli'o91~t."~'~""~ ·~~~~~~~~,. '(r W' 





a.:t Y:<t1 ta vd'l;h t~he Soviot Unlo:n :ln :rotttt>n i~Ol., h.er• entry into 
the vu:tr• e.gains·t J€Apan VTaa based upon. t;he estilnat1..1 o.t"' the 
K·wruttui'lg A:r.•m:r J.n the absence of :lntcll;tgt;}nce repot>ts. n13 
American forces :tr..1 Gh:tna. h®.d been forbidden to S¢-nd agen:bs 
ir1to r~:ranohut•ia e:l:~her openly or elandost:i.n~ly, ~l.eeording 
· ·bo one write:t.<~.14 
Actually, Q..S v1as latel" i'<;nxn.d ou:t., the cream o:e the 
Japa:nas,g !'orces \'tas destroyed in the Pacific <:>ampaigna. 
Tha:t'a was no mill:J.on·Mraan Japane~1e army in Ufs.nehuri~h 15 
lJ:h:ts t}roves that p~opfn• intelligence report a we1.1e lackifag. · 
And as Hanson Baldwib; l'lcrted. ¥vr:t te:t:• on mil:t tary atf.a1r·s, 
w:r>ote:l6 
Otu" mil:t ta.x·~r men were pt>E'Joo<.rupie:d and eono<n~necl w5;th 
the fiercE-mess oi' the JapanEHle defe:nso; the tact:toal 
situation obscured the hopel0s.s strate.g:to poaition 
ot Japan, and som:e o:f.' ott1" eormnand(l):t•s took, the~e1'oret 
ffi.J:> too P('.HHl:bn1.sti"' a view, · 
T.h:ts pess:lmlsrn was unique f'cn"' w·artime Washl:ng·~on. 
'J!h.e high :t.?a:t"lking offit'i~'!lt:l wer<i~ optimisb:tc over! the ending 
ot ·the 1~u:t?opaan war., pl"edicti:ng :t t wou.ld end :l.n novembex·. 
13 .!2 12!lls 1!-l\l~Jl.~ March 11 1':~46. 
l4 Dall:i.n~ £>.2' ,ll.t,, 1 I>. 1.94. 
15 Zacharias, .22• .£;~:!?.•, P• 15, 
:16 q;uoted in V1e:tl~Hl, 11 Hoosevelt ar.td 1>h()} Pf:tJ? :tl:~.:uJt, n 
pp. 75-76. 
'f 
--- --- ----- ---- ------
:retary <)f Wr.~r ~em.ainocl more or less ale,of trom the Pacific. 
war. It was ~ogaJ?d.~"?d as a MacA:~:.,·blJ!J.r show. Vihen -t1hoy had 
to tul"n ·to the l?acif'J.c wato in :tate l044p they Yvere 1..'ltl€H.\sy. 
The nnow0 en<1my w~1s dif'i'o:t .. e~nt, ld.~1- :tnt,en:td.<>ns wel ... E) rny$ter:t ... 
ons, Jt:\panese propag~;rnda ot i:nv.:l.ncibil:!:ty b.nd tenae:1.ty 
was bol1.{3Ved l)y nua.ny uttl:ttax~ plmmox:-s in the l1n:ttet1 States .. 
despite tn~1tU'lting oontra:r•-;r av.:tdo:n<H,). It tooll!>d oven the 
State "Depar·tment;1 which was e.s tardy in x~ecogn:t~:i~tlg the 
potential:l.t:tes of' political w·a.rfare liAS the Pentagon. was 
of mil:ttal.1:9'• A.a stated ??reviou.sl:r, ev~n as lttte as July, 
lH45, the top echelon believed. that the Japanese would 
laat m1til the tall of. 1946, and tho Oi'f:tce of War Infor.• ... 
mation was prevented :f.'rom str:tk:tng an opti1tli.stio tone even 
t;tfta:t.. the Los Alamos e~~perimo:nt ~"evoal<~d ·the. pro..c•t;:toali ty 
of the bomb.l17 
!Jater it was found out thv.t the War Department had. 
dra.i\ted two estimatea on the l~1al.'~ U:~t.tate:t'n question. One 
was more optimia·t:tc, but it Wtla pigeonholed- by a oomrH~t:t ... 
tive intelligeneo outf:J;b 1.n tb.e Aa$1£rbant Secretary's Qf ... 
.floe, 1Nh:teh allovmd only the possin1i:,1t~ic ideas to go to 
the .To:i.:nt Ch:tei's of, Stai'f ;ln.d thus ·to Hoosevelt.l8 Thus, 
l7 Zaehn:t•1.e.s, $2.• .£.:!:~·, p, :t4. 












on such slender threads is the 1"~b:r:l.c of history woven-· 
l3ut o·bheroa1 in ap:tiie of this p(tt::taimism, saw the 
s:ttttat:ton as it really waa. Some of thEH'H;} opinions have 
been: g:tven alrettdy, 11he:t~e were others,. W:t,ote Arthur . 
1\::r•ock; 19 
An Air li'ox~c~ o.t'.f:ta~l? was cl:tsp~~:tched to Yalta witll 
115 
a well ... doownented repo~t of Japanes(? wea.lcne:ss. desiwned 
to f'ol'tify l're$id.ent Hoosevelt to resist StaJ.:tn 1 s 'pr:tcan 
tor entet>1ng th~) wax~~ Ita pu:vport was .that th.e H.usairu1s 
vier~ not J?equir~d tor victory wn:t.oh wol.J,ld eo111e much 
.sooner than the high oollmtand believed. 
The o:f'i'ieer who bt"ought bhc> l?eport • • • \1\TOl'l a p:rom• 
1ae from Mr .• Hopldns to rea.d the repor~~ and show it 
to the President., Uowever, it S~5;ams that something 
prev~nted Mr. Hopkins from doing so., It Gould ha.ve 
ohange<"l the history of these timee tor the better. 
:Major Gener•al Emrnett O'Donnell, fovuler head of the Stx•ategio 
"Bombing Cormua.nd :l.n ·the 1rar :u:ast, stated that the United 
States and ·Brj.taJ.n at Yal.tt-t ha.d given unneoesa~t~y oonces .... 
sions :tn Oh:Lnese l1;1&t:t1chur:ts. to the Hu.asj,ans in orde1,. to 
ge·t thom into the waX" 1 saying at that time that :t t waB 
h:ts view and the vlaw gene::c•a.lly held hy :naval and ail., o:f-
fj.eers ·tha·li the J~panoae vulre then on their knees and that 
thel. .. e was no need. for en invasion.,. 20 A taw weeks af'te1:> 
the Ya.lt)S!. Con:!."er•enoe General Geo:r•go o. Kenney, tho head 
o£ F'ar Ii:a.ste:r:~n Air Foreea of the J\ll:tes~c announo~d tlu1t 
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the JapancH~H3 fleet \•nas :no longer a th~e~t. At this time 
the Japanese fleet had lost its st:r:tk:t:n.g fovce,_ an.d AmE:~ttiean 
naval cl?a:t:"t W$l"e cruising at will :tn Japan.f)se hmne wa.ters~2l 
Stalin 11roba.bly lmew at the time of the Yalta Con ... 
:t'el?e:nce that the Japa.nesf). were baat~m. Stalin figured 
as early as 1944 that his tr•oops would have to fight, at 
n1ot~t, three raonths~ When he talked to Harr1.man at th~.s t:lma 
along w:t.th the American m11itnr;r advisel.--s1 it W$.S et.gxteed 
that 1\,me1H.oan supplies wt_~re to bG Pl,.ov:tded o:r1 the basis 
of two or three months t l"eq'tl.ireruemts :f.'Ol" :Russiax1 troops, 
We know n.<.-.w that JAahy and that group wera right 
in saying that an 3.nvaa1on wa~1 not necessary,. that Husaita 
was not so g~eatly needed,. that thfl Chiefs of :::tarr in 
shown at the Wal" <h~im~s Tribunal in Tokyo in the ·besti-
mot1y <l>f JapaxlfHH~ officials tha.t the Japanese would n<.>t 
h.H.ve held out even without an :lnve.a:ton (and t)Xclu<'U:ng the 
use oi' the a.tom:te bomb) .22 G$ne1~a1 A:lbert c. Wedemeyer~ 
:tn c.onm1aru .. l of .American :t'orees in China, latt:n."' acknowled.f)E'Hi 
tht~t he ha~:l been one oj? the group who hS1..d. t:'tdv:tsed bring ... 
:J..ng Huss:tril. in 'tihe Japanese war, but he said H:; wae an 
f ) '!: . I l ~I t J' $$ l4b. 
21 HYal·l:ia Su:rrend.er Gantt be ,Just:tf1ed as Aid ·to 
Vict~(>r-y,u (editorial) Satu.rda.i£ }~venin(,)' .Pqst, CCXXII 
(October 15, 1949) 
1 
10·;· .. · · ..... ·" .. ~ ·····~· .... 
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But Roosevelt belienred1 on the x>ecomrnenda.t:ton of 
his top milita:ry ad.v:tse:N.t, that a prolonged war was going 
to be necessary. 1-'h:l.s was one of th(;:l two has:tc assumptions 
(tha other to be d:tsousf:.H')d latet'll) unde:t,. vrh:teh he e.cted.~ 
It is now knom'l. th..qt this assumption was wrong; and even 
though many at the time knew this also, the fact; cannot 
he ignored that the top m1l:tte.v-y· adviserslt those who we:t"e 
tlet.~:tnitely charged with the ultimate respo11s1b:Llity of 
planning Ar!aev:tcan m:tl:'i.'bary policy• believed, that the Russ:tan 
entlr'J in the war wae ~iHHH~nt:l.al.. Hoosevelt was more or 
less obl:tgat.ed to foll()\\t the1:r advi<H3. At Malta,. ~lust 
pr:tor to Yalta; Hooaevelt remarlr.~d to Chu:rohill tha·t he 
thought th.e Japal?.ese wa:r• might last until 1947, and nthere 
t~eemed to be unanimous ta.g:reement on this point," acco-x?ding 
to St;etrt:1 .. nitu:t.k34 Roosevelt m.uet not he blam,ed tor th:ta 
fe~:\t(>d with.out an :lnvas,:ton, as 'Wt-111, oi' ct:>UJ?~·Hf;, as tho 
beliefs that an invasion -vtnWJ neeaasa:t1y,. we:tte without knowl-
edge of the atomic tiomb. 'I'hose who .folt thai.i Je.pan could 


























be d~.feated w~.thout the invasion did rwt depend upon c.~n 
€itom bomb to b:v:Lng this a'bout; it w·u..s to be done, as a.lx~ea.dy 
stated, by blocH::ad~ and as a :t•eaul t of the J'apaneso hope ... 
J.asa stx~a:h$g:lc posi tlt:m. But li1te·wiae, those who .t'elt that 
an invasion. was necesetll'Y W0l?e also not b~:lng:tng the quea-
tion of the bor.t'b :tnto theit> planning~ According to Stimson, 
the Joint Chiefs wo~e not relying at the time of Yalta on 
this tas -:9'{;~t untried bomb.. The qtu~s.t:ton, thus, is thitH 
~lhould ou~ pl.anne:r•s have realieed at the time of Yal·ba 
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A ff.fJW weeks befo~o the YaJ .. t~a Conl~e:vence1 ttoosovolt 
told Statt:tnius, foJ? ·the first time, about ·che botnb~ Ae ... 
cordJ.r.tg tc) Stett;in1.tuH 25 
Ho told me that he was no·b sure how long it Vlf()Uld take 
to perfect a ll$W borttb ...... t;ho o:tomic bomb ... •but that be ... 
fore too long it might b~ poas:tbla to drop this bomb 
in New Yorit City at F'or.~t;y· .... s¢cond St:r:~eet and 'Bl,.oadway. 
11he :resu.lting elq,')103:i.on .• the I)t"fesident said., would. 
hty New Yol4 k low. 
Thus, Hoosevel t lottves the :lmpre~H.lion that he believed 
at some :tnd.~.d.'in:t te flttu.re date the bomb would. pr~lh~"tb:Ly 
be t>er:eect()d.. ~L'here seeu1~d to 'be llQ cart~;.tinty on his par·b. 
senatol? Hourlte Hicltel1looper, nepubl:tean ot Iowa, 
25 Ibid., P• 33. --
Ch:~oves, wartil.l'l!fii adm:tnistr.1at:l:va head of the atcnuio bomb 
p1lo jeot, ·that the:tH;> wr:1.s ~1 99 par oer:tt oertt:l.l:i'lty tht.ct.t ·the 
bomb was go:t:ng to wo:tltt.26 l3ut th1~3- gJ;;anted. that Gi"'oves 
made m:tch a reooumvJndat:ton, s·till did not ·tell ,1l'Lh9.~!· 
Willirutt r:... L&.ltNmce~ s.c:tence ·wx,5;bel"1 atateu27 in 
this co:nn.ec'h1..:;n·~ that from h.:t.s owx'1 personal lt:h<:l'V?ledge the:va 
"iitas g:NlU.t unee:rtu.:tnty among ao:ter:reir;;ts as to .the bomb.' s 
r>t'lWeX> to blo•uv tto a citv evart o:t; the time it was :ei:~:•st set 
- . 'J<; .. tl' 
of.~£ in new Me:>:teo on Jttl1 l6i l9~Hh At that. tin10, writf;}S 
J...~~:~.uran<:H)1 s. Hobar.·t Oppe:r:i.heime:t.~, one of the men moat :t."G·· 
sponsi'ble i'or tho me,ldng ot the bonib• guesm!ld bei'ore t.he 
bomb was dropped that its power would b(:i equ:l.va.lenti to 
only tJ:wee hu.n.dred tons o:f: 1:t'-.N.T ....... not; the twant;y ·bhousund 
t(:>:t:ls it turned out to he. All oi.' the se:Lenti!'its were awed 
very :l!act that a teat was n.eoessa:t .. ;r, using one nf: oUJ:> stoel-t-
ti~-£-.t .. ·f~····'··'·": /!,'\ .. ,,, 7.JJ.(.f.'1.1.~::t,.r·o.>.') ~~.J .. -r .. •:-·r--·;.1 •·'} lfl>t..r( (-t ;· 
pile of three bombs ..... on$ th:trd t'\lf the stoekpile ...... shows 
that the se:tenti.sts were not r:rltre. Ltluren.oe oonolud61s 
thtil.t $.t th.e ·t.i1ne of Yalta., no one could be finJ.re the bornb 
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Brian J/IacMs.hon, Chaix•.m.an of t.lm OcngroiHJional Ai;omio JEnerg;r 
GOlllm.;t t·tee ~ ag;r.•e<;i;<;l Wit}h f,al.tt•r.::mce 1 S co:nol'l.:w:tons • 28 'J.'h~J?t;.i'ore ,11 
no one n.t the time of Ynl ta. could 'have depended upOl'i. t.h(~ 
date, if at all. 
!t; seams cl¢a:~J th1:1t the quesi;ion of the bomb, ::i.n 
:t~eali'bJ1'1 hfld. litt~la to do with the Pl'oper dec1.s1ons to 
be marle at Yalta.. It :ts true that it Atueric~ plannel~s 
had l1:nown at the time of YaJ.tt-t th~tt tl:te bo1nb 't'tOUld he e1z"" 
plod~d at as early e. date as it wa.a they possibly wonJ.d 
not h~we acceed.ed to Huseiru'l demamls m'l mnter:tn.g 'l:ihe v¥ar. 
But w:t th the ad.va:n,tage ot ll:Lnd$:lght, r1.s ht'Ul all?eady bee11 
·the bor:1b 'li·'lU.S porteot<;H;l or not, Thel"efore, a careful study 
of' the s1in.:t.r~:t:to:n ind1ca:t;e~{ that the o::tbsence ot propl'H? ;f.n ... 
fo:oma.tion on the bomb t a potentl$-la ahouJ.d not ht'lve meant 
In. <>th0:t~ words, Jnpan was pr•<>h£~bl~r defaate<;:l wit;b.out the 
bomb arH:1 vd·chou.t an :b1vas:l.on. ~~he honfb prob~~bly only 
shortentH1 the Wlilrll 
l2J. 
that QV'C:m if Aln.er:toa.n planne1~a had Jr.nOi>'VU. the b(~mb Viould 
'be succesr~i'ul o.o soon ae :t t wo.H o;;o even if th.ey ht.~d accepted 
the a.d:IJ":'i.oe oj~ t;hose ·wh() st;a.te.d that Hu.s~:ta vuu~ not l'lOedod 
in dofoat1.:ng ·tho Jt\p~n~$0 that 11-ooaovoJ<t (and Ghm}Ch~.ll, 
v~hQ sirflply ~.r.·e:t\·t along IJ1/'ith Roosevelt) ''lOu.ld or co·ul.d hH.ve 
p;cevented Hussian <i>:t>.tx·~ul<'le into tho w~n"~• 
Jl. bae:to ~.Jl$'U1'11ption o:f' Roosevelt at Yalta {al:read.y 
diaeuased and to lH:? :developed more fully 1at(l1" in this 
study) was tha:t th¢ West should. mRke e".re't'y effo;~Jt to get 
along w·1.th Hussh"-t thH.t the .o:r.tly porJa~.bili·!;y of :rutu~e 
WOl"'l<l );H~act$ J.ay :b+ pleasant :r-eJ~.ations w:t th the S<Jv:lets. 
As Gun't;he:t,. '1~1tos, ~.39 Hoosevelt gsunbled :r:·o·r a p.e~ma,n.ent 
p<3ao~ on a moral, id.ea1.1,st1ct WOl"ld ·lHl.S:is., G:tven this 
asamuption$. it :te d:ti':f.~icult ·bo imagine Hoosevelt turning 
down :t.,lnt;1y HtHHi!ian .requests to t~ntJE}J:* the wtu.!l and to ob ... 
tain a aeotwe place :Ln. the I>"iax~ I~aat, ~Vrit¢e She:t•wood; ~;o 
:tt :ta qtdte cle£),l:' that Roosevelt had ba~n pr0pared 
e·ve.n bc:C'OJ."e the 'l't~h(;i.'l:tJ!lU Co:P..tex-enco :tn J.943 to ag1:ee 
to the lag:l.timaoy of. most :t:e not aJ.l of 'l.~h@ Soviet 
ola:tms in the :B'a:r? Eaa·t., :Col? th~sy involved the :r•e$to ... 
rat:ton of' posses$ions and privileges taken by the 










evoked no a:rgume:r.rb when. stalin promented. them. s·balin 
eaid to noos$Veltt "I only want to ha.v~ ret;ux•ned to Russia 
what the ,ra.panese have t{.1..1ten from my country. tl Hoosevalt 
atf.lted 1.11 reply; nrrb.a:t $€H~ms like a very l:~easont:'l.ble sug ... 
gestion !'l"Om our t'tlly ..... th.ey only vrt;l.nt to f~et back tx'k')..t 
t::t:t. '"f::J wh:tch has been talt:en f:room th~nt.'*v. W:r:i •. tes Les.hy; br.., 
It seemed very rEH·ll.Sonable ·to me t\lso# ru1d no one was 
mo~e sut'Pt"isecl thli\n I to see thea~ eond:t t.ions ag:t .. eed 
to at Yali.;a labeled a.s some horx-endous concession$ 
made by li>l':'eaident no'H~evel t to e.n enemy. 
Another. thing • • • I do not see how an:ybody could 
ob,ject to the agreements made. One thing is certain, 
th&Pe was no objeotion at Yalta b-y Chu:t"Chill or by 
Roosevelt, and the ~n.ti:re rne.ttell' eonsumecl t>ela.tively 
very little time., 
Thus, if these were assmned to be jtts'h eJ.o.:bna and :not sim-
ply a npr:lee" fJtalin was clema.ncUng fox~ h~.s en:b:ranoe in the 
wa~, then it oan only be wonde:r-ed if Hoosavel·t and Chur•ohill 
vrould have wi thbeld them if they had. not 'though't they l:teeded 
the .Hu~H!lia:r~s in the war,. It $Gems doubtful. 
Hut in this eo:n.noot1.on the queat:ton 1mwt be tasked: 
If H.uasia. had not enttn.~ed the war and Hoo~H;)Velt ( e.s well 
as Churchill) htHl not been :incl3.ned to gr&tt these Huss:t~n 
des:tres, could the 1Na$t have p>?<rtrfl:m·ted Stalin from tnaking 
good these claims anyway(l Many i'eel., such as Surmler Welles, 
tha·c it was not in l"{oosev(;)lt t s pow~r to determine wh.ether 






Russia w.a.a to be a Pacific power o::v not• Huss:f.a had been 
a l?aoifie povte~ to1~ a century. Wb:y,. in J.9•15, as11:s W(;!Jl:lea, 
would $he meekl·y x•<:Hid.gn herself at tl'.vt> peace ool1fere:rwe 
to .forenk:tng all ela~btts to te:rvi tory taken ea:rl:ter f':r·om 
her by J'apan? How eould the Un:ltod St~a.tes get Huse:ta to 
\ 
in this eonnec·biont 
One of the ·~ ~ t things X should lil~e to point out 
abou.t Yalta was that t:lnquest:tcHul.'bly thf.? Russd .. ana :bad 
it in thQ:i~ powe1~ 11ot only to tnko what was conceded. 
to thEnn1 but rnuch more besides. 
The:re was very little likelihood that anybody would 
have ·the will, and tew people could have the ptrw·er>-
to thl7ow them out; of any area on the nminlan.d wh~.oh 
they m:tght ooottpyJ t1'tld wha:t:>e they might wish to remain, 
so that this agreement gave them the bas:ts tor a legal. 
· olaim to something oonaid.el?ably lees than they nd.ght 
have te.lt~~n. w:l thout a.. legal ola:tra. 
It vma, or should hG.:V'e been,. oonilllol"J. ls:nowled.g~ that 
Ru~si(il. had an histovioaJ. yea~n:tng fov 'bhe W11!.l"n1-wo.te:t' po;t?t;a 
of~ Manchuria, and Roosevelt had a firm oonviotion that 
Huasia should h.ave an t1.n.l1runpel"ed s.<:HJe:l!s to such a pox•t .. 
He even i.tn:t{§!~~Hltetd at 1.f.lehextan th~,l.t Ruasta m:tg-)lt have fHH~oss 
to Dfldren :tn l'/ta.nohur-:ta. 35 
'!.II. . 1.· 
V"J:: Ac£lot:>cm,. .2!2• ~9·*1G• 1 pp,. ~:m'7-9o8. 









l'J:1hUt:.1t even if thr:> auo<!.esr; of the atom bomb httd b0en 
Pl'OVEKl at the 'l'lime of Yalta Ol' even i.i' th(~ top military 
pl.:u:tnel-.s llad est:Lnated eorr(iHfbly th~ weala'l.es$ ot' Japan, 
·the ques1rlon o1~ Hu.ssian c1em~tnds in the l''ar I~ast wc.n:tld atlll 
ha:vo had to have been faced. Stul:tn W~\S continually 1 .. e ... 
ferJ.?ing to the fact that R:ussiF-1• was ent:l:blod. to gat baali: 
all she ha(1 lost in th:l.a are~ to Japan at the beginning 
Qf the eent·1.wy. lie told the Ituss:tan people: 'tli1<.n:•ty yoars 
ha.ve we1. the peopl~ of' the old genert1.tion, waited toP th:ta 
da':f. u 'liJ:d .. ~ ~rbatemen:t, howe·ver, was :ln ·t~he fao~ of' the 
t:t"~ad.it:tonr.\1 pol:te:r taken by th0 <.'l.ottm1t11'lit3ts ln Russ:lia s:tnce 
th.ey had como i~o power, tor t':l.t f~t:t11t-rt ........ st:t:t"pris:i.n()ly ...... Bol ... 
sh(:'lV:i.ks 1 N!enshev:tks 1 $.nd even tho liberals had x>ejo!c~d. 
over the d.:ei'eat of r.rsardom. Lenin had said that this de ... 
teat had tnEHtnt nusa:Lnn fr$-t::dom. was near~r. Stalin had 
sa.:ld so too ...... :tl'l. the pasti" Hut his l'lew view of history, 
his l:1ewl.,- i,.ou.nd so:r.row for• t;he past humS.liat::ton of !i:ussia, 
f.:tttet1 in welJ. witlt this new pos:1:tion he was tl~ld.ng ...... CH>l-
loctcl~ ot littssian posse$S1ons sJ.l ovex• the world.. 00 This 
aboui.; face on. the part of ~:3ta1in should have made Western 
o1~1'ioials at least a l:tttle susp:l.c:J.crus, bu.t it did no·t. 
of' Huss:t!l on th£~ part o:r Hoosevolt (and Churchill), the:t:l.~ 
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g¢:neral pl:dlosophy of Hlmp1.ng'1 nus$1a would ooopeJ?ate., it 
carmot he assumed that if the West had no"~ ·thought thnt 
l26 
to allow Huss:ta to have a :wl;:.ronge.J? p<.ns:tt:ton in the t11at' Bast,. 
Roosevelt aonsidec:t•ed th<HH:} HusZiliu~ :reqtwsts leg;Lt:tm~:te, 
He wanted. to b$ .fair ·w·i th n.ussit:a., to tH'>opa.rate in even.""J' 
WFA"J possible, hoping that th1e v-ms the SUI"ea'b wa:y to peac;Hh 
Tha:t"efo:re1 it doos not eeen1 likely that the situat:ton ::tn 
A~da would havt;~ 'beon a.:tta:re~l gx>aatJ:.r even 1t Hoosevelt 
had been. co:nvin¢(1){§ that Jta:ptul. wo·(..\ld be dat:ea:bGci without 
m >:nil ''\Ut,'l ~111'1~ o~<r Ola cn·rit."A-.. .t.J. . w.\1 t,'llf J\111~~.,.. .'.!.'ll ·. t . .n. h 
Roosevelt never tailed to su.ppo:~?t the ·Nat;ionaliat 
Govern.m$nt. 1:rh~ facts do :t'tot support $ny conclusion ·~hat 
Uo<H~evel t was in any way in :ravor oi' a. e.cmnn.unis·h govern ... 
ment in China. Aecord:tng to Welles,37 liooeevelt, :i.n l945J 
stated his objectives rag.aro.ing Ohin$. \W3re a~~ tollowst 
lrirst, 't~o ~estot>e to Oh:tn1:>.. all te:tn•1tox•y p:.~:~ev:tously talten 
by coe:ro:ton or cox1quest.. Beco:r.~.d, to au.ppo:t•t the 1\fat.:t.f...n'l ... 
~lists as the only gove:t."'n.rnent that couJ.d t:tn:tf.'y Oh1.na ~md 
p:rleven:t; a o1v11 wu.r. Th1'lnl1 to br.tng ~bou.t, an cl.g:~?eement 







in Chinese :tnterne.l at'faira or enroachlnent on Chinese te:t'• 
l.'~itoryl!' {1J:his showr{, by tha way, tha1i Hooaevolt was not 
blind to th.Q possible Soviet ntenaoe in Ohi:n.a$ a.11.d. it is 
just anothol" :ttem tluil.t slJ.ould have 111ac\e nooseveJ.t hesita:te 
in v.tawing the Hussian posttJinJ~,r pla.n.s with optimism.) ':Phere 
is noth:tng :ln the Yalt~:t disouss.:lons to indieate that he 
ev~r WtilV'(!):Ved .from. thi.s pro .... Nationalist view (althoug;h11 
as will be f4hown1 he: might ha:\l'e Ullw:l,tt:t:ngly atl"angth.en~Sd 
the eommtmist hand in, among othe!i things.~ pledging that 
tJ:1e 11,al' Eastern. O.F;~l:"eamenta :.rreaah~~e::1 a:b Ya.l:ba, wi·tbo'I..'Lt tl:~.e 
Pl"€HlGnce. of Oh,.na, would be: u.uqu¢st:tonabJ;y :f'u1:t.~:D.led.) • 
A:l?ter the "Yalta Confet~enot:> ho r;tga:tr.t st!ited his su.pport 
fo1• the Nat:tonalist Goverrnnent. Ac¢ording to Patril.llt J • 
".{0 H"Ltrloy., .... ~ th6n Ame~:tc.an Arrthaasador ·to Chinat 
In my last coxll'e:vonoe w:L th :Pl .. e$ident Hooaevolt h.(!) 
entrusted me with two apooia.l 111iseions • ., • ~rhe fi:r•.zt 
, • • was to b:ring Ohut>oh.iJ.l and f~tali:n. to ttn. ,';J,gl:le~ .... 
ment on. th$ poli.cy that the trni ted sto.te';a had been 
p'U:r"suina j,n Oh:Ln.a, Nan1el:y ( 1) to • • , i:nJ:i.ng about 
unification un.der 'liha lfat:t.ona.l:tst Cfove:r."~n.ment of all 
S.l'lti•Japanese armed .forces in China"~ ( rn To endorse 
the asp.ira.t:tons of the (~h1.neH1e people .f'or the <::HJtab ... 
liahraent of a. f't"'e~ tW'lit<ld dem.oer-o.tic Chinese Government. 
( Sl 'l':o cont:tnue to insist tl1at Ch:i.na .. • • wo:~:~lt out 
l1e1" ovm d.E}stiny ~.n he~ ovm \VS.:f .. ... • ± obtained 


















at·berit:ton on the defoa.t of the enemy and did not conctitt'n 
himself too much with the po·tent,,a.l pol1t:toa:k situation 
aftel' the war (in spite o:f l:lis defin1t.e. bel:tefs in th~ 
poli tioal :t?$alm.) • Whatever could be done to aO(H.'ll(J.:r;ta:te 
the Jaratnese detent .!lt .. ~ ;e:t.~.f..l}.~ J?.~.ac.~ must be agreed to, 
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he seemed to feel, even :tt it VJ"Gnt against the proclaimed 
prineiplea of nat:tcmal seJ.f ... determin3.sm1 the Atlantic (~har­
ter» (!l.Ud similar pronouncements. A~J has been pointed. out 
~arl:Ler, any possible injustices be:tng done he felt would 
be str>a.ightened out by the proposed U:ni ted liJa·M.on.ts. As 
Rosenman points ou.t, 39 as tar as Roosevelt was oone(l.U?lled 
ttthe li1&'$:' :ruastem agx-eement4a at Yalta wal."e not un item o:l' 
.fo:t'eign pol:to·y·, The-y we:t'e wall measures exeeut$d in time 
of vntr $Jnergeney, and t;he SJ..lfi<f nr.C? .. a~2 was to sa:vo .American 
'boys from death. 11 H1s pe~sona.l a:ttitude ·bowtlr-d Huss:ta 
led him to m:lx:timize (or igno:tie) the reality of the Soviet 
e.xpans:to11 :Ln. the F'a:r Ea.st1 to aeceed to .Stalin' a demands, 
and then to gu~trantee that China would accept them. 11 China 
'lmas clearly bEting mad.e to pay the heavy pr1.ee ot• Boviet 
pa.rt1cipat:ton in the war~tt40 
A:t Oa;t~o, :tn. November, l£;431 an ag:t~t:H!I-t11en·t botween 
Oh;:hmg Ka:l.•shek1 Cilul .. eh.:tll.'ii· and Hoosev(~lt stated: 
39 flouenman, J2lh <1it~, P.• 543. 
40. T>aJ .. l:tn, .21?.• .. <?..~.~·, lh 193. 
- -----=-=-=-=-=-----'---== 
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Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the 
Paeific which she has seized ox• oocup:ted since • • .. 
1914, and • • • all the territories Japan hra.s stolen 
from the Ohinese, such as MfiDchuria, b"'o.x'mosa and 1?he 
1
. 
:t'eseadores, shall be restored to the nepublie of China. 4 
At Yalta vital rights of China were sac:ri.ficed to 
Russia. 'l'h.is l~~H3toration to the Sc)'viets of' the .t~orn1er \, 
rights of rrsal"'ist Russia to dominate Manol'.mria through 
\ 
the co11trolling of the Ch:i.nese Eastern and. South Ma:nchu.ria.n 
va11:roads and to eontx~ol Port Arthur flnd J)airen were pledged 
by Hoosevelt and Htal:ln wlthout Chlna• s oonsent. Then 
after mt:lldng tho agreement, Hoosevelt and Churcldll promised 
to "take measures" to obtain Ohinat s consEn'lt to these agree-
ments and at the same time agreed that H.uss:tan ele.:tms n sh.all 
be 1.1.nquestionably fl:t.lf:tlled. n This is cel:'ta:lnly a black 
ma1-.k against Hoosevelt, which. again reinforces the idea 
that Hoosevelt war; ignorint?; the realit:tea of the sittul.tlon. 
Even those who nomnally defend. Roosevelt• s ~'lotions 
ha.VE'i criticized tb.is matter• of' unquest:i.ona.bly fulfill:tng 
H.ussian demands. Wrote Shar•wood: 42 
1l'his • • • was the mos·t assailable point itl t;he 
entire Yalta accord, and the most su:x•prising in that { 
it involved Hoosevelij in the ldnd of firm oolr.md.tment . 
tha·t he usuall-y mnnaged to avo:td. • • • If Ghina had 
:1?(:1f'used to agree to ~1:ny of the sov:l.et claims, p:restun·· 
ably ·bh~ u.s. and Br:ttain would have been compelled 
to jo:tn :tn enfox•cing the1n. 
41 quoted .:tn 'William C. Bulli tt ~ n A Report on Ohlna, 11 
1,~!,~1 XXIIJ: (October 1~~. 1947), 36. 
















Welles45 was or:i.ti<Hll of the sect:ton g:tv:tng nussia 
w:tll make it altogeth.er impo:Hdble for a new unified O.hina 
to exercise full sove~Ede;nt·.r w:tth:tn Manehu:r. .. la, are all the 
more objeot:tonable in view of Ohina•$ absence :f'rom the 
o<.mference. • - • " Gene val Wedemeyex• stated44 that the 
Yalta agreements should never have been acoom.p11.shed with ... 
out Chiang, And an ed.:t to rial :i.n the New York T:i:mea statea45 
inthia connection: 
One of the least defensible aspects of this .••• 
agreement :ts that Great Bx•ita:tn and the Urrlted Stutes 
agreed to the surrender of the basic r:tghts of a.nothe:r-
allyJ Ch:t.na, w:l.th ·tho Pres1.dent• of the Unitt~d 8tates 
undertr~J:d.ng to secure Ch;tna. t s const:)l'lt after the fac't. 
At Y:'alt~t, nootlleve:Lt oomp:t.,.omised on a cru~d:t.nal pr1n ... 
elple of American .:&1a.:r li1astern polioy ... -r(')spect for the tar ... 
:r•:ttorial inteer1.ty of CJ:tinet. Roosevelt gave Rttsnia a 
stx·onghold in Manchuria which, in the past, John Hay had 
tried to p:r•event in his Open Door nf.)tes. 4H It is tl"Ue 
that Hussia pledged Ohhut wa~ going to keep her sovereignty 
in Ma:nchuria. Again in May, 194!5 11 in a eonversa:h:.ton. between 
~~•._lrr '~'.,"',.~""..,..o1""''~,~~;~ 
4:.? Sumner \Nelles~ Vll'here Are We U~M.d:tn_s'i (New Yorlr.: 
rlarper and. Brothers, 1946T;ji'; Z'Jbo.-- · 
44 !!!!! J_q~ :~:~m~, June 14, 1951. 
45 I~~:t.<f.:., t.?ebruary 17, 1946. 
46 'l'hom$-r:~ A. Ba:tl~~y, f:£lht$ t;lan :tn the :.>t:reet (New 
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H.opldnat Ha:r•riman, and stai~.l:t~t, Stalin ~fs.;t tera:t;ed h:ls sup ... 
port of.' a stable and un:ti'ied China controlling a.ll o:t" 
Manchuria. Stalin. again said that Husa:ta did. not claim 
any terr:t tory fron1 China and that llussi.a. would support an 
Open noor Policy.. He statE>)d also thn.t he would welcome 
Chiang's repr•t1HHmtati.vaa with Hus~ia.n troops and would 
be in favor of a Chinese Na.t:tona.11st Gove:rnment :l.n men ... 
churia. 47 !if)w""vez)• :tt ~.a very di!'fieult t:o un.de1~atan.d how 
Chine. could still have its .f.11ll sovereignty while other 
Hussian pre-eminent interf>sts thert:> 'were to be maintained, 
Ha.x't\:i.man statee48 in this co:nnoction th(O.l.t Hoosevelt did 
gt') bf)y(m.d r1ovi@t :l.nter•osts :t:n the tree trans:t t of goods 
going .i:n f.tnd ottt of H.ussia~~ Hooservel·b ·bold Harriman at 
Yalta that this was his interpx~ata.tion, and in. August, 
1945, Stal:tn ~;rbated the same thing to H~~.rriman. But the 
tact still rema:f.ns tha.t, howeve-r good HQosevelt' s intentions 
were, he did at:~r(tle tc) sornei~hing that ws.s a rnatte:l:' of an.otht):t' 
c.our1t:;r-y' ::1 interm:\1 af'fa.:J.rs, and we kno·w thr;~.t stalin tcHJl~ 
the phx~ase Hp;re ... er~:I.nent interests" to mean much moi•e than 
just .free t:x•ansit of good.s, R.oosevolt was very nai.ve t;o 
47 Harriman •. 9J'.• ~~·; p, 378. 











assume th.<:tt tho pht•ase vroulu be so 1:1mit;t:>c,1., 
:r·he 1:-oa.son given .fo1<) :n.ot consultin~·~ w:i.th Oh:tang 
w::J.s that the m.a:tter of bringing nussia into the Ja.pHneaa 
war had. t.o be k$pt secret until Stalin could st:t"'e-ngthen 
his Sibe~i.tul .t•ol'~~OEHh It was felt that in the pa~rb tTtwan 
had a1vmys le!n"~ned of secrErbs from Chungking. 49 Wl1ota 
tho Ch.lnese immediately of' 1;lle Y.a.l·cm. discusslona was duG 
to tear of. the t:H~'IClU"ity of secrets in Ohtt.o.glti:ng.11 lmd 
Harriman w:rote:6l 
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! am sure tht!l.t Hoosevolt would. havo much pr•efG'n:•:~;><::Hl 
to hfi.Va con~ml·l:ied Chia:n.g in ;);tdvan~e, if he had tl1oughi:i 
:t t was feasible :t'or him to (10 so. On tho other hand"' 
he ,. , , 1n1EH1t of Ch:tang* s dasil?e to eorue to ~l permanent 
·ur1do:('standi.ng with the Sovie-t; Unlon. li'or these l,.ea ... 
sons, and also booaus.e of~ the sti,ong su:pport that he 
he.d g1:ven Oh:i.a..ng ir.l the );>fiSt, HoofH'.rv~lt felt that 
hG could Vf(n•k th:i.ngs out w:t·bh Chiang when the ti:me 
cetuna. 
Stpttinius d.{~fondr;: ·t;he keeping secret oi' ·the 1.~.g:roements 
on tltese same g:~?olli··:vls, ~ulding that he .fE~l.t tha.t :::a;e.lin would. 
have l?$:f't..1sed to negotis:be to entfJX" ·bhe war before t:t. large 
negotiating group.52 But gr.•ruJ.ted that this was the reason 
for keeping the negotiatlon'~ secr~et (and no al tarnative 
4)? J.P,!E!·, p. r;75 _ 












plish :tt~' purpose. Pormer Ambai\.H~i~tdo:t" ·to Chir1s.., Pfa:iFl~iok 
:J ~ Htlrley 1 stated t 55 
It :ta well known that the Hus~~ia.n an.d Oh:tnose oora-
mun:tst$ and ·en€! J~'j;Hil.nose knew of th,1.s AglJeement. I 
l~}a:rned c,Yf :tt::1 exir;51~enoo th:c.-.ou.gb. the Ch:tn.esQ a1~med 
Comrrrun1,s·t;s. 
Latez• I quari~(;><l the State Department about the Ag:t;~ee., 
ment and Vli:UJ ~x.dv:lfH:.\d that the St;n1;e Dop&r•tmfJnt knew 
no·thlng abotl t the Agreornent. 
Thus,_ :t'l; was only fli'Om Chungking that secrets 
lealted. out. or eo·t.tt..,se; tb.e~a is no proof of which party 
because t>he i:nf'orm.at~ion. was ao cru.iokly 1.:n the ha:nds of the 
whioh ~EH:11i1n likely; it :ts onl~r another. indi(lnt:ton that tllE)Y 
did not l~agtlrd the Js:pa.l'lese as n fo~!itl.d~ble Gl1.t;>ln:f, that 
th.ey we~e not WOl"'ried of a prematu1.,e attaclc by the Japn.nese 
:tn ~~ibe:c>in, that ·they retllizec1 tl.1e J.0.1'HJ.nei$e were Vil'ltu,ally 
d~t·eated alrti'iady.,. It is hardly stn,.p:t.<;:tsingll ·t~he:n, that 
Oh:ta.ng 11ad b~)en shocked and deeply hurt a:t the der;ds:l.ons 
1nr:1.<le vr:tthout :hJ.s rn~es~noe at the Yt1.lta Oonferenea., General 
Wec1emeyex• was O<'>nv:tnecd of: th-~;•~~e ft:.H:tl:l.X:lf£8 a:t'te:r· personal 












Ruaa:ta and China-. u Wh~n th~se agl~~ementa wet-a l?cvoalf>cl1 
an:t:t ... oommu.nist el.em.ente f<l'tiavted e·tu.den·t delnonst:r•ations 
against nu.sai~l and the Cli.inese Ootmnun1~tt Party. Off:tces 
of' bo·th a communist n.ewspape:r., the J!a;.P;& 11!.! ~l !!:t-!.~ ... 4, 
and tht~ Democratic Pres.sp O'ViXH~d. by the China Demoera.t:to 
...... lilt~~ -·'*'i'·~~. . 
teagu.e, we:re alt<Jo w:J:>eoked~ sh.owing th~::? ha·tl"0d bet;ween 
Kuom:tntang and Oornra.tm:lst :f.e.etions ~ 66 
the political develo:prnent o;e Ch1.na tnight ht~.ve b~en vevr 
d:l.ff'erant, lilOl'l< instance, sov~~al 1e~:ra later• at a State ... 
War ... £Ia'V'y rtleeting, as J~unas .F10l'tl'lestal l"aco:rded: fl? 
l made tho obset•vaticrt'l th.a:c we could. not d;).'l'$);W en-
tirely (Jbl:i.qu0 conclt:u.~:tons about Ch.:i.n.u toda:y wi t~hou.t 
'JJ dtq'f!',ll lit 
f)t~ 1' ,...,. P>. it 
.,.,. J.IVVf! ¥· • 
~ ..... ~,·~
----- ------- --·---
ree.:t:t~i1lt,~ th.aij pe.rt of the DX!.t:tpa.thy, which Marshall 
had quoterl was nov.· mo1.xnting in Ch:i:na, der5 .. vad tx•om \--·· 
the Yalta agreemerrt in. wh:leh v;e gavQ tJJ..Wt:.'l"'J eartain of -" 
the sove:re:tgn r:tgl1t s o:f.' Oh:tna in oxode:t• to get the 
nusa:tans into the war. • • • Ma:lNJthall a~~x·e(Hl ·chat this 
unfortunate fact wa~1 a aubstantd.al factor in the pres ... 
ant :t.~:t sing u.npop1lle.r:1:by o:r the n. f3. AI! :tu C1:1ina~ 
the Yalta at.:~:reem(:):nta, in ·which it was atat$tl that China 
and Hus$:1a should conclude a pact of friendshi};> a:nd all:tt--:mce. 
Ch:ln(;)ae Na.tio:nal:Lst ofi':tci1~la v.fet1e first in:f'orm.<-}<1 
of the ·:{alta sec:vet agreements (and thus of the fact tha·t 
H.oosevelt a.l'ld 01::.ur>ch111 hs.d all"Gady ag~eee<l to this Sino ... 
Soviet pact) on J'-t:~,.ne 9, 19461 when P1 ... ~sidan.t rJ:ru:nw.:n il':l.fol.~ed 
enoe. Ch:tang Ka:J .... shtDk wa.s infonnod <.>f them by Al::H>Vloan 
Anib~:~.asadr.;r t<:> Ch1na 1Iu:t)ley on Jt~11e 15, l9t~5. 58 In th1.s 
me!Slr~age to Ght~tng :ti; was stated the.t :t.t would be :ln tho 
bes·b interests of Chin.f.l to start negoi:>iat:tons and to con-
clude a tjN:Iaty ot fr:tenc1ship with Huss:1.a. 59 
Soong w~s in Moscow at t~he erlcl o:t June to b~C':L:n.g 
about th1s tx•ea.ty ~ A<:H;o;:-d.il:lg to Har:t~1man, 60 who was 
58 Harriman, 91'• .9Nt.·li. • P• 377. 
59 Dallin, EJ?.-. £1&•• p. 197, 






pl,.(:HH'snt at these d1.souss1ons, stalin made demands beyond 
the Ye.l ta. a~~reen1enta, tmd Soong, though not p:rep$.:t"ed to 
acoeed to them all, Wal"lued an a.g:re~'1tent an.cl p:rJepar-ed. for 
conoess.ions. Wrote Ha:r~iman~ 61 
135 
At no time did ~:loong g1.ve me a.n~r indication that lt 
he felt the Yalta tmde::r:•li:.rtanding was a hal1.flicsp ;i;n. his 
negotiations~ l repeatedly u~ged him not to g:tv~ in 
to Stalin• s demands. • • ., I had several tal!u~ with 
stul:tn and :Molotov j,n wh:teh I insisted tbat the ~'1ov1et 
pos1 tion was not justif:t()d, ., • ~· I i:n.form$d Soong • • • 
that S.11'Y' cortOG(IS.f.ons wh.:lch went beyond <>ll:t> intal~ln~e ... 
tatio11 o:f the Yalta unde;~ste.nd:tng would be made b.ecause 
Soong belteved. the:y would b.$ of v-alue in obte.irlins 
Soviet au.pport in other d:t:t~eotions, • • • Soong gave 
in on several points in. ordE:l:t:• to aehiav~~ his objecti\re$ .. 
It :ts d1.f'ficult to see, howeve~t at what place this 
Sino ... soviet paet went against the lette~ of the Yalta agree• 
manta. As stated earoliex•• the Russians got privileges 
in Manohu.ri~ ra,4ll"oails a.nd port faeil:t. t:t~s, bt.tt Russia 
aoimowledg¢d. the authority of the Naid.onalist Gove:r•mnent 
ove:~? both China and Manehtlr:ta and a.gresed to suppoJJ'b the 
N'ational.:tst Govermnent, '1!hese me.in prov1s:tot:ta 1,.ol1owad 
the lette~ of the Yalta atz,J:>eementr3 vet<y closely. The 
spirit; we now know, was vastly d:tfferent :tn i.ihO mind$ 
of tho l'h:tssianfs than :t t was in the minds of" Bl'li ta:tn and 
Ame:oica e.t Yalta :ln what ·th~ t$:t?Jnt{ :t>eally meant, ao it 
ls verYy difficult to say whether tl1e Sino~soviet :r:veaty 
followed the sp:t;P:l.t ot the Yalta agreements. :rt all depends 











from \'1hich point of view one loolte at tho probletn. 
When the Si:rao .... soviet a.gl;'0emf;nta wel.'e madf.b :t:n.tbl1.c• 
they were !'avora.bly :r•eoe1ve<1 in both China al'ld the Un:t.ted 
States.62 The Ch.:tnese vu~:re ver'Y sat1.s.fied with the treaty, 
and ovex1 :tn 1947 ·the Chinese Po;t•eign Min:tate;r vJas appt"'e.,.. 
hens:tve that Russia might cancel th.e trea.ty/3:3 In l.95~~ 
the ChinEH:m :~1at:to:r:mlist d.eJ.egflLta ·to the ·ani ted Na.tions 
submitted a l!•esolution wh:lch called on th() ho<ly to de·her .... 
m:tnEil torrnally that n th<i1 us::;R itt he~ relations with. Oh:t.na 
s:Lnoa the aurrt,lnde:t .. ():f: ~r~ptiUi baa v:lolat~e<i0 the Oh:.tnese ... 
Soviet p~tot, 64 :tmp1y:1,nt; that 1.1' :tt h.€td be$n ora:r?ried i-">U1; 
in spi:r:tt the:~e ·wot:tld r1ot have b0an the 1n:~ouble that en ... 
sued. Ambaet\lador Htlvley1 ver.ty st:r'longly p~o-Nat:tont\list, 
ea'bl~d ·the Stat(!) Departraant: 
'l~h~ publ1os,.t1on of thea~ d.ocu.»l&llt;;$ has demcm.~;~t:t:a.tocl 
COl'lOlusi v~ly that the Soviet Govert.mlsnt supports the 
Nat:tona.l Govevmnent of China and also that the two 
gove:t"'nm~.n:l'\js are in ag:t~e~m$n·t ~eg$;~t1:tng ?liarlcl:.n.tria~ 65 
If ·bhe sov:lets had lived up to th(u~e ag;reems11.ts 1 
very possibly the situ~:b:ton in Aaia would be vastly dif.., 
.1'$l,.ent today.,. Dean Aeh.eaon stated66 that the Oh:tnese 
64 t!~oeJ~t2}2: Re~q~~" JruJ.Ual~y 26, 1952. 
65 Quoted in Harriman, .212• .~.:tt?.., p"' 3'78. 









rega.:t .. dod j.t as t3. v~luable ·bret.tty because it • • • car. ... 
,.,.1od vlith 1 t the obligation of the Hussia.ne to evaou. ... 
ate Manchuria, to reeogn.:L:rse the Chinese :Natione.:L:tst~ 
Government, QU(;l to aid in the re•~HJtabJ.1ahrJ1ent of 
Ohineae sovel"'aign.ty :tn Iv.Tanob.ut»ia. 
But :tt is again difi\icn:tl t to understand how Ar.uer-i~an and 
Ohine:;le of:t:'ioials could h!>'lVe bt~$n ao hope;t"ul, especiall·y 
in v-iew of the .t'aot that llussil::t demanded that 1 ts pl"e"" 
eminent :tntereats wa:t'e to 'be j..,.eoogn1zed .in :Man.ohux-ia, thes$ 
intel~ests being gual!?ant~ed by Br;t tt-lirl and Amer.•:1.oa. ...... what ... 
evev the parties concerned meant bjt tho te:ma. If Stalin 
had been acting in good faith;. he would not have nf6H~ded 
any such gua:r.~1.te<H also; HooeH~v~lt {and CJ:u.:u;;chill) had 
no right to g:tv¢ sueh t.\ p10tlge, wha:l;ev~r the:tr intentions. 
It 1.s true tl:.l.at China was w:Llline; to .sign the agl~eement. 
that the nationttlists were pleased v::tth it, thrt.rli t11.e'Y' d:td 
not sign :tt uruier p~otest. Btdi it is also true, aa l?aul:tne 
1110pltina states, 67 that 11 Ante:t'ioan pl?esaura on the Nationalist 
Govarllln.ent • • • brought about ·the d.:tspatohing <:Jf Chinese 
(lJlnissariea to 1\f!oscow to negotiate a tVeQ.ty in ful:f::tllmant 
of tho Yalta bargain .. n It will never be known, of' course, 
it th~l Htt.af.lS.ans h£Hi :n.ot $eetned C()c:Jpe:r.at:i.ve, it' the United 
~~~""""· 
St~te$ v~Tould have tol"Oad Ch:tn.a to sign suoh a p$.at1 but 
this <:HU9ta!nly we.s :tmplied 1.n the Yalta ag:ree1n~nts, Tbe 









too, be<HlUO~D h.e f.d.gnefl thf) ag:re,em!'llnts) ·l;ha.t form~r pleclgQ$ 
( Ca1:ro) W<;):t:"G be:i.:n.g blJ()ken., ·ttha:b w;tsdom ( $'ltpposec11:;,r 11ctlng 
on bGha.l.f ,>f Ch:tnat s ultimate well ... be:tng) wns b~:tng aasumecl~ 
that 1.-.ights ( Ohine1.t s in dotel--ntintng her O\Vn fate) wer~ 
bo:tn.g ttau.t"p$d .• 
Nothing :1.n the Ya.lta a.gre~nlEmte Ol" the .Si.:fbseq:Uf->Jt~t 
Sino""Soviet paci; (which :tf~., in t'Qal11~Y\t ainiply tt renff:iJ:~ ... 
raation.; an e~:etens1on, of the Ya:tta, ttga"eern.t~l'lts) dof1.rdtely 
:i.ndicat~~$ tl1.nt 'bh.e1 wore the <~atu.le tor: Ch.:tna :tl'lter goi.ng 
cow..t)/,U.n:tst:te. · 11'hrougi1ou.t the d:tseu.ssJ.o;::us H.oosevelt v;aa 
<;)rl'¥n(:ntt o:r. Chir.w., e.:n(l 8taliJ."l S.tfi~l.:tn and again pledged h:f.a 
suppoX"t fen~ ·hhi~3 gov~n:~nxr.ten'b.. But once more the_ b1:t:rning 
have !'<)r at;an:nn.1ne;, :tn Rpite oi' ·what he said, thti'tt Stalin 
would n<:>t ~.ru~pJ.tH,;rt t;he Oh:lnesG Oowr11u:n:t.sta? His notions 
and wor.-dc~ 1n relation to the PoJ.ish. government, to give 
just one example, should havo g:tven them ar.t ind:tcf.l.t:l.on 
tho.t hf;) wa.a not abandon:I.tlt; th.~ eot1ll1tmiErl:ia thore~ WJ:ry., 
then; wottld he ab((tt:td.on the cmmuunists 1.n Ohi:na:r It can 
be a1~gued1 however, that Sta.lin Pl?Omised to suppos~:b the 
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advantage of hlrJ.daight :ts now por~sible, lt :ts s1;~1ll !'ai:r• 
to sta:te that noosevelt was llrax~ned a.bou:b Hut:{sian, prom:i.r.H~s. 
For inste.nce. just bafo~e the ·~b~lt!l Cor1fe:t."'$llOe, Ge.ne~a.:L 
Dea~:te 1 Ame.rtoan mil:ttar:Y' l"~epresontat:tve lt':t uosoow~ :aent 
a aec.ret cliep~tteh to Waah:tngton :t.n whieh ho sto:ted: n:r;t 
has b(?)e:n. my e%'pe:r:~:tence tht:it .an a.g~eom~nt in pr;bm:tple merxns 
exactly 11o·bh:tng ·to the H1..1.saians, They ure the:t""e:f'or•o gen, ... 
o:t"'ous in giving st,teh ~e;.reemEmts.11 68 Bu:t nooli.HJVEillt t{hos~ 
to tx,ust the nuar.d.ans. 
One th:tng that undoubtedly 11~itrltp$red Roosovelt :tn 
ool~ .. <.H~tly est:lmatj.ng HU(I~~:ta.n. Far lTiast"~x)n ltrt-;ent;:toxu~ was 
tru1.t1 as VloJ~lea statea, 69 
At th-G Oai:ro con:t"aren.ces wHih ~;he Gon~n?alies:J.mo 
and Madatn~~ Chiang Ka.:t ... sheh:, the Presidc~nt had at his 
side no e;;;:port ad:v:tsex• on ll'ar I~s.:St~t'n ~fairs. At 
Yalta (t.lso St.\oh ll<.:lvice was J.n..ek:tng. · It' the J?:ves:tdent 
had h(.tc1. with him e.t thotae tv1o conferencet~ [an] autho:c':t ... 
tativo and keen mind.ed. • • • a:n:pert on J:t~a:r Easte::~Jn 
aff'a:l:.t>s • • • a number of tha defeats in tih.e Oail10 
and. Y7ta.lt;& tagl?aements \?n Asia m1.g~h.t well. havf.l been 
t,Woid.ed. 
assuranCtiHl wl':d.ch dt&tlin he1.d p:r•avtonaly g:tvan to sx~ecif'io 









wa;r~ to lJ.mit Soviet a:::q:H~.ns:ton in the 1lletot~ .£tnd to gail1 
SoviG;t; su:pport for tl:;& Nat:lon.alist <knr~'t'llm~;n'At of Ch:t:ne,~ n70 
Th.iH ili; a f'ai:r~ stf.:lte:raent of Hoos-evelt' s altn~l. Bwt, in:Jpl:led 
~-
v.1serlti~ Hooaevelt Ullderstood th.nt num;,d,a <:Ud ht;\VG ideas 
o1') e.it,~}t:msion :tn th7ts nx~ea., 1fhera ::1·.'£l~ I:H!rtrel"'tt.l st~1.temant.s 
tb.:l?ou~ .•. hout this. stud:t indicating tho.t ltoOEH~vol.t at :J.et~A.st 
partly :t11ecogn12.:od tJt<t> ainw of Ruaai£-t in thi::,~ n.r<~ta ( alt.Jho~.l.gh 
Russian dee:b:•os he:r~}. 1i?ha qu<ilstion than D,gl:l:tn Gt,'J: ... :l.nes~ 
Why did l~oo~ovel·b a.gr\?e t;o tho np:re--ond.:aen:t i:n:tf~l?E~st11 
clause J.t ho Il.:new th:l.s1~ ~J.Iho &l'lsv-rer f.HHiJJ:ns to be_. e.t~ Ch:u1.the:v 
po;!.uto out.lfl that 1\ootH)v'elt t~ambl~<l at Yalt.a a.J."H.l 1ost .• 
Jl\.go.:tn v10 come to the wot"d "hop~,n H.<)os<~velt; hopl{)d. 
have told him, th~:r:>e wras t1o basis !'o;t~ thls hopE>. lloose-velt 
was not :t"Galistic; he '<JaB too .idoal:tst~!.c~. 
70 :U,t.:t:t?l"'ima,n, .22,. sJ:.~•, p~ 3?:3. 
71 Cr'tJ.:ntheJ:>_, Hoooovolt :Ln Hotl"£ .. 5'!l').ect, 11• 356, 
~~~,.~~"f! ~ .. ~~ ~......,.,.. 
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were reaponaiblo for· the Munich a.ffalr, intend to bring 
abot:rb conques·bs by Iiitle:r. Cha.mbel"'lain wanted peace ~bOVf) 
all else, as did 1'1ooseveJ.t. Iloth were acting :tn good faith; 
both were m:tsgu:tded. noosevel.t was willing to g:i.ve Sovi.et 
Russia a role in Ch:tnese af'ta:tvtiJ that it did not have prior 
to the vn:tr~ and China was an ally, not an enenry·. Ho one 
can tell tor sure what Roosv.nrelt mtd stalin ~~ctu.a1J:y meant 
by the words Hpre .. ·eminent intervH:liH1u il'l ManchuX>ia, or what 
th€f~T mean.t regarding tho fate of Inner s.:ad. Outev Mongolia., 
Port Ar'thur, and Da:tren.. P::t~obo.b:ly,. as has boen polnted 
out already; the-y meant cU:f.':f'erant things. We onl~T know 
tht~t they agreed to ce:r-tain thi:nga, r.m.d we ltnow how the r;~e 
things they agreed to turned out,. 'They resulted :tn c:1.. shift 
ot the balance of power in Asia in :t"'avo:t> of HU!ils:la. In 
h:l.s desire to:o peace . .; Hoor~evelt a:ppes.sed. Htt:'llin in the 
l~'J:tr 1~aat (an appeasemum.t that ws.s .:tn the vei'Y n.attu ... e o:r 
the atnbigu.ity Of the terms in. the 11'e,r ;g;as·tez~n. ll.gl?fiEllH011.tS) 1 
just as Ohambel"la:ln (much tn.O:t"e conac:toluilly) appeased n:t tler 
for ·the ~Hil.rne l':'eason, and ·!;;he wor.-d n nppeasedu is the rlght 
wo:t•d.. J:J} Roosevol·!; meant the term 11pre ... ri?rti.inent lnt0rest:;,11 
to mean free tr·ans.1.t of good.s, why was tlds no·t st.s:tted. 1:!-:t 
the agre<;nne:nta 'r If Roo sevel tt in E-tg!t .. eoing t~hat Hu!Hdo.n 
de.si:r•es in Manohur:La should be nunquestlont:tbl;r :f'ulfilled.1 11 
·cool?: this to imply GhillGfiO ccm<~tn:·rence, wJ:.ty w·as this not 
atated in the ~1gttet'1mEmts without ·tho 1'l€H!i{';ing and arnblgulty 
-------
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It; cannot be st;t:J.ted that Y~1.lta was <Urectly ;respon ... 
J 
sihla for the loss of' Gh.:tna to the oorrununists. This :ts - !' 
an oversimpli.t:tea.t:ton. lf the Yalta e.g:t'EH~raents and the 
subsequent S:tno-Smrie·t 11zte!;~.ty had b1:1en carried out aeco:rding 
to the Wt.'\y l'Vestern o.ffia1als interpveted thorn, th.e Nation..;. 
ul:tsts rn,:l££J~t. st:tll oontrol China. ~:ih$ Httas:l.tiuls d:ld not 
honor the Sino ... soviet pact, e.~.nd this is pax•tly how the 
commw::d.ats took over~ 
Bu·b the:t,.-.e is something elr:~e, someth1.ng very v:tta1, 
even tl.K>ugh it :ts ve':i?y it'lt.an.gfble"' :L1he goal Roosevelt sat 
for himself vn1s a worthwl1.:llo o11~, but :tts cost ln r>ela:liion 
to Am<ilr:lea;n guid:tng pvinoiples of :b:"ltOj:"rlH.lilon.al mcl:ttality 
was far ~too grer.rh. Noth~.ng tangible in ·this eonn.ection 
can bo pointed owb, but many imp:ress:tons m1.u:rt. be reco~ded. 
Hoosavol.t declded ma.tters tov anoth(~r CO\lntry and pledge(1 
they would b0 nunquestions.bl-y· f.uJ.f111ed.." ne pl~aed the 
Huasitans in a stronger pord. tim:1 in the Ii'ar li:ast, saem.ing 
to :i.gnore 'l:;hei~ well·ll:nO\'vn aims in th:1.a e.rea. Ho appeared 
m.attor•s w:tth l:tttle~ :1..1' an;h _ .o.d.vioe ;t':t:•om anyone except 
1:.hosa who stated ·that Huos:ta ntttst; enter ·I.Jho war. In all 
o:r this he itppears to have ·tb.ought he was- do:1ng ·the cox~:tleet 





thing. It was just one houx~ befo>?~ ho died when he cabled 
Ghureh1l:L ~ 
I would minimize the CHm~re.l sovi(;)t J?:robliam as much 
as p<>asible becaus~ ·the>se :f)J."()blema1 in onE<~ :t~o:vra Ql,. 
anothal".t seem to arise eve:c>y day an<.i tnost or th®m 
s ·oraighten ou.t. • • • 
We must be i'i:s:•m however, and our co-u:rse thus i'~xt 
is oorract/'12 
Will:trun a. Langdon, fol?ltlerly A:rllerican Consul Gene~al 
at Mukden and Dairen1 in a letter to the New York Ti~ues. ~~_, ...... ,,,. 
Criticism of. our Yalta di~plomaoy will no doubt con ... 
tinUf:) as long aa w:tde conviction is laaldng that there 
were overriding lifa ... am:1-death considerations at the 
t:tme1 fott th.e Chi:nese as well etf.:J ourselves, for bring ... 
:tng Rm~~ia into the Pacific Wav. Jt.tst:t:t?iont:.ton on 
r:tny other grounds, or dei'Gl.1t:H) of, this o:to tlurc coxwes ... 
sion to llussia fo~ JHil.:t'~t:touln:r- re~aons, doe.a I'lot, it 
is bel:teve'h K~prea.d this convlction. Rather, it tends 
to color YaltEi with soph:tstl?y •• • • 
Cla:t.rns that ou1~ negot:tatOl"S put value o!' good faith 
on the Rusaian comraJ .. tments to UL:l a1~e also l~tkely to 
be l ... eee:lved with skept:te1sn1; Q.S it is not ea.sy to- be.,. 
11eve that :rnNaot:tot.tl states1nen were actually eoi.:mting; 
on serupuJ.ous ohse:rvanoe of promises by a Government 
that at that very moment •;;as in the act oi.~ breaking 
i·cs treaty ot neutva.lity with Japan. 
This letter puts the mat·cer a little too s-trongly, 
but 1 t doe a point to the fact that there waa no bt\sis fo:.:-
opt1rnism regal?dins Russia. 
'rhe United states sa:rlotioned. a Husr$1an invasion 
72 ~~uoted in ~J~~.~If XYN (Soptembexo e, 1948) I 90. 




o:r Iifi.anch.uria in order ·to de.fE)a.t Japanese forces there~ 
and Russia deli vel:ved Ma-nchuria to the Chinese Oomm.un~T.st 
troops. Could thiS) Ruasians haV0 tal-ten control of China. 
at:~ quickly if ·the United States had not allowed this :.tn ... 
vasionc! Prol.">abJ.y not, Roosevel t• s h01)(~a, his ganlble, 
were with thJ;) highest stakes. 
'l'he Yalta agreement, u:tldoubtec11y1 mrtst have helped 
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to m1dermine the 1¥tarshal1 mission to China. ten months later. 
Again there :i.s nothin£1) definite to htdica.ta this, but the 
l'act that th.e Nfltionalist Goverr:unen't;; hnd. bean, at lea.at 
by implication, forced into the }U:no ... sov1.ot ~r:reaty by the 
United States and B:t~:ttain muat have dealt at least a lllinor 
blow to tho prestige of the !{uom:tntang group, tll~reby 
wsa1-ten:tng its barga:Ln1ng position. vis.,.a .... v:ts other Chin~se 
polltical fao·~iona ...... namely., ·th@ comw.u.:n.ists. Hegardless 
of tha !'t~ct that th.e Natio:ttalists vrera pleased with the 
treaty, tho fact rema1.ns th.a:b the Un:U;ad States a.nd Hr:Lta.:tn 
pledged tlv1t Ch~.na would coti.Cll.tde th;Ls i.n~eaty IJt:lthout the 
ND.tiona.lists' consent. Also, the Ohiner~o Contmuniats ln ... 
heritec1 in :Ma.n.ohu~ia. a strategic position as a result of 
the miscalculation by hig:;_:t officials in Ame:vica regarding 
Japa:nt s r~t.:t"ength~ And th~ fact that 11t.tsaian tx•oops were 
:1.n Dedren and Port Arthur certainly c11d not lessen, and 
probably stvengthenad, the :tndop~nder1t 1 Xlon ... comp~omis:tng 





















All of ·thls is not to say that ·hhese things would 
not have coma nn"J~tNJty fJV"Gn if such agreements had. not beon 
subscribed to at Ye.tlta. But :tt is to say that; at the 
very least., the m<:nrement toward oommu:nism was not thwarted 
ln. China and :probal;ly was tac1l:t tated by the agroements 
at Yalta, whateva:v thtil- a:tm.s of' Hoosevelt (who was prirm:wlly 










In a study of the Yalta Conf'erence, the question 
of ·the gene:roal philosophy ot" Hoosevel t regarding 1n1:;e:rna-
ticmal a.f'.fa.:t.:rs mu~>t be considered. ~3tates one writeJ.,: l 
The progress of the Un.ited Stateta to this ~.ealiza .... 
tion that fn the interest o:r its own weli'aro and sa ... 
cur:tty it must play a reSJ>onai'ble !"ole :tn world affairs 
is the outs·cand:tng feature of the 12-year pt~esideney 
ot F:roanklin Delano Roosevelt. 
Ilia goaJ. :tn fo:t'eign affairs was to obtain acceptance both 
· n:li home and abroad for the idem. that the security o.f¥ t~he 
wo1.:>ld wa.s dependent on a. world. ord.er based on law.. Con-
·t;inues Bolles! 2 
r.rh.e United States fought the .Ax:ts powers leas to de ... 
t:ltroy fascists and d:f.c:t;ato:t"S than ·bo prevent aggros ... 
siv~:1 countries fron1 end1:u1gering the existence ot this 
cour.rtry. In practim:tl fc>re:tgn policy tho President 
was no·t a mil:t te.nt eru.sad.G:r intent on imposing our 
k:Lnd of demool~acy on states whicJ:1 J.aoked Hi. 'l'hrough-
ou.t ·the wav ••• Hooaevel.t dtH.\lt wlth undomoarutio 
leadOl"S " , • jttstify:tng his t.:t.ctions on the grottnds 
of stra:l:a·)g:lo necessity •••• ;l(~t he often expresaod 
hope for• the spi"ead of democracy •••• 
By his · :3peeches, which seldom stressed the s:imple 
survival theme, H.oosevelt encoul"agetl the country to 
look f.oz• ~H:>me specific gain from the wav in t.ho sanae 
ot a. moral and :l.deo.l:tstic readjustment of world affa~!.);•s. 
• "' • ~eb.e Atlantic Charter :r·n:tsed many hopes of this 
l. Clair Bolles, "Hoosevelt;' s Po reign Policy," l':o:r~.i£~~2 







:n,a:btt~e that subsequent events fa:tled ·bo fulf:t:tl.. , , • 
J:I:la GlO('!t.lent statements o1' d~i>e:p 1nt•et>ost in democrac-y 
li.tnd the mo~al '\70lf!l.l?0 of. 1'\l~::lnld.:nd. set thol:l? ma:!?k upon 
the world. 
Roosevelt, then, above e.ll olsot we:nted twc; thingtH 
tl speec1y ~nd to tl1e W€U' an.d a sys·tem or world govex-nmo:o:t. 
He was unwill:l:ng, according to Wel:les,3 Hto pevm::l.t nny 
intransigency abou.t details to prejudice ·t;he oppo:l?tunity 
'to at·ta:tn ag1~EH~n:tEn:1t~ betw0~n. the two gctVe;~Jnm.<'.m,ts [America 
W1\l H'Ussia] on bt"OS.d.@:t" :T.sSUf::ts.,n flpecif:t.c poli:hit~a,l df~ci ... 
~~:tons thus h.a<.i to 'b~ po:Jtponed ( Ol'l't .r.u:1 was urJually dono 
e.t :rnlta, gloss{Hl ~YvCl<t) lt '\;hey raigh:b illter!'t~re t'fi·th. 1-;ho 
qu.iek e:nding o:t" tho war.. v~rroto WeJ.1t;:ts~4 
TY..~.e ~tgroome~nt$ ~{Q b:t'ttet'ly o.st3a:tled wnulcl 1U:w~> been 
far d:i.fferent ha.d the Pl,.esi<:lont decided in l942 to 
insist \tpon t;he f~:t;~eat:to:n of a Un~tt~H1 1\fat~.onH Oov.no:tl 
cba:rget1 with the <lu1;y o:£ fittd.lng solutions i'Ol"' poli ti~· 
cal and. 't;or:t~i.tc>rial p:c·oblenul: bofore ·chJ) t~nd of the 
war. His ~e.:t'\ts:;ll to do so was in ~1.coord with the 
achr:tce given h1n.~ by h:tn Socl,e·ta:t\y of St~t<!l 1 the Joint 
Chiefs of gtaft, and. by mor!'l:; <.tf' his White Hou,se l!dV:ts"" 
ex~s, am vmll a.s wi'th the v:J;.ows tl:t.on hold by the Prime 
M:tn:tster of' G:t. . aa.t Bl .. i tain. It was a decision d:iotatec1 
by the :P:r'e siclen.t' ~~ oonvi,ctioJl that a.s Comrrlano.e;r .... ;in ... 
Chief hie. parMJ.ount obligation wfis to perm:tt. nothing 
to jaopiJ.z~dJ.ze the wi:n:n.:tng of' the 'fJt..tr., Yet • ., • :!.t 
aeerns fair to say tho.t it wa..s this deoisi<>n that was 
J.ai,.,.gOl"&r ret;ponsi.l;le for the t1:i.vi~1ion of the worlt1. today 
into two :tncreatd.ngly wn.rr:tng crunps .. 
The <lif'f:tculty arises fron1 the ftJ.ct thai;, whether 
3 'vV())lles, ~'Ql.e,r,~. ~;r~ ~ £!,qq~il:1i? P• 10441 
4 wolltH~~ §ev:?!! J~j~ !t~~ ~~ Jl!f.l~l::Z' P~ 14(5. 
-- ------ ------- ---
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decds:tons, tho.t militacy mai;te:t .. s cannot be divorced from 
political. Por in@tanco, h() one<.~ sttvted that. tho I''a:r .mast 
a.g:recments v1ere just mll:ttary daolaions. 11111s, although 
many strictly ·pol:Ltical mattC~:t'*a ·v1erre a5.the:r 1£~lored or 
l ... oached at Yal'tia were an r.:1uoh p6li tical as they vrere miJ.i-
tax•y, mosi; o:f them. even. more so. HooaeveJ..t did not ~3eem 
to be avmre of this. Acoorcling to Welles: 5 
Behin(l it all was the President • s undeJJly:l.ng con .... 
v:totion that for. the sake o.t~ •ffo:t•ld peace, for the tHil.ke 
of i;he future ::Jecurit;y of tho United States itself, 
the one great essential was to secure from the Sov:let 
Union t:he .fi:rm comm.itmont that she would oontinue to 
co-operate with the United States artor the war as a 
par1m<.n:o ~.n oreat:tng and pcn•.feoting .. • • ·the trni ted. 
Nations. ~ •• 
It might be impossible to obi:;a.in the kind of ag:t?eo ... 
mont on eastern 1~ttl"Opo, in ·hho Noa1 .. Bast~ or evan :tn 
+;he F'a:t,. East, that would repreEH91lt one hundred per 
cent or what the President :t•egardod as equ1.tahle or 
desirable, But lf a United Nt.'tt:tons orga:ni~a.t:lon could 
he C:t"~Hlted .. .. .. tha·t would p:r•ovide the beat opportun:i.ty 
later to correct such. in1.qu:j.t:1.es as m:tgb:b rG>:::cist when 
the peace s0·ttlomoni:;a were :e:tre:rt entered into. 
Hoosevolt "i'lO.S a st:t.Pl"Omely oonf:ldant man. but;, as 
Gunther· states, 6 tt overcon.f.id.enoo lod him ln1~o grave pit-
falls on occasion, as stt Yalta. n Hoosavelt th.ought he 
could han.dle Stal:tn. ~ru:3t before he loft; for Yalta, 
:Hoosevelt ·w,as warned how tough Stalin was going to be. 
---------
---------------
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Roo~levelt replied that stalin ought to be warned because 
he 1 Hoos<:welt., was just (!l.S tough. He fe1·t; he could handle 
' 1tha.t old buzzax•d, tt he once sa:td./7 Wl:'ote Eleanot-. Uoosevelt:B 
nF'ra.nklin had h:tgh hopes that at th:ts conference he could 
me.lce real progress :tn strengthening the personal :rela.t:lon-
shipEI between himself' and Marshal Stalin. n Hooaevelt v1a.s 
convinced that stalin hac1 some sort of a u S1Jllpathetic 
quality in his :natu:re.n9 
It was partly these attitudes on the part o:t the 
l):r:•esident that led to h:ts fa1ltt:re at 'Yalta~ He was just 
naive. Nobody, .t~or instance, should have been tooled at 
that time by such Russian promises as were found in the 
.Declaration on Liberated li.;uropa or in •the Fa:r Ea.E3tern a.grae:l-
ments. But Hoosevelt seerned almost hypnotized by his own 
precon.ceived confidence that he could hs.nc1lo the situation, 
that it could not get out of his contt~ol., It is t:rue that 
soon after Yalta he began to_ have a few doubts about his 
success there, Hurl~)Y s·cates that Hoosovel t told hirn that ,_ 
there were 80tne tea.twos oi' ·t:.he agx~eem~nts justifying his 
(Hurleyr s} rears, and he sent Ht.lrley to Moscow in order 
7 ~-- p. 356. 
8 Eleanor Hoosevelt, Thi~l I Hemember (new Yorlc: 
Harper and Brothersl! 1949), P• 33"9",-"' ·' _, __ 
9 Prances Pe:rld.ns, ~ !i95.?.*~.9;V~.l~ 1 ~ {New York: 
The Viking Preas, 1946) ,_ P• 14}~. 
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to discuss these matters with Stalllh Hurley had been 
eapecially Or"itioa.l of the I''a:r lllaste:t"lt asreements, feeling 
that the territol"ia1 intag~1 ty and political independence 
of China had been stwrendo:rec1 by Hoosevelt and Churahi1l.l0 
floosevelt wafJ also di.st~bed over• the l;'J.olish developntents. 
But.; as he showed in t~he cable to Churchill just before 
he died, he t'elt that his course thus f'n:r had hee:n correct, 
and when asked what the Un:L't:;ed states would do if Russ:t.a 
or any other great power repudiated its pledges; he said; 
ui do not think that will b.s.;ppt:m1 but :tf it does, we must 
go ahead anyway ...... alone1 if need be.nll 
The tragedy was .that Stalin took advantage o:f• this 
naivete of Roosevelt to make Hooaeva:tt, in the eyes of 
history, look like til babe in comparison,. Harriman haJJ 
statedl2 that 11 the one grl';)at thing acocnnpl:tahed by our 
constant effo:t""ta dur:tng and s:tnce the war to :reach a. set .. 
tlement with the sov:tet Unlon is that we ho,ve firmly es-
tabl.:tshed our moral pos:t tion befox•e the world. n Bu.t have 
obta . .ined by su.ch questionable deals as the F's.u:~ .m~i\.~~tern 
10 na-en11 Hurley on Yalta: FDH. 'J.lr:tecl to Back Out, 11 
U.• sl!. ~ ~ Yr<?J.:~.£ .~~.?l?;:>.r.t:, xxx (June B9, J.95l) ~ 22 .. 
11 Anne OtHare JvtcCorm:tck in the New York IJ.'imas, 











agreements or 'by simply :prom.:ta:tng things and not s~eing 
that the prominea we~e e:n.:r.oreed (such afJ in l)olnnd and 
eastern Europe)? The:r.a is no evidence that ax17/ oou.rrtry 
thought w·e were any more nm(.n,aJ.n hEH.'1o.U~Hll we made these agree-
ments.. In fact,. H.uss.:ta took it a.s evid.ence of' our '.vealmess. 
On Apr:ll 6, 19451 Ha:t'rim.a.n cabled Waah:tngton1 say1.ng he 
h~id evidence that the continued *' genal."Otts and considerate 
att:ttudGn of th$ Un:Lted states at Yalta was thought by 
tha Jtu.as:tans only ·to be a sign ot weaknesa.l3 . And Ha:r•riman 
told Secretary of State s·tettinius ·~ .• • that Molotov 
• • • confh"'med his impression that since 'Y.'alta, Soviet 
leaders believed they could f'oroa the:txo will on ·the United 
States on any issue. 11 l4 
Hoosevelt' s ne.ivet() (something t;ied up with his 
ideal:tsm, which 'lfdll l;e discussed later on) defeated h:J.ru 
at Yalta. But Hooaevel.t cannot; be blamed ~JOleJ~y for· th:ts 
\ 
state o:r mind, fo:rt it VHU-:t also the state of. m:b1.d ol a ·~;t.a·--
jol:.:t:by of the Amer:tcan people he :l?epresented., Hooaevalt1 
above t.1.11 1 1J'Ir~w a polit:tc:lan, so he w~1s.- 'bu.s:toa11y., a :Col ... 
lower of public op1.n1.on., The people were vtar weary. f1ven. 
if he had wanted to do differently, it is difficult to soe 
how he would have hoen able to keep our forces in being 
111 •• 1 ,,,. J J • 
14 Leahy, .~• £!!!• 1 P• ~331. 
I -- --- --
! 
BX~l!:ttish (>:t't:toial~~ ~ * .~ i:l~.SO'l:Himinfti tht} 131€6 '1))ht"·~~ tne~t"" 
itlg • • , :.1a~,a th$1 ur.M~.o~e.tood. t~om I~ondon thK~.t W~it·eb• 
~tnr.~tf;n v.rtt.t;t ill~:re.w.e;tn~:ly eon.c{<)l:tl!'l;ii)(~ in obt:ain:t~lt~ 'iilft14:cf 
settlotnt;lnts t.b~1t th~ p~OJ.:)ll() ~'fQu.ld at;.pp:Ql.'lt• f#tH1: tJuti; 
t;}:le £1 t'i'~et1<1e~:tt W~l;$ ~)»p~<:rb~t~ to ;~-~~It\~~ tt~tle~;L(J$J'l v.i~W'$1 
~t the coni"iri:t~flinuQ with~ g:Niitt:b vigo:r.l.O 
T1\V~)~(f atap alQOtl$V'~.lt tQo1*"" ... 0V0ll Whflln be_ Witt~ ~(~lNH'11;:Q(S liQ 
tr.d.r~tt;~ tht~t.} w~:t,.s be:Jon<.l h,it:J :~.71e;ht t-o i..\~~ta ·tot wh€-ut h~ 
was ba;i:ng; mr;Hrt P~01iltn~X:li.l'u.o~~e,..."""w~Vll) do a1~.~J.~d to b:t~.:t~~~·t;!; t;hm 
'~if~l? to ttw end. el.S q<td.ckly t-ls poss:tlll(i ... •Ju~t ets the> $l~01~1(~ 
. s.t 'bhe co:r.a!t~~~x~<}e._ ,f.Hl .t;\ l~Hl;)(·•e XteTI'Xl!iHl!Jntat.lv~ of' f.;; ru.>n .... 
:b1£r.1~rn()d pu'blit1, tJJ.' a pt~b:t:t{J i;~no:r·~nt oi.,. tll($! Pli~(rHlH:lrl'b tU1d 
~'JIOt®:~lt:l.al wox~ld ~j:tU4:il.tiGtl1 t~he l';r~td.dl':ltl.t 4't(~tod oor~:x~eatly.­
Butt l>tltbcn.l.J~h. the P~~·H~J.d,$:tlt i l!.l only tho ·~o:Pl"~t~{t.~nt();'t;i,re o:f: 
4;.he :p~opla, 'lJ'ta mt:u~is. taf)t:s:llrile th.~t\t hfJl has t:t. l:J'~,yb·e0:11 g:r'~~P of 
tlv.ll 1naues involV~id tl~an th'iJ J;HjO&>l~ hfll 1~ :t'$Pt"t;)~H·~ntln~~; 
~n.ri~.d ~sill act to:P th~ p~opl~' tJ good• to:~? theit"' gt~~i~t·~$t 
betrt.<.tr.3.t 1.n th~ ltWlQ: wu.n,,, Wa~hirtgto:rl., -.1fJi~fer•sot~, J~:tneoln 
~cted in thi~ v~~~~~· thi:nld,n~:. o:r t;h$' i',~ttW() ~nd not juat 
(>i" 1ihe 1:i:t)f~~l0t'l1) ...... ~.rrltle:tpa.tikl~t :~:nibJJ.o o;p:t:nic.;n to {!I. ctn"'t~in 














instance, during tbe depl.'~l;)Ssion days or in the yea:~s just 
before our ontx-anoe in the warw But at Y~lta he seomed 
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t;o be myopic., not aware o:t' the s:ttu.ntlon as it really wats. 
Why was th1 s? 
Horae reasons frequently g:tven CEUt b~ quicldy d.is-
m5.~lsed., .Hooaevelt was not a communist; ha was not tJ?ying 
to delivov the world to communism. He ~ hfmd:tcapped 
ret~a;r:'d:tng h:ts ad:vir:!ers.. ~1tettin:tus was not a st1->ong Seo• 
1 .. etaey of S.·bate. although he was an honest and accttrate 
rocordel," of the d:tst1uas:i.Qns held at Ylllt~:l.. He was not 
too well ver~H~d in foreign ~:f'aira, and his at'Hlociates 
:.tn gove1.,11ment sorv:l.ce and the :roroign diplomats soon be ... 
came m1are of' th:tr;;. l6 Hopltins was s:tclt during the entire 
eo11ferencc~, l:tn.d even if he had not been, there is no ;t"ea.son 
·to assu.me he lmevt a.ny more about the s1 tuat1,on than did 
Hoosevelt. Th.e absence of Far ~U:o.stom advisers has already 
b0~11 ooti)JJlented upon. 
And then theve :ta Alger H:t ss, E~ rne:mbe:t' of the 
Am.e:t"~ica,n advirsery team us ta State Department expert a.t 
Ynl ta an.d lato~C' convicted of p0r jury in relation to his 

















relating he continuaJ.ly refax~red matters to Hiss for reports 
to be made. But nolivhere in the Yalta. record is any specific 
contribution or Hiss mentioned. WJ..,ote Stettinius: 17 "I 
had always reason to believe that Hiss '-toted honora.l,ly and 
pat~iot:lea.lly in the performance of his duties at these 
conferences. n The role of Hiss at Yalta is d~.sm:tssed by 
Gunther, who stt:ttes18 tha·t Hiss had no power to influence 
HootaeveJ.t. Hoosevelt; had no contact with technical adv:ts ... 
era like Hiss, according to Gunther; he did not move on 
that level. I't; :ts doubtful, .feels Gunt;her, that Hoosevelt 
was aware Hiss was in the san10 room.. Th.t;:ts1 there is no 
direct evidence of Hiss dil. .. eoting 1\)ner~lcan policy towa1,d 
Russin. We do know, h.owev0:r1 th(ilt ltooc~evelt was 11 taken 
intt by Stalin, ·bhat he was not a11vare of ·the Russian. true 
of Hiss, Hiss d:td mal{e recotnlnendations that must have had -· 
some in.t'luenoe on Sta.te Depa.Ptraent thinking, which in turn 
must have vaguely influenced noosevelt, even if he was 
not awe..:re of it, After the conference Hurley made charges 
·that the State Department leaned toward the Chinti:H.H7 Oom-
munist;s and. that ·this was partly the reason for the fall 
of.' the Nationalists. '11hese charges were never proved, 
iolO i " r11 • 'If , •• ,~.It T ): 
17 Stett:i.n:tus, .!?ll• ,g:\.t,. 1 pp .• 207 ... 208 .. 






but they cannot be ignored, lmowing that !Iiss was present. 
Another handicap o;t' Hooaevolt at Y~lta, according 
to me.ny, was his health., It is vory difficult to al'ir:i.ve 
at a. def'ini te conclusion reg~1rding this b<H}ause of the 
sometlmes conflicting reports. But the bullt of the av:tdence 
seems to indicate that noosevelt was not well at Ya.l·ba and 
that thls illness had something to do with th¢1 results there. 
The main detractor ot the opj~n:ton that Roosevelt 
was ill at Yalta and that this thereby afteoted his ability 
to barga:tn to his full capacity is Hoo~1evel t' s pe:r.•sonal 
physio1al'l, Vice-Admiral Ross T. Molnti:re. According to 
Mcintil. ... cHl9 
As ~\ result of malicious and persistent px•opaganda, 
it has come to be accepted as a :r.act that the l:1 l"'Osi ... 
dent was not himr:Hwlf at Yalta~ either physically or 
mentally •••• 
I said then, and I so.y now, that ·these charges were 
• , .. f.also t..md baseless. • • • Never once was ·the:t?e 
a loss of. vigol'.' and cltlrity. 
Wrote Mcint.:tre:20 ttHad he been i dying on his feet• at 
Yalta, r .. as one bound by his proi'oss:tonal oath, could 
not and would not have permitted the P:t .. e£ddent to have 
poured out his energy :tn day and nlght sess;tons, 11 1'he 
d1:>ctor who was with him at his death stated tha·t Hoosevelt 
19 Vica-Admir~ll Hoes ~:. Mcintire, White House 
.P)~il/-t:h9:1.an (New Yo:rk: t1 .. I). l'u:tnamts Sons,-ffiti)";P"rT." 2l6-H1'7, 
20 ~·~ P• 24. 
I 
! 
tvrote his own speech :eor tho prospective San Fl'*anc:tsoo 
Oqp.ference just bafOl"'e he d:ted and that th:ts showet;;l he 
was in full contti1and of his mental powers.2l Wro·tt) the 
President's wife:22 
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When I11!'&1'1kl:tn landed [ar·tor the cm'l.ferenoe] ho seemed 
better. • ., • 
I am su:tte that ~ven at the Yalta conf'erence1 the 
necessity of matching \~ittll against other people stimu. ... 
lated him. and kept him al<n:•t and interested,. :no 1nat ... 
ter how weary ho rrJe:y at times have been-. · 
But there at:H)ma to be 111ucl'l. more evidence to the 
contrary. Jonathan Daniels, an Administrative Assistant 
to the Pr~4':3aident, it1 reviewing Mcintire's book23 wrote 
. that even though he respected Meil'lti:t'e' s opinions and 
believed they were in good fai.th, he waa stlll not con ... 
vj.nct)d of thelr validity.. lle wrote that 
the steady decl;l.ne or Roosevelt t a health was hea:rt'brealt-
ingly apparent to everybody a~ound him .f:rom the infJ.u ... 
en.:aa of December, 1943, until he died.. , • • :r doubt 
tho.t the rumors in the· country • • • were any more 
·widespread ·than the guarded f'_.fa:t1's among h1.s · friends, 
@ontrary 'ho lVJc:Cnt:tre' s v:tewsj the pictuz;es which 
appeared. after Yaltn wax-o not the worst but the best 
p:tctures tal;;en. 
went to the m.eeting uin fast-failing health, weakened :tn 
21 ~-- p. 29. 
22 Eleanor Roosevelt, 2£• Ri~., P• 340. 
2~5 J'ona.t;hen Daniels, 11 As ft\cintlre Hemembe:rs H:l.m, 11 
Sai.;urduy R~v:tew of I..:Lte:r.a.tu:J:")e, XXIX (Deeembe:t.'l 21, 1946), 12. 
f....,l t"•N' 111 .... ~lOll If P\ll:o;i;l •1 IOIIAi ItO!~~~- ''!"""""'-- «..i.if. • ~*•llllff"'i<, f ....,,..,.~,, 
----------
---- ------------
ml.:n.d and body~ u24; "Byrnes, us stated earlier, wtt'{)te tho.t 
Roosevelt had :11. cold wht'3n he left for Yalta an.d i;hat he 
did :not study p:t•epa::t"Od VGpO:J?tS tltt~i~ h~td been prepUi"I1'Hl 'fO:t:> 
: . ()t:: h:lm because of his :.tl.lness.t.:iv 
t:i.onr:lbly, ho was not in 6Sooc1 health,. and thE~ long confaJ.'l,... 
ences ·tlrod h:11n.n (}t'l-.l.t.1e Tv.l:J.y, Roosevelt t s personal sec-
retary, vn'"'ote27 'l~hat Hoosevelt t s daughter Anna ·wanted to 
go with him and Mr$.. Hoosovel·c v1rantad h.ex• to go tCio in 
orde~ to watch his health end be sur~ he toolt it as easy 
e.s possible t.tndor the clenHands of thf.) eonreveneo. Whe:n 
15'1 
he retu:t"nec1~ Miss ~l1ully stated) tt s1.gna of weariness were 
etched deeply in b.is thinning face.n Aeeording to Hurley:28 
l went to th() White Iiotwa (in March~ 1945) , ,. • 
u:nd I went over " .. .. w:t th nty ears bt:HJk end. nxy tef~th 
sltinn.(Hl, to hm:ve a fig'h.t a,bout wht:tt had hetiiln done. 
When. ·the President ;~..,eached up thut fine, f'irrn, strong 
hand r)f l'lim to shalt:e he,nda wlth ;:ne# Wh9.i; I f<n:tn.cl :tn 
ltt'Y hand. w~1s t.\ ver.~y loose br--tg of bones. 
iJ.il:lall ! loolt:ed at h:tm closely, and 'l;;ho aldn seemed 
to be po.s·i::.tHl do\'m on his cheek bones; t\nd you know, 
all the tight tb.at I had :tn me wen·c out. 
26 Harrinuan, O£• ill•, P• 375. 
27 Grace 'rully, !il.D,H. !X Boss (N'ew Yorlc: Ohal~les 
Scrihnei~* s Sons, 1949) » p, '"S54. -
28 11 Gen, Hurley on Ya:lta: PDR ~t1:t~:ted to Baek Out;, a 
u~s, News and Worl.d Henort, XXX {June 291 1951), i-3B. 
-~~~ ...... ~~~
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f, 
It cannot bE;l state<l for n carta:tnt~;r, .of' ccnl!.t>Se 1 
tc> what e:J<'be:n.t his health. c-lf.fo<~·ted the decisions reachGd 
at Yalta, l)ut• some of the ord:tna.rily f.tt:r)ong sur>por•'l:w:~:ts 
of Hoosevel't; beJ.ieve that it did. James A. lrarley., . .for 
many years an influt>nt:tal mru.1 in ·bhe Damoc:r'atie Party $;lnd 
dafln:t'tely PlH.I•Hoosev~lt up to 1940, w~ote:29 
Ill, o1.:tr evaluation of Pveaid.¢nt Hoosevelt, Cordell 
[Hul]J and I agreed that he v1as a ulck man at Yalta 
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und sh.ould not; have bef.1n called u·oo11. to make decisions 
at:rect::t.ng th:ta countx•y and ·bhe w·oi?ld. Physical illness~ 
we lmev111 taxed. his mind attd left h:tm. in no shape to 
bargain w:tth such hard bar-gainers as the Hussians. ., • • 
Had he not been physically and me:r:ttally tir•ed at 
TehQratl. ttrtd Yalta,. and at home, and had .t<\nterica had 
a nwre vigorous voice in int~rnat:tonal a1'!'a:t~:-a 1 states-
men of' the world &.re ag:t.,.t:H:n:t almost w:tth<.n.rb exception 
that mar.r:r of the troubloa ne.%ing the \'it(}rld today would 
not h<:l1.:ve arls€m .• 
And Sherwood wrote~30 
!t :ta my belief tb.at Hoosevelt would not have agreed 
to th.a.t f~l.nal :Cit"tll conun5:bmant ~afer:r. .. i:ng ·bo tho rmques .... 
·tionable f'ulf'illmen·t of Russian desi:r•es in Nanchuria 
had :Ui not boen that tiha Yal.t~ Conference was alwHJt 
at an e:nd and he was tired e.nd. anxious ·to avoid furthea-> 
ar•gument. 
·It soero.s i"atr ·to conclude ·!ihtJ.t Rooaev.alt~ wus not 
hia d0eislons in Pl"Oblematica.l, but that it d.id to eome 
degree seems certain., 












However, the main rf.Hason for Roosevelt• s inability 
to see things as ·they were was a re::n.tl t of h:'i.s general 
attitude1 his ph1.losoph.y; when he crone to the eonf'erenco. 
159 
Hoose.rveltJ in all of his d(:)a.lings a:b Yalta,- acted 
:tn good faith; he had what he thought were the best irl.ter-
eHrbs of h;ts own count;r~r and. the v1orld in mind. He wm1ted. 
a good and pee.cef'ul worJ,\11 ~d he Jl<fl?Od that Stalin did 
also. He wa.nt&d Stalin 'tiO be given a. chance to show that 
he wanted world peace by being as fair ·bo him. as possi'ble. 
Hoosevelt wanted to make it clear that he :tnsisted on a 
pea.eei\tl world. based on tolerance or others, freedom e.ncl 
,iul:ltlce, and increased economic welJ . ..,.be:l.ng :eor all people. 
He wanted to ma.J.re sure that the world realized that th.e 
United States did not cov~t ·any pcu"t of any ne;bion. 
All deoent people, of oou~sa, would agree to suoh 
:i.clerl.list:tc ::Hmt:tmenta 11 but we are (and we~e then) in a. 
vtOl"ld that is not idealistlo, ancl befo:t?e ideaJ.isnl (however 
raueh we dislike to) we nmat put J;*e9.1iam, ( 1J.lhe:t~e is nothing 
idealistic about a. W€Ar, and Hoosevelt vvaa :tn tho midst 
of one v;he.n he rmt forth these ldea.s.,) It was :Hoosevelt;* s 
rnain aim at Yalta to get the war over as quicldy as possible 
with \"the least possible loss of Allied l:i.fe. lie was ·will ... 
:.tng to agree to many things he mi.g1Tti not have ot.herw:tse 
agl"eed to :1n ordt:;r to obtain this quick peace, Most or 











'.I'hey wanted to get th.ei:r boys home. H01.1seva1t {nnd the 
peopl~) were not w:tll:tng to consider the scope of the 
postwar Pl"oblems. 
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Roosevelt hoped to solve futu:x~e v;orl.d problems, 
wh~::.l.tover they m:lgh.t be, through th.e proposed United l~~:tt:'l.ons, 
but he ignored in th:i.a connection tho realistic situation 
at the time, the po~dtions · an.d potential por:.~itions of. soviet 
armies in 1~urope and. later in Asia. At Yalta everything ... 
was l~tt to the ngood willn or nussis.; and at what time 
did HooseveJ.t arrive at a definlte oo:noluslon that Httsaia 
!!a?, any "good willn? Not, c~r.t,.t&inly, ~.n the ll'innish W~t· 
or in the Russo .... (lerman ];"1act of 1940 • Only when Germany 
at·backed Huss:La dld Huss:1.a tight. 'llhe Soviets wer€1 our 
ally simply because there 1.vas a common enemy. ~t'he facts 
n1 .. e 'tL~nista.kable., Roosovelt .UQl>~<~ that Russia would see 
·that the West htld no hostile des1.gn.s regarding Hussia, 
would sea that cooperation and ngood willu were to tho 
advantage of the Soviets as well as the r•est of the world/• a, 
l 
\ 
Hoor:~evelt hQped that HtM,~~Ila, as well as th.e Wes·b, was tirrd 
of wa:p,. ( 
Bu'{; this is only an idealist:tc, not a :reJ;ionul:ts:tic, ·\ 
approach. A :realist would have r•emembered. tho bloody rovo-
l.ution :tn Hussia, ·the Soviet; slaughter of tho undesirables, 
the Purge Trials, and so forth. Ire would hi;l.V'e seen that 
so1md d:lplomacy rests n.ol~ on e. hope or ~l h.unch hut on a. 
-- -- ---- - -----
-- -- ----
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realistic appra.1oa1 of the cu:L ... Ve:ut s:ttuation based upon 
the facts ot' the past. If history 1neans anyth:lng 11 :i.t meana 
we must study the past ·bo plan for the future, HE'!lre, this 
was not done. The past was ignored, t:tnd the f'u.ture Wt1.S J 
1:.l.oped :ro~. 
~Phere was probabJ.y VEH"'Y l:t ttle tha:h was ag:r-eed to 
at Yalta thhl.t B.ttssi(\\ could not have taken an"J'•;ay :it :tt had 
re(;l.J,ly want~d it, given the temper ot the Wes·tern worltl 
a·b ·the time. It iril :b:l this connact:lon that the cont~i'Y.'-1el"'SY 
enters eonco:t?ning whether Btt.a11.n h~H.:1 ovorythin€~ ph.tmlod 
in advance and would have taken these th:tngs tmyway or 
wheth{i)r he was just an oppm .... ·tm'l:.i.s·t and tool{ advantage of 
every 11 slip" Roosevelt ( t::tnd Church:lll) made. r. Deutscher 
:tn h1.s biogJ:--aphy of Sta.l1.n states thf.:rb s·t:;a.11n' a foJ?eign 
policy appears not ·t;o have beetl t;he l"'(H'lUl t of any p:rtocon.-
ce:tved ple.n but tho rasulta.JTI.i of contr-adictory domestic 
and foreie:n preasUl."EHJ'-' lilo:r~ instance~ :J.f Stalin cona:tstently 
revolution in oaetex"n Germany, wb:'f did he detach from 
Gex'!nany 1,;md :tncol"l::>OJ:'ato :tn Foland t'l.ll Gel"l:nan p:r. .. ovlnces 
east ot tho HeitH~e and Ocler H.tvel"S.,..-l~and ·t;ha Pol.e::t had 
not even dreumoc:t of. ll.av:ti1g'r 
.. ,._ -"" -----··-,::=-- _-.....:_~ 
----- --
tlu~n for him to hRve baoome an opportunist some·bhing had 
·to have been ugivonn hin1 at -:\~alta anc1 elsewhere (or had 
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to :have been perm:t tted by Weste:t•n werumess and indeo:tsiol'l); 
there:ro;ro, evary'bhing that Htal:1n explicitly obtained. (or 
was 11 allowedn to obt~1i:n bJI' defa.uJ. t) by the Ya:t iHa. Oo1'lf erence 
contr:tbuted to all of' our presen:t; ... day troubles. :.t:e thi.s 
).. .. ~ the case~ th$ Yalta ag:~:~eernenta ure a baa:tc causa of the 
present un:ra~st. If 1 on th.e other hand, StaJ~1.n planned. 
to talr:e these lands anyway ( s.s, in :real:tty1 he vj,rtttally 
did, fo:t .. he has lived up to the YaJ.;ta;L a:g:ll'oemm'ltS only when 
the agreements. expl.ici tl-y gave the Huss:lans direct oo:ntx>ol 
ot an a:t .. ea) ~ th0~3e ag:t.~eemetlts were• in a.otual:tty, ha.:t")dJ.y 
worth ·bhe paper they wa1 .. e written on a:x:eept to show to 
the world tha.t Russia wae not living up to its agreements. 
rmt even this is hardly a pos:tt:tve value because the rant 
of the world can e.lso a.0e that America has not stood tlp 
i:o:r:- the principles :U; .says 1 t stands for,. Wha:b m1.:u.:rt the 
world ·think <>t tho Weet allowing Pole.nd1 ozechoalova\t:ta,ll 
tyranny when ·the West pledged at Yalta that these countries 
would be :rree ~:md independent? Oerta:tnly it is Husa:ta t s 
fa:ult that the benian Yalta agreemeniH:~ were not OS.l'\r:led. 
out, But would. it not; have been' be·ttel?; in. rea.list:to terms, 
if the United States ha.d not agreed to these hopeful Pl'?O,.. 








carried out1 Wal te1~ Lippmtwn once w:ro·bo that Ame:t."'ica.n 
:tora:l.,gn policy has alvn.tys $.ttenrpt€.Hl moro :tn pea.cet:i.me di ... 
plcanai)Y tha:rl it has been vd.ll:tng to enforce i.f. things did 
not go smocrthlj • This seems to be p:t"oved here .•. 
It cannot be statec1 .i'or st.:tre whe'l:;hor all of Stalin• s 
actions ware planned in advance o:r ncrt'i.. nut regardless 
of wh:lch 'W&.s the caae • Hooaevelt sltould. not; have mr:~ile an,yl,·., 
agreemonts at ·ya,J.ta that he was unable to carry out. He 
had no rena on to trust Btalin 1n any of thasQ ag:t?eements. 
HE~ should have learned trom M'l..Ul.ioh nove.t' aga:tn to compromise 
un·t1l he was ~ure with whom he \JI£.:ts corftp:tlorn:i.s:tng. In this 
connect:ton there :ts a paraclo:x: that 113 vary evident~ It 
is usuaJ_l:y the idealists (who hope for the best J.:H:)ss:lble 
worJ...<l in the f'utu~e) who a~e most :t~eady to oompl ... omise with 
thetir principles to hring tl .a\!t~:2!:! peace, thex~eby putt:tng 
that u1dealist1o11 world oven .t'liwther :l':nto the futul ... o., 
We now llave tho help of hindsight; this :t~1 true~ 
Bu·IJ thG woJ: .. th1.ness o£ :r.>espons:tblo peopl$ must l:to :tn tho 
good they t.woom.plJ.ah, not in tho good they hope for. ~?h:la, 
although nofj :i.dt)alis'tic., .*-... ~ realistic. Many peoplo hope 
!'o:t? a better v:rol,.ld but do nothing to b.olp bl ... :t:n.e it about. 














a fillse, l->~ule:less opt1m.:L$rn that made :a t:r~agio ta:tlu:!:le ot• ) 
the vrell .... luoan:.tng attetnptali ot aoosGvel t a:b pe:t~manent world 
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